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ABSTRACT

A MATTER OF SIZE: EXAMINING REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIVENESS IN
STATE LEGISLATURES AND CITY COUNCILS

Benjamin Bingle, PhD
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Scot Schraufnagel, Director
Representation and legislative responsiveness are vital components of a functional
democracy. In representative democracies legislators are elected to stand for, and act on
behalf of, the citizenry. Although fundamental to the effectiveness of America's political
system, both representation and responsiveness can be influenced by external factors such as
legislature and constituency size.
What follows is an exploration of representation and responsiveness in American
states and cities through the lens of legislature and constituency size. All 50 states are
included in the analyses as well as cities with populations of at least 100,000 people as of the
2010 decennial census.
The research argues that legislature size matters in three distinct ways: 1) descriptive
representation, 2) education outcomes, and 3) socioeconomic realities. Evidence presented
here suggests larger legislatures are linked with improved descriptive representation for
certain marginalized population groups at both units of analysis. In terms of responsiveness,
larger constituencies are associated with a greater percentage of citizens who did not graduate
high school and are positively related to the percentage of the public living in poverty. This is
true at state and city levels.

A theory of legislature size is presented in the conclusion to help explain the empirical
results. This theory posits that a larger legislature—relative to the population it is charged
with representing—will be more demographically congruent than a relatively smaller
assembly, on average. Improved descriptive representation results in a transition from passive
to active representation (i.e., standing for versus acting for). It is through substantive
representation that legislators become responsive to constituent demands and broader societal
needs. Legislative responsiveness—in the form of agenda setting, policy creation, and
targeted spending—contributes to improved societal outcomes, the final stage of this
theoretical model.
In sum, this dissertation suggests that racial minorities and women are
underrepresented by state legislatures and city councils. Furthermore, larger legislatures are
more descriptively representative than their smaller counterparts, especially among nonWhites and Latino/as. Plus, as constituencies grow, better education outcomes suffer and
poverty rates increase, on average. The totality of the findings indicate that real implications
emerge when political constituencies grow too large.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Political representation means “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner
responsive to them” (Pitkin 1967, 209).

This project explores the relationship between the size of legislative institutions and
their representation of and responsiveness to the citizenry. At the core of this research is the
notion that fewer constituents per legislator yields a better representational experience.
Commonly researched areas such as representational congruence (Erikson 1978; Eulau and
Karps 1977; Miller and Stokes 1963), demographic similarity between legislators and citizens
(Casellas 2009; Forest 2005; Ladewig 2005; Schraufnagel and Halperin 2006), the
representative-constituent relationship (Davidson 1969) and legislative responsiveness
(Muzzio and Tompkins 1989) could all improve with smaller constituencies, on average.
Clearly, this is a bold normative claim, yet the findings uncovered here suggest the time has
come to re-evaluate the role of size in United States representative democracy.

Size and Democracy
While debates related to the appropriate size of a political unit can be traced back at
least as far as ancient Greece, the most thorough and systematic investigation took place just
over 40 years ago. In Size and Democracy, Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte (1973) take the
study of scale to a level unmatched by other political scientists before or since. Central to
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Dahl and Tufte’s book is their definition of the ideal polity, which satisfies at least two
conditions: citizen effectiveness and system capacity. By citizen effectiveness, they mean
“citizens acting responsibly and competently [can then] fully control the decisions of the
polity” (20). By system capacity, the authors mean “the polity1 has the capacity to respond
fully to the collective preferences of its citizens” (20). Stated differently, participation by
citizens (i.e., citizen effectiveness) and responsiveness (i.e., system capacity) are vital
elements of a well-functioning government. The authors explore the tensions and tradeoffs
related to these two criteria throughout much of the book. They elaborate on two sources of
conflict between these competing goals:
First, the effectiveness of the citizen who is in concord with the preponderant majority
of other citizens in his unit may well be maximized, as Rousseau thought, when the
unit is small and homogeneous. The politics of homogeneity serve this citizen best.
Yet in such a unit the effectiveness of the dissenting citizen is minimized by his
difficulty in finding an ally, and by the weakness of political competition. The politics
of diversity in the larger, more heterogeneous unit may serve the dissenting citizen
best. And yet the same citizen may sometimes be in concord, sometimes in dissent. . . .
Second, and more important, the goal of maximizing citizen effectiveness on matters
that are highly important to him can and does conflict with the effort to maximize the
capacity of the system (and hence ultimately, though in a different sense, the citizen’s
effectiveness) for dealing with these matters. (Dahl and Tufte 1973, 138)
The authors conclude by noting, “No single type or size of unit is optimal for achieving the
twin goals of citizen effectiveness and system capacity…Democratic goals conflict, and no
single unit or kind of unit can best serve these goals” (138).
Though a classic, this elusive conclusion is often critiqued by scholars looking for
more definitive answers about size and democracy. Another criticism is the lack of empirical
evidence present in this largely normative theoretical contribution. Indeed, the authors put
1

When using the term “polity,” Dahl and Tufte are referring to the government. This differs from some
contemporary accounts which use the term to describe the citizenry (i.e., the people, the masses).
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forth testable propositions throughout the book but rarely investigate the points they pose. It is
important to note that Dahl and Tufte realize their work is abstract. In fact, they call for a
more adequate theory near the end of the book. While the effort at hand does not attempt to
construct a grand explanation to solve the dilemma of size and democracy once and for all,
this research does rely on two themes central to Dahl and Tufte’s work: representation and
responsiveness.

Representation and Responsiveness
Individual citizens do not directly decide on legislation at the federal or state level in
the United States; instead, individuals select those who determine policy on their behalf
(Rosenthal 2008). This is the cornerstone of representative democracy. While instances of
direct democracy exist (e.g., New England town hall meetings), representative democracy is
most typical even at a local level in the contemporary United States political landscape
(Rosenthal 2008). Responsiveness is a component of representation (Dahl 1971). It occurs
when elected officials acknowledge the preferences of individual citizens and act according to
those collective inclinations. Before moving too far ahead, let us take a step back to view
representation and responsiveness broadly.
As democracy took shape in the United States, the Great Compromise laid the
foundation for a bicameral legislature2 with equal representation3 among states in the Senate

2

See Frances Lee (2011) for more on bicameral representation.
For more on representation, see: Bafumi and Herron 2010; Balinski and Young 1978; Cameron, Epstein, and
O’Halloran 1996; Canon 1999a, 1999b; Ellis 2013; Erikson 1978; Fenno 1977, 1978, 1996, 2003, 2007, 2013;
Fiorina 1997; Frederick 2010; Froman 1963; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1998; Jones 1961; Juenke and Preuhs
2012; Lee and Oppenheimer 1999; Mansbridge 2003; Miller and Stokes 1963; Minta 2011; Schraufnagel and
Halperin 2006; Snowiss 1966; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Weissberg 1978.
3
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and representation based on population in the House of Representatives (Fenno 1982; Yale
Law School n.d.). Yet the governance of those elected never fully embodies the political
wishes of the electorate (Burden 2004). This comes as little surprise due partly to the diverse
opinions, viewpoints, and demographic characteristics that exist in mass electorates.
Complicating matters is the notion that one of the central traits of a democracy is the extent to
which citizen preferences are given equal value in the decision-making process (Dahl 1956).
To be sure, the basic dilemma of how elected legislators should represent constituents has
been a challenging puzzle for centuries.
The role of legislators as either trustees or delegates is an enduring consideration for
understanding representation. Edmund Burke (1774) is often credited with creating both the
trustee and the delegate models of representation. As a core dilemma of the representational
experience in the United States, it has received plenty of scholarly attention since Burke’s
contentions were first leveled in the late 18th century. John Stewart Mill (1861) critiqued
delegate representation by colorfully arguing, “One whose desires and impulses are not his
own has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character” (622).4 In addition, the
inconsistency of attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies among mass publics (Converse 1964; Key
1961; Lippmann 1922) leads some to suggest the citizenry speak in “meaningless tongues”
(Riker 1982, 239),5 which creates challenges for the delegate model. To clarify, if the public
does not necessarily know what they want or their preferences regularly shift depending on
what issues are top-of-mind (Zaller 1992), how can an elected official effectively serve as a
4

Bryan Caplan (2008) argues that democracy fails specifically because it enacts the public’s preferences.
Others defend public opinion as important for democracy (Gallup 1944) and argue for the stability and
meaningfulness of collective preferences (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2001; Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller
and Feldman 1992).
5
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delegate with their best “interests” as priorities? The act of representation is further
complicated when considering the different ways by which the public are represented (i.e.,
following Hannah Pitkin [1967], formalistic, descriptive, symbolical, and substantive), that
legislators are most responsive to their re-election constituencies (Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1974),
and that race and ethnicity6 are potentially important dynamics (Canon 1999b; Tate 2001,
2004).
Another fundamental dynamic for representation is that democratically elected
officials must face the twin tasks of representing and governing those who vote them into
office (Polsby 1968; Shepsle 1988), and through this process, the electorate develops
expectations of their representatives (Grant and Rudolph 2004; Griffin and Flavin 2007).
Indeed, at a normative level, those elected to create public policy ought to be responsive7 to
the public’s expectations. Dahl notes that “a key characteristic of democracy is the continuing
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political
equals” (Dahl 1971, 1). This was addressed famously by Pitkin’s (1967) seminal work which
finds legislator responsiveness to constituents is foundational to the concept of representation.
This type of responsiveness can come in a variety of forms (Eulau and Karps 1977).
Legislators may represent constituent policy concerns (Miller and Stokes 1963), chase porkbarrel projects for the district (Chen 2010; Ferejohn 1974; Fiorina 1977b; Lazarus 2010),
offer casework services (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Hibbing 1991; Johannes 1983;
6

Interestingly, Scott Clifford (2012) suggests that Latinos and African-Americans are more ideologically distant
from their representatives than are Caucasians, yet no evidence is found to suggest representatives place greater
value on the views of Caucasians. Clifford notes the contradiction may result from the fact that minorities
typically live in ideologically diverse districts.
7
James Stimson, Michael Mackuen, and Robert Erikson (1995) find evidence suggesting that the federal
government as a whole —including Congress—is responsive to public opinion, resulting in a concept they term
“dynamic representation” (543).

6
Johannes and McAdams 1981), or generally carry themselves in a way that fosters the
district’s trust in their abilities (Fenno 1978).
Related to this is the notion of a representative-constituent relationship (Davidson
1969; Kingdon 1969; Mayhew 1974; Miller and Stokes 1963; Parker and Davidson 1979;
Squire and Moncrief 2009; Turner 1970). Richard Fenno finds that members of Congress
perceive “four concentric constituencies: geographic, re-election, primary, and personal,” and
representatives act strategically toward each group (1978, 27). The savvy representative
continuously nurtures relationships with each constituency if remaining in office is the goal.
Considering ever-present electoral pressures, members of Congress “feel more accountable to
some constituents than to others because the support of some constituents is more important
to them than the support of others” (Fenno 1978, 234). The steps taken in representing
constituents, Fenno argues, cannot be differentiated from the process of election.8 This
symbiotic relationship between representation and elections is rooted in accountability;
without being held accountable by the electorate, members of Congress lack incentive to act
in the public’s best interest (Abramowitz and Segal 1992).9
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Jane Mansbridge suggests representation occurs by others outside of one’s legislative district. “Surrogate
representation is representation by a representative with whom one has no electoral relationship—that is, a
representative in another district” (Mansbridge 2003, 522). Put another way, some issues do not conform to
geographic boundaries, which means they do not align with territory-based notions of representation.
Mansbridge uses Barry Frank, a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives, as an example. Frank is
openly homosexual and while in office he purposefully spoke for gay interests far beyond the state of
Massachusetts, which he represented territorially. Mansbridge claims that surrogate representation can
encapsulate issues that may be left out under rigid territorial representation.
9
David Kimball and Samuel Patterson (1997) argue that constituent evaluations of members of Congress are
based on the difference between their expectations and perceptions. They note, “Citizens appear to make
comparisons between what they expect their elected representatives to be like, and what they perceive these
representatives actually are like” (1997, 722). It must be noted that this is by no means the only possible
explanation of how citizens evaluate—and ultimately hold accountable via the ballot box—legislators.
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Outline of the Dissertation
To summarize at this point: representation hinges on responsiveness, comes in a
variety of forms, and demands a sense of accountability to constituents. Since these duties of
representation typically fall to the legislative branch (Schraufnagel 2011), two unique types of
legislative institutions serve as the lens through which representation and responsiveness are
explored: state legislatures and city councils. The decision to explore these phenomena at the
sub-national level is primarily due to the abundance of existing scholarship that has taken
place at the national level. Furthermore, methodologically, the sub-national units of analysis
provide an ample number of cases for cross-sectional exploration.
What follows is a systematic exploration of representation and responsiveness in
American states and cities in 2010 through the lens of legislature size. The contemporary
focus aligns with the most recent decennial census. Although every American state is
included in the analysis, only those cities with populations of at least 100,000 people are
explored. Introducing this minimum threshold still allows for substantial variation in terms of
population range while yielding a sample that does not mix cases that are so distinct that
comparisons are not appropriate. Through a contemporary, sub-national lens this dissertation
seeks to build on prior literature by summarizing its major components to create a series of
hypotheses to empirically assess the implications of legislature size on representation and
responsiveness. Following are the primary research questions:
1.

How demographically congruent are state legislatures—and city councils—

with their constituencies?
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2.

Is the size of legislatures associated with the demographic gap between state

legislatures—and city councils—and their constituencies?
3.

Does the size of state legislatures—and city councils—correspond with

educational outcomes?
4.

Does the size of state legislatures—and city councils—associate with

socioeconomic outcomes?
Each of the empirical chapters that follow answers one of these research questions in
this attempt to better understand the relationship between legislature size and representation
or responsiveness. Taken individually, each chapter tells part of the story through either a
unique descriptive analysis or an inferential test. When viewed collectively, it is hoped that
the chapters will provide a more nuanced and complete story of representation and legislative
responsiveness in contemporary America society.
Chapter Two suggests that size matters. This chapter reviews significant theoretical
arguments about population size and draws on the work of some of the earliest political
philosophers. Since scholarship on population size is not exclusive to political science, the
focus shifts slightly to provide a multidisciplinary perspective on the size of populations.
Valuable context is afforded by exploring size beyond the disciplinary bounds of political
science. In the end, much of the scholarship from fields like anthropology, sociology, and
economics aligns with the views of Plato and Aristotle: smaller populations are preferred.
Next, the size of legislatures is considered. For the most part, existing research consists of
normative arguments touting the need for larger legislative institutions or wary declarations of
the economic drawbacks associated with larger groups, generally, and larger legislatures
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specifically. It is vital to include scholarship on both the size of populations and legislatures.
Changes in either variable shifts the relative balance of constituency size with potential
implications for quality governance. To clarify, an increase in population effectively increases
the number of constituents per representative if the number of legislative seats remains static.
Conversely, an increase in legislature size decreases the constituent per representative ratio if
there is no change in population. This may be obvious to some, yet it warrants mention.
Moreover, eschewing a singular focus in Chapter Two adequately sets up the analyses that
follow in the empirical portion of this dissertation.
Chapter Three focuses on representations. Specifically, descriptive representation,
which is the extent to which representatives demographically mirror those they represent.
While demographic similarity in no way guarantees the tenets of democratic representation
will be upheld, it does suggest notions of diversity, openness, accessibility, and equality.
Passive and active representation are discussed along with previous research on demographic
congruence. Following this is a descriptive portrayal of the non-White population at-large and
among elected representatives in legislatures at the state and city levels. The resulting
demographic “gap” is depicted to chart the landscape of descriptive representation in
America. Next, the gaps are explored for specific population groups: African-Americans,
Latino/as, and females.
Chapter Four empirically explores the relationship between legislature size and the
demographic gap. Is there an association between the size of legislative institutions and their
descriptive representativeness? In theory a larger legislature ought to be more heterogeneous
than a relatively smaller legislature, on average. Accordingly, more legislative seats should
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correlate with a smaller representation gap. On the other hand, more constituents per
representative (i.e., smaller legislature relative to population) should correlate with a larger
demographic gap. Empirically, some scholars identify a positive association between larger
legislature size and enhanced descriptive representation (Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah 2010;
Trounstine and Valdini 2008) while others remain skeptical (Alozie and Manganaro 1993;
Casellas 2009). Much like previous work on the subject, the results in Chapter Four are not
straightforward or simple; however, it does appear that larger legislatures correspond with
better descriptive representation for non-White and Latino/a populations.
Chapters Five and Six explore the societal costs associated with smaller legislatures.
At this point, the focus shifts noticeably from representation to responsiveness. The term
responsiveness is used to describe the capacity of a legislative body to improve the overall
conditions in their political jurisdictions. This is similar to Dahl and Tufte’s use of “system
capacity” (1973, 20) to describe a government’s ability to respond to the citizenry’s collective
preferences. Acknowledged here are demands or stressors that are placed on the political
system. These are operationalized via two fundamental public policy arenas: education and
poverty. In theory, a larger legislature has more capacity to respond to the stressors bearing
down on their districts than do smaller legislatures. This ought to result in improved overall
conditions, an assumption that is tested empirically.
More specifically, Chapter Five assesses the link between the size of constituency for
state representatives and city councilmembers and the percentage of the population over the
age of 25 without a high school diploma. Like the rest of the study, the American states and
the 274 American cities with populations of 100,000 or more as of the 2010 census serve as
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the testing grounds. Even after controlling for important factors, the multivariate tests suggest
that larger constituencies correspond with fewer high school graduates, on average, at both
units of analysis.
Chapter Six substitutes poverty rates in place of the education measure. The same
units of analysis are used once again to understand the relationship between constituency size
and the percentage of the population that lives below the federally established poverty line.
The models included in Chapter Six indicate that larger political constituencies are associated
with higher poverty rates, all else being equal. This is true in both American states and cities
and the relationship remains in place after conducting alternative model runs.
Chapter Seven summarizes the main findings uncovered here and puts forth a theory
of legislature size. This theory posits that a larger legislature, relative to the population it is
charged with representing, will be more demographically congruent than a relatively smaller
assembly on average. Improved descriptive representation results in a transition from passive
to active representation and it is through this substantive representation that legislators
become responsive to constituent demands and broader societal needs. Legislative
responsiveness—in the form of agenda setting, policy creation, and targeted spending—
contributes to improved societal outcomes, the end result of this theoretical framework. In the
end, this chapter reiterates the notion that larger legislatures are more representative and
responsive than smaller assemblies. Basically, the size of legislatures and populations does
indeed matter.
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Contemporary Relevance
This research offers a timely counterpoint to the seemingly ever-present cries for
smaller government and reduced legislature size. Consider the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives. On May 5, 2015, state representatives approved bills to allow citizens the
opportunity to cast votes to reduce the size of the legislature (Rourke 2015). With the second
largest state assembly in the United States, Pennsylvanians have a case for shrinking their
legislature. The reduction calls for the lower chamber to decrease by 52 members and the
upper chamber to shed 13 members. These changes are expected to save at least $8 million in
salaries, benefits, travel and lodging (Rourke 2015). This has been debated for some time in
Pennsylvania, with a prominent media outlet lending its support to the size reduction “in the
name of savings, efficiency and public confidence” (PennLive Editorial Board 2014).
Pennsylvania is not alone. In 2011, legislation to change the size of state assemblies
was introduced in 12 states (National Conference of State Legislatures 2007), and since 1960,
there have been 15 instances where the number of seats in a state legislature has been reduced
(Squire and Hamm 2005). These downward shifts often gain support from concerned citizens,
like William Schaffer (2015) in Minnesota:
We have to cut the size of our Legislature. With 134 representatives and 67 senators,
we have the largest legislature in the United States per capita, representing 5.3 million
people per our census. No longer are we in the horse-and-buggy days. It's time to
amend the state Constitution. The political party that takes the initiative to reduce our
Legislature will be well rewarded…It costs the taxpayer $67,075 for a representative,
and $69,773 for a senator on average with salary, per-diem pay and other expenses for
a 142-day session. Now we have an effort to raise 30 commissioners salaries by as
much as $35,000, and the poor working person is getting a raise of 2 percent on
average. (Schaffer 2015, n.p.)
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With respect, Mr. Schaffer has overestimated the situation in Minnesota. Legislators there
represent 26,388 constituents each, on average, which is the 21st smallest constituency size.
Minnesota is on the larger end of the spectrum but is far from the “largest legislature in the
United States per capita.” With this point of contention aside, the economic argument is
typically what appeals to those dedicated citizens who long for smaller government and
balanced budgets. Often overlooked, however, is the potential for representation and
responsiveness to decline along with the number of legislative seats. It is relatively easy to
point to salaries, travel expenditures, and per diem while bemoaning large legislatures. It is
harder to operationalize how representation and responsiveness are influenced by legislature
size. After all—returning to the scenario in Pennsylvania—if voters agree to shrink assembly
size, the typical constituency in Pennsylvania would expand by 20,500 citizens almost
overnight. Surely a change like that carries some implications, right? This research attempts to
understand legislature size beyond the editorial column of the local newspaper.
In the end, this dissertation helps fill the void of research which focuses on legislature
size at the sub-national level. Including city councils alongside state legislatures not only
allows for comparative findings to emerge but also provides additional evidence in support of
the empirical claims. This work contributes to the collective understanding of democratic
institutions and ideals such as representation and responsiveness. All told, the research argues
that legislature size matters in three distinct ways: 1) descriptive representation, 2) education
outcomes, and 3) socioeconomic realities and puts forth an inclusive theory of the effect

14
legislature size has on these societal outcomes. The following pages ultimately argue for a
more representative democracy, a democracy with relatively larger legislatures and, thus, an
enhanced capacity to respond to the demands of our increasingly diverse society.

CHAPTER TWO
HOW BIG IS TOO BIG? HOW SMALL IS TOO SMALL? POPULATION
AND LEGISLATURE SIZE

“Size matters” (Robert Dahl 1998, 105).

In his presidential address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association in 1967, Robert Dahl expounded on a vast number of enduring and
foundational problems facing political science. One problem was “the appropriate unit for a
democratic political system” (1967, 953). Specifically, he was referring to the size of the
citizenry, but by extension he was considering the appropriate size of a constituency, which
leads to a consideration of the size of legislatures. Central to solving this quandary is the
notion that populations range in size and diversity. After all, to determine the appropriate unit
size, characteristics of the populace ought to be taken into account. This led Dahl to ponder:
What, then, is the optimum size for a city? Curiously, this question, which so far as I
know was first asked by political philosophers in Athens over 2,000 years ago, is no
longer a subject of discussion among political scientists. . . . If to our own loss we
have ignored the question of the optimum size of cities, fortunately it has been
examined by scholars in a variety of fields other than our own. It is impossible to do
justice to this discussion here but the analysis and the evidence are too important for
us to ignore. (Dahl 1967, 965)
This chapter explores multidisciplinary perspectives on population size, beginning
with some of the political philosophers alluded to by Dahl. In addition, the scholarship on
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legislature size is reviewed. The size of state legislatures and city councils in contemporary
United States democracy are also portrayed descriptively. As representative institutions, the
relative size of legislatures is often considered to be essential in determining the extent to
which citizens have access to and can influence decisions made by their representatives (Dahl
and Tufte 1973). This discussion begins as many of this type do: in ancient Greece.

Political Philosophers on Population Size
It is quite common to trace philosophical considerations of community size1 to ancient
Greece. Influential thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle are well documented to have favored
smaller political communities (Barker 1952; Plato 1937). They favored the polis, a small, selfgoverning, relatively homogeneous city-state with defined borders. This may have been
partially motivated by geographical considerations, namely the mountainous landscape
occupied by the Greeks, which nudged them into insulated villages (Dahl and Tufte 1973).
The larger concern shared by Plato and Aristotle, however, seems to center on fostering the
appropriate conditions for a well-functioning, effective political community. Plato stressed the
importance of citizens knowing each other personally as a vital consideration for size. Stated
differently, the sheer volume of a large body politic limits the ability for personal connections

1

At times the terms “population” and “community” are used interchangeably in this project. While similar,
depending on the context, one term may be more appropriate than the other. Broadly stated, individuals are
members of, and identify with, multiple communities (Schumaker 2010). Paul Schumaker clarifies by noting the
various citizenships he has had while living in the United States, a resident of multiple cities, states, and
countries, as well as his affiliation with numerous associations. He argues that he belongs to each of these
communities. To be clear, referenced here is the territorial and geographical notion of community (e.g.,
neighborhood, town, city) as opposed to the relational conception. Relational community centers on the “quality
of character of human relationship, without reference to location” (Gusfield 1975, xvi). Although Emile
Durkheim (1933) notes that community develops around shared interests and skills more than location, the focus
here is placed on territorial communities. For an excellent review of the theory of community and its definitions,
see McMillan and Chavis (1986).
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to be made with all others in the community. With this in mind, Plato proposed 5,040 as the
optimal number of male heads of households2 in a given political community (Plato 1937).
Aristotle took a different approach to identifying optimal size. Eschewing an exact
number, he suggested that the population must be large enough to be self-supporting but not
so huge that citizens are hindered from knowing the character of others (Barker 1952). He
writes:
A state, then, only begins to exist when it has attained a population sufficient for a
good life in the political community: it may indeed, if it somewhat exceed this
number, be a greater state. But, as I was saying, there must be a limit. What should be
the limit will be easily ascertained by experience. For both governors and governed
have duties to perform; the special functions of a governor to command and to judge.
But if the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices according to merit,
then they must know each other’s characters; where they do not possess this
knowledge, both the election to offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong.
When the population is very large they are manifestly settled at haphazard, which
clearly ought not to be. Besides, in an over-populous state foreigners and metics will
readily acquire the rights of citizens, for who will find them out? Clearly then the best
limit of the population of a state is the largest number which suffices for the purposes
of life, and can be taken in at a single view. Enough concerning the size of a state.
(Barker 1952, n.p.)
Other early political theorists have tackled the subject of size, despite Aristotle’s
demonstrative concluding sentence in the quotation above.
For instance, Rousseau was a principal figure and critic of the European
Enlightenment that emphasized citizen participation and considered small city-states optimal
for achieving this aim. Citizen participation, to Rousseau (1761), is negatively impacted as the
community increases in size because a typical citizen’s share in decision-making diminishes
with population and territory growth. Further, he argued that freedom can best flourish in

2

When considering family members, slaves, and metics (i.e., resident aliens in ancient Greece), the total
population Plato argued for was approximately 35,000 (Sale 1980).
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smaller, agreeable, homogeneous, and unified city-states (Rousseau 1761; Wokler 2001).3
Montesquieu took yet a different approach by claiming that a republic ought to have slight
territory and an equally small number of citizens. According to Montesquieu, if a republic is
allowed to grow too large, there are negative implications for the common good. This large
republic “is ruined by an internal imperfection,” namely corruption from within (Montesquieu
1914, 183). Yet, both Rousseau and Montesquieu acknowledged the threat of external forces
if a republic remained too small. This threat became an increasingly pressing consideration
with the passage of time. Ultimately, within relatively short order, “the rise of nationalism and
the nation-state rendered the autonomous commune and the city-state obsolete, or at least
virtually impossible either to preserve or to re-create” (Dahl and Tufte 1973, 8).
The dominance of nation-states has not stopped people from offering suggestions
about optimal community size. Coming full circle, Robert Dahl regularly comments on the
importance of population size (1998) and even notes the most advantageous type of modern
city may be somewhere between 50,000 and 200,000 people (1967). Acclaimed sociologist
Otis Dudley Duncan (1951) argues that cities ranging from 50,000 to 150,000 are equipped
with all the facilities and amenities any city would need, while widely known economist
Werner Hirsch (1968) pinpoints communities between 50,000 and 100,000 as the most
efficient and democratic. Economist and statistician E.F. Schumacher (1973) is less precise
but still argues there should be “ideally no major town more than a couple of hundred

3

Rousseau (1761, n.p.) argued, “A fundamental rule for every well-constituted and legitimately governed
society would be that all the members could be easily assembled every time this would be necessary…it follows
that the state ought to be limited to one town at the most.” Similarly, Aristotle claimed that all citizens should
ideally be able to gather in one area and still audibly hear the voice of whoever is addressing the group (Barker
1952).
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thousand or thereabouts” (63). Clearly, political theorists are not the only scholars to
investigate the puzzle of population size; far from it.

Multidisciplinary perspectives of Population Size
While identifying an exact optimal size for a given community remains elusive,
exploring some of the multidisciplinary efforts that have taken place on size, broadly stated, is
arguably worthwhile. To begin, communities are a frequent topic of inquiry in anthropology
(e.g., Shuttleworth and Kasnitz 2004; Wilson and Peterson 2002; Wolfe 2000) and sociology
(e.g., Bell, Newby, and Allen 1971; Bernard 1973, 2012; Pearson 1995; Polsby 1959). For
instance, anthropologist George Murdoch (1949) carried out a cross-cultural, interdisciplinary
analysis of 250 societies over a ten-year period of time. The societies ranged in geographic
location and stage of development. Through this intensive approach Murdoch finds, “The
community and the nuclear family are the only social groups that are genuinely universal.
They occur in every known human society, and both are also found in germinal form on a
subhuman level” (1949, 79). Murdoch notes that “nowhere on earth do people live regularly
in isolated families” and geographic proximity tends to bond “at least a few neighboring
families into a larger social group all of whose members maintain face-to-face relationships
with one another” (1949, 80). Murdoch’s work provides incredible insight into the formation,
durability, and omnipresence of communities; others offer an equally fascinating glimpse.
John Pfeiffer suggests 500 as the ideal size because the number often recurs as the
limit of tribal communities:
The phenomenon becomes clear and meaningful only after taking census figures for a
large number of tribes. Such studies reveal a central tendency to cluster at the 500
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level, and this tendency is widespread. It holds for the Shoshoni Indians of the Great
Plains, the Andaman Islanders in the Bay of Bengal, and other peoples as well as the
Australian aborigines. (Pfeiffer 1969, 376-77)
A population of this size, Pfeiffer suggests, may be determined by the necessity of direct
communication and culture-sharing considerations. Martin Wobst (1974) argues that the need
for an adequately sized mating pool is also an influencing factor. His analysis indicates the
ideal community is around 475. While these major works focus primarily on tribal or
Paleolithic societies, the consensus from an anthropological viewpoint seems to favor smaller
communities.
The sociological perspective tends to agree. Sociology scholars have contributed
substantially to our understanding of population size, particularly in urban cities. In his
lectures on the “metropolis and mental life,” Georges Simmel (1903) explores the influence
of large cities on inhabitants. He notes permanent changes occur in the minds of city dwellers
and challenges emerge related to maintaining independence and individuality. Max Weber
(1921) also assessed “the city.” He argues that urban development is effected by factors such
as the privileged position of some citizens, Christianity, and declining solidarity, which leads
to less unified communities. Emile Durkheim, the first professor of sociology in France,
contemplated the alienation, normlessness, and isolation—or anomie4—that can result in
suicide (1897). He specifically identifies the negative impact of cities when discussing youth
suicide:
We must not forget that the child, too, is subject to social forces and that these may be
sufficient to drive him to suicide. What demonstrates the influence of such forces even
4

It is important to also note that Durkheim (1933) suggests anomie may derive from overspecialization that can
result from capitalism, particularly as people are channeled into specific vocational positions via the division of
labor.
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in this case is that child suicides vary according to social environment. Nowhere are
they as numerous as large towns; the reason is that nowhere else does social life begin
so early for the child, as is demonstrated by the precocity of the young city-dweller.
Initiated to the course of civilization earlier in life and more fully, he suffers
correspondingly earlier and more deeply from its effects. (Durkheim 1897, n.p.)
Indeed, sociologists have produced classic literature on the differences between urban
and rural life in terms of human behavior (Park 1915), population heterogeneity (Wirth 1938),
individual morality (Angell 1951, 1974) and more (Miner 1952; Weber 1921).5 Others have
carried out important work linking deviance, or tolerance of deviant behavior, with
metropolitan areas (Stouffer 1955; Thomlinson 1969). Some suggest “abnormal elements and
institutions” are much more likely in larger cities (Small and Vincent 1894, 163) and “cities
encourage the expression of unusual, bizarre, or different tastes and interest by providing a
place in which the persons who have them can congregate and thereby mutually reinforce one
another” (Park 1915, 610).
More recently, sociologists have investigated population size and social control
(Jackson 1986), community satisfaction (Auh and Cook 2009), social integration (Photiadis
1967), perceptions of crime (Sacco 1985), and tolerance of nonconformity (Stephan and
McMullin 1982). In the end, the consensus from sociologists appears to suggest negative
implications for individuals (i.e., alienation, loneliness, deviance, etc.) and society (i.e.,
fragmentation, higher crime, etc.) as the size of community increases.
Other disciplines beyond political science, anthropology, and sociology have studied
population size. For instance, economists have compared large and small cities (perloff and
Wingo 1968), investigated the supply of public services (Hirsch 1968), and noted the tradeoff
5

Other sociologists (e.g., Dewey 1960) argue that rural-urban differences are no longer significant due in part to
modern forms of transportation and enhanced modes of communication.
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between economies of scale and the challenges of heterogeneity in large areas (Alesina and
Spolaore 2003). Urban planners ponder land use, housing, transportation, and other
considerations related to growing populations (Jackson and Penalosa 1976). Others focus on
practical guidelines and frameworks for addressing growth management (Kemp 2007).
Finally, population size can be viewed through an environmental lens. Marina Alberti (2005,
337) notes, “Urban development fragments, isolates, and degrades natural habitats . . .
disrupts hydrological systems; and modifies energy flow and nutrient cycling. Urban areas
also appropriate a large share of earth’s carrying capacity from other regions in terms of
resource input and waste sinks” (168). Stated differently, urbanization has negative ecological
implications and cities are concentrated sites of high use of natural resources and waste.
Further, ecological scholars have focused more broadly on population, environmental justice
and the sustainable city (Haughton 1999; Rees 1997).
This review of disciplinary perspectives is cursory; however, there is plenty of
evidence—across disciplines—that densely populous areas result in challenges.6 Many
scholars have developed articulate arguments against large cities and pleas for more
ecological, manageable, and human-focused communities (Kohr 1957, 1978; Roszak 1978;
Sale 1980; Schumacher 1973). In the political realm, large populations tend to usher in
6

Despite the problems associated with large communities and the call for ideal-sized communities, increasing
population size is no passing fad. In the year 1800, an estimated 978 million people lived on planet earth. This
number grew substantially (69.3% increase) during the nineteenth century to 1.656 billion in 1900. Global
population counts are provided for each decade since 1900. The global census in 2010 was 6.866 billion and that
number is expected to exceed 7.631 billion by 2020. Between 1900 and 2010, the global population increased by
315%. The United States follows this global trend. The first United States census was conducted in 1790 (U.S.
Census Bureau n.d.), which revealed a population of 3.929 million. The largest decade-to-decade increases
occurred between 1800 and 1810 (36.4 %), 1840 and 1850 (35.9 %), and 1850 and 1860 (35.6 %). Land
expansion, the settling of the frontier, and growth of new immigrant populations explain the large gains during
these eras. While the decade-to-decade figures fluctuate, it is important to note the overall consistent population
gains since the census began. In fact, population grew by more than 7,757% between 1790 and 2010 in the
United States.
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problems such as higher gross expenditures and other economic considerations. The
challenges of mass population, however, transcend the financial realm. The number of
constituents per legislator also impacts the representation afforded to that political
community. Attention now turns to a review of literature on legislature size and some of the
challenges facing representative institutions that are either too large or too small.

Legislatures and Size
Legislatures have received considerable attention from a wide array of scholars dating
back to the earliest days of the formal study of American political science (Bryce 1888; Mill
1861; Sullivan 1893; Wilson 1885) and, indeed, the formative days of the American republic
(Burke 1774; Publius 1788). The history of legislatures, however, is much longer than the
American experiment. Depending on who is asked, legislatures date back at least to medieval
Spain (Holden 1930) or ancient Greece and Rome (Beard and Lewis 1932). While legislatures
have long histories as institutions, their powers have evolved considerably over time. For
example, early legislatures were representative only in that “rulers used them as a means by
which propertied classes could hear the justification of decisions and give their consent”—
these men did not debate, vote on issues, or were elected (Weissberg, Heberlig, and Campoli
1999, 2). Eventually legislatures transitioned into policy-making entities and gradually the
makeup of these institutions shifted from ruler selection to voting by citizen elections (Beard
and Lewis 1932). With the drafting of the United States Constitution, the Founding Fathers
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created a more powerful Congress, which reflected the sentiment colonists had toward
unchecked executive supremacy at the time.7
Since its formation, the United States Congress has grown increasingly complex
(Jacobson 2013), yet this has not hindered political scientists from investigating legislatures in
extraordinary depth. Specific areas of inquiry range widely from institutionalization (Polsby
1968; Schickler 2000; Shepsle 1979; Squire 1992), to the role of political parties in Congress
(Aldrich and Rohde 2000a; Cox and McCubbins 1991, 1993, 1994, 2005; Dodd and
Schraufnagel 2012; Jackman 2014; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Krehbiel 1993, 1998;
Mayhew 1966; Rohde 1991, 1994; Stokes and Miller 1962; Theriault 2008; Truman 1959) to
its committee structure (Aldrich and Rohde 2000b; Fenno 1973; Haeberle 1978). In fact,
Congress and legislatures have been central areas of study from the earliest days of the
American Political Science Association and its flagship publication, the American Political
Science Review.8 But what about constituency size, the size of legislatures for that matter?9
This question has puzzled even the greatest minds for quite some time. For instance, in
The Federalist, Number 54, James Madison (Publius 1788) astutely noted, “No political
problem is less susceptible to a precise solution than that which relates to the number
convenient for a representative legislature.” Indeed, for more than two centuries, a solution to
7

Indeed, James Madison argued in Federalist No. 51, “The legislative authority necessarily predominates”
(Publius 1788, n.p.).
8
Publishing of APSR began in 1906 and the inaugural volume included no less than three articles on Congress
and legislation (i.e., Dodd 1906; Low 1906; Whitten 1906). This trend continued in the early, subsequent years
of APSR (e.g., Aylesworth 1908; Barnett 1908; Bruncken 1909; Lapp 1910; Thompson 1907). It is, however,
important to recognize that influential theorists were writing on the topic of representative democracy prior to
the creation of APSA and APSR (e.g., Mill 1861).
9
To this point, the focus has been placed firmly on community size. The representation literature in political
science typically discusses this phenomenon in terms of constituency size. Furthermore, studies on legislature
size are equally important as those on constituency size because an increase in the number of legislators—in
essence—equates to a smaller constituency per legislator. On the other hand, a decrease in legislators results in a
relative increase in constituents per legislator.
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the problem of appropriate legislature size has remained elusive. Attention now turns to some
of the major scholarship on the size of legislatures.
Constitutional scholars such as Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte (1973) and James
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) provide solid theoretical expectations regarding the
relative costs and benefits of legislatures of varying size. There is general consensus that
tradeoffs exist and that legislatures which are either too large or too small cause problems for
democracy. For example, rational choice theory recognizes that larger legislatures reduce
“external costs” but add to “decision-making costs” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 214-17).
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) note, improving representation (i.e., more legislators) reduces
the “expected external costs function” (215) or costs associated with bad decisions made by a
non-representative assembly. Alternatively, the authors correctly argue that in a hypothetical
legislature of either 5 or 10 individuals, with a majority decision-making rule, “the costs of
securing agreement among 6 persons are greater than those of securing similar agreement
among 3” (1962, 216).
In support of Buchanan and Tullock’s latter position, Dahl and Tufte write that as
membership in a legislature increases:
Discussion becomes more burdensome; participation in debate must be more and more
severely restricted; delegation of authority to committees creates problems of
coordination and collective control. The parliament, in short, becomes less and less
capable of functioning as an assembly. As a consequence, parliaments cannot be
allowed to expand indefinitely, or even in strict proportion to population. (Dahl and
Tufte 1973, 80)
In contrast, Dahl and Tufte also suggest, “Any increase in the number of constituents [per
legislator] makes it more difficult to achieve an accurate match between the views of voters
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and politicians” (1973, 85). Likewise, Dahl and Tufte recognize that this is all the more a
problem with “increased social difference” or population heterogeneity (1973, 85).
This point is elucidated by Richard Fenno in his influential study of U.S. House
members in their home districts. Fenno (1978, 233) asks, “What does the representative see
when he or she goes home to look at the represented? How does what he or she sees affect his
or her representational activity?” It is plain how different the answer to the former question
would be if asked to two representatives: one with a smaller, more homogeneous district and
the other with a larger, more diverse district. The latter question becomes much more complex
when the variables of size and social differences are considered.
Others contend that a larger population base (i.e., smaller legislature) compromises the
quality of the representative-constituent relationship (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999;
Oppenheimer 1996), leading to less citizen contact (Hibbing and Alford 1990) and less
popular politicians (Binder, Maltzman, and Sigelman, 1998; on governors, see King and
Cohen 2005; on state legislators, see Squire 1993). The U.S. Senate has been a popular testing
ground for work on size because the number of representatives from each of the 50 American
states is constant, but populations fluctuate wildly. Yet Brian Frederick (2010), using
population change from decade to decade to test the effect of the relative size of legislatures,
also finds that smaller constituencies (i.e., larger legislatures) are associated with better
representation and more popular members in the House of Representatives.
Unsurprisingly, there are countervailing views among those who have identified
problems with larger legislatures. In particular, political economists argue that relatively
larger assemblies are associated with more spending (Baqir 2002; Bradbury and Stephenson
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2003; Gilligan and Matsusaka 1995, 2001; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981). More
broadly, Mancur Olson (1965) was the first to outline the problem of collective action and
offer possible solutions. In essence, as a group grows larger, the amount of benefit any one
individual receives for acting on the group’s behalf reduces. This is also true for the group as
a whole because as the group grows larger, the reward for group action is reduced. Since the
total benefit received by each group member is lower when groups are larger, there is less
likelihood that any individual, or small faction of individuals, will put forth effort, finances, or
other resources to help achieve the common good. Finally, as group size increases so do
organization costs, which creates a barrier that must be dealt with prior to the pursuit and
advancement of the common interest or good (Olson 1965). Aldrich summarizes: “The
problem of collective action—the potential that individually rational decisions lead to Pareto
inferior outcomes—is ever present in the provision of public goods” (1995, 32).10 All told, it
is difficult to deny that challenges typically accompany increased group size.

City Councils and Size
To gain leverage on the empirical analyses that follow in subsequent chapters, a study
of the size of city councils is included alongside the inquiry into state legislature size. This
allows a more comprehensive understanding of the representativeness and responsiveness of
legislative institutions, of varying size, at the sub-national level. Attention now turns to a
review of previous work on city councils and the size of urban legislatures.

10

See R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1957) for more on Pareto inferior outcomes, game theory, and the
prisoners’ dilemma.
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Scholarship on city councils can be traced back at least to the turn of the twentieth
century as academic journals became increasingly common. Early research offered
prescriptions on how to improve local government (Hart et al. 1891), compared council
government and mayor government (Durand 1900), and explored city councils outside of the
United States (James 1900a, 1900b). Gradually, the research shifted toward analyses of the
actual process of municipal government, the procedures that come along with local
governance, and the experience of being a councilmember. Howard White (1927) provides
insight on the minutia of councilmembership, such as how ordinances and measures can be
enacted more quickly and the negative impacts of end-of-session rushes. Arthur Bromage
(1950)—college professor and a councilmember in Ann Arbor, Michigan, from 1949 to
1950—shares his personal experiences and focuses on the challenges facing freshman
members of a city legislature. On learning to be a councilmember, he notes, “It can only be
learned the hard way through the school of experience over the years” (Bromage 1950, v).
One of the most influential works on city governance is James Svara’s (1990) Official
Leadership in the City. Svara studies the roles of city administrators, mayors, and
councilmembers while offering practical recommendations to improve their performance. He
sums up councilmembers in the following way:
The council member is a representative, governor, supervisor, and judge. As
representative, the council member speaks for and acts on behalf of constituents. As
governor, the council member not only legislates but more generally gives ‘direction
to the collective affairs of the whole.’11 The council’s primary role, in the view of
some, is ‘formulating policy and overseeing its execution.’12 As supervisor, the
council takes on tasks associated with the executive. . . . As judge, the council member
resolves specific disputes. . . . The roles will not be equally developed in all
11
12

Svara cites Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt (1973, 12).
Svara cites Wayne Anderson, Chester Newland, and Richard Stillman (1983, 51).
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governments owing both to structural and idiosyncratic differences among cities.
(Svara 1990, 123)
Importantly, Svara emphasizes the linkage city councils provide: serving as the conduit
between citizens and their government. This often boils down to the representational function.
Councils “speak for and make decisions on behalf of the citizens of the community,
committing the body politic to certain courses of action” (Svara 1990, 122). As discussed
earlier, tradeoffs exist related to the representational function, and the efficiency of
legislatures and city councils is no different. Larger city council size—or fewer constituents
per councilmember—can enhance representation (see Dahl and Tufte 1973), yet inefficiencies
abound as groups grow too large (see Olson 1965). Although much of the literature covered
previously can be applied to city councils, there is a noticeable void in the scholarship
specifically focused on the size of city councils and the influence of council size on
representational quality.
There are a few exceptions. Douglas Muzzio and Tim Tompkins (1989) focus on the
effects of legislature size by examining the local assembly in New York City. In doing so,
they identify some important considerations in studying council size, namely that there is no
consistent definition of large and small. For example, at the national level, the Senate is
considered the “small” chamber with just two seats per state, yet for seven states the “large”
chamber—the House of Representatives—actually has fewer seats, at just one for Alaska,
Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. Sub-national
definitions of legislature size are equally complicated. Muzzio and Tompkins identify two
unique but related factors that can simultaneously make a legislature large or small: “1) the
number of members in the body, irrespective of the number of constituents served by each
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member; and 2) the number of constituents represented by each member, regardless of the
number of members” (1989, 85).13
Related to the overriding themes of representation and responsiveness, Muzzio and
Tompkins (1989) identify factors that are potentially influenced by council size. They note the
logical inference that a larger council ought to be more representative of religiously ,
ethnically, or racially diverse districts. Moreover, “a larger council will likely have both
stronger leadership and more vigorous public dissent by individual members. The presence of
more people with dissimilar backgrounds would produce a greater diversity of voices and
interest in the council” (Muzzio and Tompkins 1989, 90-91). They also note how enlarging a
city council could improve the body by enhancing electoral competition, generating
membership turnover, and ultimately challenging the norms of the institution. Importantly, the
authors argue that relatively larger legislatures have more capacity to respond to constituent
needs than do smaller councils.
What follows is a glimpse at the contemporary landscape of population and legislature
size. This descriptive analysis sheds light on these important considerations for representation
in the United States.

State Legislature and Population Size, 2010
There are 7,382 seats across all American state legislatures. This may seem like a lot,
but given a population in excess of 308 million, the typical state representative has 41,743

13

See Chapter Four for details about both operationalizations of size at the subnational level used in this study.
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constituents.14 A more nuanced look reveals substantial variation in not only the number of
legislative seats but also in constituents per representative at the state level.
Table 1 depicts each American state, the corresponding population size, legislature
size in terms of number of seats, and constituency size per representative. The data are for
2010 to correspond with the most recent decennial census and provide a contemporary lens
through which to view size. The table is organized by the number of constituents per
representative, sorted largest to smallest.

Table 1
Constituents per State Legislator, 2010
Legislative
Seats
120

persons per
Representative
310,450

State
California

Population
37,253,956

Texas

25,145,561

181

138,926

Florida

18,801,310

160

117,508

New York

19,378,102

212

91,406

Ohio

11,536,504

132

87,398

8,791,894

120

73,266

Illinois

12,830,632

177

72,489

Arizona

6,392,017

90

71,022

Michigan

9,883,640

148

66,781

Virginia

8,001,024

140

57,150

North Carolina

9,535,483

170

56,091

Colorado

5,029,196

100

50,292

12,702,379

253

50,207

Tennessee

6,346,105

132

48,077

Washington

6,724,540

147

45,745

Indiana

6,483,802

150

43,225

Wisconsin

5,686,986

132

43,083

Nevada

2,700,551

63

42,866

New Jersey

Pennsylvania

(continued on following page)

14

The typical member of the U.S. House of Representatives had 708,377 constituents in 2010.
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Table 1 (continued)
State

Legislative
Seats
90

Persons Per
Representative
42,567

236

41,049

Oregon

Population
3,831,074

Georgia

9,687,653

Nebraska

1,826,341

49

37,272

Alabama

4,779,736

140

34,141

Massachusetts

6,547,629

200

32,738

Louisiana

4,533,372

144

31,482

Kentucky

4,339,367

138

31,445

Maryland

5,773,552

188

30,710

Missouri

5,988,927

197

30,401

South Carolina

4,625,364

170

27,208

Utah

2,763,885

104

26,576

Minnesota

5,303,925

201

26,388

Oklahoma

3,751,351

149

25,177

Arkansas

2,915,918

135

21,599

Iowa

3,046,355

150

20,309

Connecticut

3,574,097

187

19,113

New Mexico

2,059,179

112

18,386

Hawaii

1,360,301

76

17,899

Kansas

2,853,118

165

17,292

Mississippi

2,967,297

174

17,053

Idaho

1,567,582

105

14,929

897,934

62

14,483

1,852,994

134

13,828

710,231

60

11,837

Rhode Island

1,052,567

113

9,315

South Dakota

814,180

105

7,754

1,328,361

186

7,142

Montana

989,415

150

6,596

Wyoming

563,626

90

6,263

North Dakota

672,591

141

4,770

Vermont

625,741

180

3,476

1,316,470

424

3,105

Delaware
West Virginia
Alaska

Maine

New Hampshire

Note: Population data reported from the 2010 Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
www.census.gov/2010census/data/. Legislature data derive from the National Conference of State Legislatures,
www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/number-of-legislators-and-length-of-terms.aspx.
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To begin, the sheer vastness of California’s population ensures a top spot for the
Golden State. The California State Assembly had 28 seats less than the average state
legislature (California = 120; mean = 148), so it is on the “small” side of the spectrum;
regardless, the influence of population shines through. California had over 12 million more
residents than Texas, the second most populous state. This results in nearly three times as
many constituents per representative, although Texas had a comparatively larger assembly,
which contributes to the discrepancy.
The least populous state in 2010 was Wyoming with 563,626 residents. For
comparison, if the state of Wyoming were a city it would rank 32nd in terms of population,
nestled between Oklahoma City and Albuquerque. With a state legislature of 90, Wyoming
representatives had 6,263 constituents on average in 2010. It is New Hampshire, however,
that had the fewest constituents per representative. This is primarily due to its incredibly large
state assembly, which has 424 seats. At only 11 fewer seats than the U.S. House of
Representatives, New Hampshire is truly an anomaly at the state level. It had 171 more seats
than the next largest assembly (Pennsylvania = 253). Further, the smallest six state
legislatures combined had fewer seats than New Hampshire (Nebraska = 49; Alaska = 60;
Delaware = 62; Nevada = 63; Hawaii = 76; Oregon = 90).
It is plain to see that population size and legislature size cannot be viewed in isolation.
A shift in population influences the number of constituents per representative in the same way
an increase or decrease in legislative seats affects the quotient. This is further reinforced at the
city level.
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City Council and Population Size, 2010
Table 2 shows the 20 largest constituencies per councilmember in American cities. For
this data—and all to follow at the city level of analysis—only municipalities with a 2010

Table 2
Twenty Largest Constituencies per Councilmember, 2010

State
CA

Population
3,792,621

Legislative
Seats
15

AZ

1,445,632

8

180,704

San Diego

CA

1,307,402

8

163,425

New York

NY

8,175,133

51

160,297

Portland

OR

583,776

4

145,944

San Antonio

TX

1,327,407

10

132,741

Austin

TX

790,390

6

131,732

Houston

TX

2,099,451

16

131,216

Columbus

OH

787,033

7

112,433

Las Vegas

NV

583,756

6

97,293

San Jose

CA

945,942

10

94,594

Fort Worth

TX

741,206

8

92,651

Tucson

AZ

520,116

6

86,686

Dallas

TX

1,197,816

14

85,558

Philadelphia

PA

1,526,006

18

84,778

Anaheim

CA

336,265

4

84,066

El Paso

TX

649,121

8

81,140

Miami

FL

399,457

5

79,891

Detroit

MI

713,777

9

79,309

San Francisco

CA

805,235

11

73,203

City
Los Angeles
Phoenix

Persons Per
Representative
252,841

Note: Population data reported from the 2010 Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html. City council data derive from the official city websites of each
municipality and manually coding demographic information. Mayors are not included in the city council figures.
For the purposes of this project, mayors are considered comparable to governors and are classified as executive
rather than legislative.
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population of 100,000 residents or more are included. This results in 274 cities emanating
from every state in the Union except Wyoming.15
The average population of cities in this dataset is 307,732 while the average number of
council seats is eight. In 2010, there were 2,308 city council seats, in aggregate, among all
274 cities combined. Los Angeles was the second most populous city in America and with 15
city council seats, the typical councilperson represented about 252,841 citizens in 2010.
Stated another way, councilmembers from Los Angeles represented 72,137 more citizens, on
average, than their counterparts in Phoenix, which had the second largest constituency per
representative figure at 180,704. Among cities with the largest constituency sizes, the number
of council seats ranged from four in Anaheim and Portland to 51 in New York.
Unsurprisingly, cities from populous states are most frequently present in Table 2. Six cities
from Texas made the list, followed closely by five California municipalities.
Table 3 portrays the 20 smallest constituencies per city councilor in 2010. Stamford,
Connecticut, had 40 council seats and a population of 122,643, resulting in just 3,066
constituents per representative. To go back for a moment, keep in mind this figure is only
slightly smaller than the 3,105 constituents per representative in the state of New Hampshire.
The uniqueness of New Hampshire will continue to resurface throughout the remainder of this
research.
Again, the interrelated dynamics of population and legislature size emerge. Consider
two instances from Table 3: Ann Arbor/St. Louis and Waterbury/Providence. Ann Arbor’s

15

Cheyenne is the capital and largest city in Wyoming. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the 2010
population of Cheyenne was 59,466 (http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/56/5613900.html; last accessed
March 29, 2015).

36
Table 3
Twenty Smallest Constituencies per Councilmember, 2010

State
CT

Population
122,643

Legislative
Seats
40

Persons Per
Representative
3,066

New Haven

CT

129,779

30

4,326

Bridgeport

CT

144,229

20

7,211

Waterbury

CT

110,366

15

7,358

Manchester

NH

109,565

14

7,826

Green Bay

WI

104,057

12

8,671

Charleston

SC

120,083

12

10,007

Billings

MT

104,170

10

10,417

Rockford

IL

152,871

14

10,919

Clarksville

TN

132,929

12

11,077

South Bend

IN

101,168

9

11,241

Flint

MI

102,434

9

11,382

Ann Arbor

MI

113,934

10

11,393

St. Louis

MO

319,294

28

11,403

Peoria

IL

115,007

10

11,501

Springfield

IL

116,250

10

11,625

Madison

WI

233,209

20

11,660

Athens-Clarke

GA

116,714

10

11,671

Springfield

MA

153,060

13

11,774

Providence

RI

178,042

15

11,869

City
Stamford

Note: Population data reported from the 2010 Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html. City council data derive from the official city websites of each
municipality and manually coding demographic information. Mayors are not included in the city council figures.
For the purposes of this project, mayors are considered comparable to governors and are classified as executive
rather than legislative.

population was 113,934 compared to St. Louis which was 319,294, a difference of 205,360.
Yet councilmembers in St. Louis typically only had 10 more constituents than their
counterparts in Ann Arbor. In this example, city council size tempers the noticeable
population difference. St. Louis had 28 city council seats while Ann Arbor was much smaller
at 10. The result is a very similar number of constituents per representative despite
dramatically different population figures. On the other hand, Waterbury, Connecticut, and
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Providence, Rhode Island, both had 15 city council seats; however, due to population
differences (Waterbury: 110,366; Providence: 178,042) the constituents per representative is
quite distinct. Taking this to an extreme example, consider Los Angeles (see Table 2) and
Waterbury. Los Angeles also had 15 councilseats, but councilmembers had 252,841
constituents on average compared to 7,358 in Waterbury. At the risk of belaboring the point,
this comparison cements the importance of considering both population size and institution
size when discussing ideals like quality representation and government responsiveness.

Conclusion
In all, legislators must govern and represent while remaining accountable to their
constituents, which suggests some level of responsiveness is necessary. Moreover, the size of
constituencies and their makeup may influence how a legislator views those he/she represents
and how he/she goes about the act of representing their interests. Finally, some suggest larger
legislatures result in enhanced representation while others outline the drawbacks of larger
groups (i.e., increased spending and decision-making costs and collective action problems).
Achieving consensus on an issue like constituency/legislature size is incredibly
difficult. Dahl and Tufte’s concluding remarks exemplify this enigmatic puzzle:
It seems evident to us that among the units most needed in the world as it has been
evolving lie several at the extremes: we need some very small units and some very
large units…Very large units that transcend the parochialism and inadequate system
capacity of the nation-state are evolving, but too slowly–quite possibly too slowly for
human survival. If the giant units are needed for handling transnational matters of
extraordinary moment, very small units seem to us necessary to provide a place where
ordinary people can acquire the sense and the reality of moral responsibility and

38
political effectiveness in a universe where remote galaxies of leaders spin on in
courses mysterious and unfathomable to the ordinary citizen. (Dahl and Tufte 1973,
142)
The pages that follow argue that sub-national legislatures, specifically, ought to be on the
larger side. One reason has to do with relatively larger legislatures—and their correspondingly
smaller constituencies—having the potential to be more demographically congruent on
average. Stated differently, a legislature with a greater number of seats is likely to be more
descriptively representative than a smaller counterpart. This claim will be explored
empirically in Chapter Four, but first, attention turns to an investigation of descriptive
representation in contemporary American states and cities.

CHAPTER THREE
IDENTIFYING THE GAP: DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

“Representation is imperfect” (Alexander Hamilton 1788).

Representation is central to American democracy. There is little argument about the
importance of representation, yet substantial debate—dating back to the founding—exists on
how we ought to be represented. Edmund Burke introduced the notion of trustee versus
delegate representation in 1774, around the time American states were ratifying their
constitutions. Tension about how representation should be accomplished emerged during
many of these constitutional debates. In 1788, at the New York state constitutional ratifying
convention in Poughkeepsie, Melancton Smith asked how the community’s will would be
expressed in this new government. Smith considered the national Congress too small and
believed something needed to be done at the state level to ensure representativeness. In
contrast, Alexander Hamilton suggested large electoral districts were the appropriate solution.
Trustee representatives could use their expertise to serve the interests of their constituents.
They would “refine and enlarge public views, to act as a filter for impassioned and
intemperate opinions and interests” (Muzzio and Tompkins 1989, 84). Hamilton’s view,
however, did not accommodate one of Smith’s prerequisites for adequate representation.
Smith argued a larger legislature with smaller districts would be more likely to ensure
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councilmembers “resemble those they represent.” In this conceptualization, the legislature
would be a “true picture of the people, possess a knowledge of their circumstances and their
wants, sympathize in all their distresses, and be disposed to seek their true interests”(Muzzio
and Tompkins 1989, 84).
Ensuring an entirely “true picture” is impossible because the governance of those
elected never fully embodies the political wishes of the electorate (Burden 2004). Yet a
legislature with a more analogous semblance to constituents suggests a representative body
that is amenable to the plurality of ideas, opinions, and views that exist in heterogeneous
districts—and some homogeneous districts, for that matter. Philosophical discussions
notwithstanding, there has been a long-running debate about quality representation and one of
the views expressed over this considerable period of time favors descriptive representation.
John Adams, second president of the United States, argued the legislature “should be an exact
portrait, in miniature, of the people at large” (1865, 195). This chapter attempts to shed light
on the current state of descriptive representation in American states and cities.
More directly, the chapter answers this question: How demographically congruent are
state legislatures—and city councils—with their constituencies? The question derives from a
conundrum outlined by Dahl and Tufte who propose that “any increase in the number of
constituents [per legislator] makes it more difficult to achieve an accurate match between the
views of voters and politicians,” which is all the more a problem with “increased social
difference” or population heterogeneity (1973, 85). As this research moves toward testing the
socioeconomic implications of legislatures of varying size, a logical first step is to ascertain
whether small or large constituencies are producing a more “exact portrait.”
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The following pages include a summary of literature related to descriptive
representation and previous work on legislatures and demographic considerations. Racial and
gender-based heterogeneity in American states and cities is explored and the demographic
“gap” between legislatures and their constituencies is identified. Finally, descriptive statistics
are used to summarize the realities of demographic congruence in legislatures of varying size
so comparisons can be made between states and cities.

Difficulties with Descriptive Representation
The term descriptive representation refers to the extent to which a specific group is
represented by someone from their group. Put differently, it refers to representatives who
resemble the citizens they represent. As noted at the start of this chapter, the notion that
legislators in the United States ought to “resemble those they represent” dates back to the
earliest days of the American democratic experiment.1 Inherent in John Adams’ view,
elaborated earlier, is that a mirror image of the citizenry at-large in the legislature will
enhance the responsiveness of these institutions, yield improved accountability, mitigate
corruption, diminish the threat of tyranny, and create better public policy.
To be certain, the philosophical debate has not gone away and the value of descriptive
representation remains a contentious issue among political theorists. Hannah Pitkin (1967),
for instance, argues that descriptive representation is incompatible with accountability. To
clarify, she suggests that over-emphasizing the demographic traits of a representative may
hinder constituents from focusing on what the representative actually does. In the end,
1

The history of descriptive representation outside of the United States is much longer, to be sure (Pitkin 1967,
73).
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accountability suffers because of a preoccupation with demographic congruence between
representatives and constituents. Others argue the tension between descriptive representation
and accountability is the fundamental challenge facing advocates of descriptive representation
(Dovi 2007).
Clearly, Pitkin considers descriptive representation imperfect. She compares it to
mapping and artistic painting. Maps vary in accuracy and type even though they are designed
to portray a given geographic area; paintings are visual representations, but they can easily
deceive the viewer unless the style of the painting is properly understood. perhaps most
relevantly, Pitkin states, “Even a mirror or photograph shows only visible features” (1967,
87). This is a problem because similar physical appearance does not guarantee any ideological
commonalities. Descriptive representation does not ensure any set of qualities or traits are
present; indeed, if it could guarantee that representatives would possess basic admirable traits
like trustworthiness, collegiality, and honesty, arguing for descriptive representation would be
a much easier endeavor. But there is no way to ensure that desirable internal traits accompany
descriptive representation.
Others offer additional concerns about the efficacy of descriptive representation.
Melissa Williams points out:
It would be absurd to claim that a representative, simply because she is a woman,
therefore represents the interests or perspectives of women generally, or that an
African-American representative is automatically representative of all AfricanAmericans. The mere presence of members of marginalized groups in legislatures is
not sufficient for the fair representation of citizens from those groups, even though it is
often necessary. (Williams 1998, 6)
Stated another way, demographic traits are not enough to ensure the interests of the broader
group are adequately represented. More to the point, “the diversity within historically
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disadvantaged groups means that one descriptive representative cannot adequately represent
all the members of a historically disadvantaged group” (Dovi 2007, 34). To be sure, groups of
any kind can have substantial differences of opinion about what interests, values, and beliefs
are important to the group. This tension can be described as “the problem of intra-group
conflict” (Dovi 2007, 34).
Intra-group conflict arises when adding more opinions to the political process
unintentionally dampens the voice of others (Young 1997). For example, imagine an urban
community with a strong Latin heritage but very little representation on the municipality’s
five-seat city council. Candidate A and her supporters believe education and job training are
the most important policy areas to improve the lives of her constituents. Candidate B is also
Latin-American, but he considers public health and access to nutritious food to be of vital
concern. When Candidate A is elected, great strides toward descriptive representation will
appear to have been made—especially considering the small, five-seat council. Yet, the
interests of Candidate B and his supporters may be forgotten altogether. Similarly, Cathy
Cohen (1999) warns about secondary marginalization. In her study of auto-immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and black politics, Cohen finds that African-American
representatives in New York supported AIDS education for the most part, but they did not
stand behind a needle-exchange initiative that would benefit intravenous drug users, a small
subgroup of the African-American community. What Cohen illuminates is the notion that
more privileged members of a given group (i.e., elected officials) may not advocate for less
privileged members of that same group resulting in secondary marginalization. Again,
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descriptive representation alone does not necessarily advance the interests of all members of
the historically disadvantaged group.
In sum, the within-group problem of descriptive representation can lead to
marginalization of sub-group interests. What about between-group considerations? Suzanne
Dovi identifies another issue with descriptive representation, which is “the problem of intergroup conflict” (Dovi 2007, 34). This problem develops when descriptive representation
among one group, for instance Latin-Americans, occurs at the expense of another group, for
instance African-Americans. Unsurprisingly, prioritizing the representation of one group over
another creates obstacles to democratic representation. More troubling is that inter-group
conflict can be institutionalized via electoral arrangements, such as district-at-large voting
(Matland and Studlar 1998). In fact, electoral considerations are often credited in the
descriptive representation literature as an important factor (Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah 2010;
Shah, Marschall, and Ruhil 2013). More specifically, there is a large body of research
exhibiting a link between single-member districts (SMD) and representation of racial minority
constituents (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Karnig and Welch 1982; Trounstine and Valdini
2008). Scholars argue that SMDs concentrate African-Americans into compressed electoral
districts, thus reducing their reliance on other racial groups and enhancing their ability to elect
Black representatives. On the other hand, district at-large voting is less concentrated,
requiring candidates to compete with others from around the district. Additionally, racial bloc
voting in at-large systems all but requires a sizable minority population of voting-aged
citizens, or more reliance on voters willing to cross over and vote for minority candidates
(Shah, Marschall, and Ruhil 2013).

45
Dovi’s problems related to descriptive representation are quite compelling. Intra-group
problems such as interest marginalization can dampen the voices of less privileged members
of the population. Inter-group challenges result when one historically disadvantaged group is
prioritized at the expense of another. Moreover, as Pitkin suggests, descriptive representation
is primarily about standing for others and says nothing of acting for others. These difficulties
related to descriptive representation are substantial, but the literature in this area extends
beyond criticisms of the theoretical.

Importance of Descriptive Representation
Despite its challenges, descriptive representation has plenty of advocates. These
proponents—ranging from John Adams to contemporary scholars—have a lot to offer in
terms of advancing our understanding of the concept. Virginia Sapiro’s (1981) work on the
political representation of women is one example. Historically, there was no issue with
women’s representation because the consensus was that they were already being represented
by their husbands. As “head of the household,” the male represented his family and their
interests in all matters outside the home (Sapiro 1981). Sapiro argues that this is insufficient
and provides a foundation for the politics of presence.2 She also offers a counterpoint to
Pitkin’s argument about the incompatibility of descriptive representation and accountability.
By focusing on the struggle between privileged and disadvantaged groups, Sapiro suggests
that descriptive representation is often required for democratic accountability.

2

Descriptive representation is also commonly referred to as passive representation, self-representation, group
representation, and the politics of presence.
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Anne Phillips (1991) outlines why descriptive representation is important through four
arguments. The role model argument suggests that people from traditionally disadvantaged
population groups benefit from seeing one of their own in a position of power, which can be
life affirming. The justice argument contends that descriptive representation helps
recompense for injustices that have occurred in the past. Moreover, she argues that it is unjust
for White men who are well-off financially to dominate representational seats and that
descriptive representation plays a role in loosening their stranglehold on positions of power.
The overlooked interests argument notes that descriptive representation allows the
opportunity to illuminate political agendas, opinions, and perspectives that have been ignored
historically. Furthermore, Phillips suggests that deliberation and debate on public policy and
issues are improved through diversity. Finally, the revitalized democracy argument claims
that descriptive representation can yield positive results for democracy; namely, it has the
potential to enhance participation and accountability in democratic institutions. All told, these
arguments suggest descriptive representation is beneficial—at least in some small way, and
perhaps in some grand ways—to quality democratic governance.
In reality, democratic institutions are regularly assessed by the race, ethnicity, and
gender of their elected representatives (Guinier 1995; Paolino 1995). Theorists often claim
that political institutions are unjust when representatives from historically disadvantaged
groups are not present. Dovi summarizes the common theme among theorists working in the
realm of descriptive representation:
To be fully democratic, a society that has denied full political membership to certain
groups must be strongly committed to including those groups in its political life. Such
a commitment, at least in many circumstances, requires society to take active steps to
increase the number of descriptive representatives. (Dovi 2002, 729)
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Dovi tackles the formidable challenge of developing criteria for identifying descriptive
representatives. She suggests that “preferable descriptive representatives possess strong
mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups of historically disadvantaged groups” (Dovi
2002, 729). This shows a progression in the literature. The debate has moved from political
institutions ought to have descriptive representatives to descriptive representatives ought to
have certain qualities. Indeed, Dovi suggests moving beyond descriptive representation; yes,
we should have descriptive representatives in office, but some are preferable to others just like
any other candidate. We should have quality and competent descriptive representatives (Dovi
2002, 2007).
Finally, there is evidence suggesting descriptive representation translates into
substantive representation. Recall that Pitkin (1967) drew a line of distinction between passive
and active representation (i.e., standing for versus acting for). As a counterpoint, former
president of the American Political Science Association Jane Mansbridge (1999) argues that
descriptive representation must be in place if substantive representation is to occur. Michele
Swers (2005) offers empirical evidence to support this argument. She analyzes the impact of
identity on policy preferences and finds a clear linkage between descriptive and substantive
representation. Others find that women are more likely to support legislation on social
services, education, and health care than men (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Seltzer,
Newman, and Leighton 1997). This suggests, at a bare minimum, the potential for some
difference in policy preferences depending on the demographic characteristics of those in

48
office.3 For their part, Rodney Hero and Robert Preuhs (2007, 2013) have empirically shown
that Latin-Americans and African-Americans fair better, from a public policy standpoint,
under conditions of improved descriptive representation.
It is useful to remember that descriptive representation4 alone is not enough to
guarantee preferred policy outcomes in every instance. In other words, descriptive
representation may often be necessary but it is not sufficient for active representation. With
that said, evidence suggests a link between the two. Furthermore, there are compelling
arguments in support of descriptive representation dating back to the earliest days of the
American republic. Values such as justice, equality, equity, fairness, and accountability are
possible through descriptively representative democratic political institutions. While not a
panacea, descriptive representation can help foster inclusivity in an increasingly diverse
society. With this foundation in place, attention now turns to an exploration of the
demographic alignment of state legislatures and city councils with their constituencies.

Identifying the Gap: Data and Methodology
Descriptive representation may influence political effectiveness and can lead
constituents to feel more connected to legislators who share their demographic traits
(Frederick 2007; Mansbridge 1999). Furthermore, racial congruence between citizens and
3

Others have linked passive and active representation within congressional staff (Bell and Rosenthal 2003;
Rosenbloom and Featherstonhaugh 2003) and public service bureaucratic institutions (Hindera 1993).
4
There is ample literature on descriptive representation beyond that which is covered here. For instance, scholars
have looked into descriptive representation of women (Cammisa and Reingold 2004; Diamond and Hartsock
1981; Hughes 2011; Matland 1998; Phillips 1991; Reingold 1992; Sanbonmatsu 2003; Sapiro 1981), AfricanAmericans (Brouthers 1983; Herring and Forbes 1994; Rosenbloom and Featherstonhaugh 2003; Tate 2001),
Hispanics and Latin-Americans (Casellas 2011; Clifford 2012; Minta 2011; Taebel 1978), and generally,
representation among historically disadvantaged groups (Urbinati and Warren 2008; Williams 1998; Young
1990, 2000).
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their representative tends to enhance support and trust for that legislator while also leading to
more attempts by constituents to contact their representatives, suggesting more active civic
engagement (Gay 2002). But how demographically congruent are state legislatures—and city
councils—with their constituencies?
To answer this research question data were collected for population and legislature
demographics following the most recent decennial census in 2010. Consistent with others
(e.g., Frederick 2007), decennial U.S. Census Bureau figures, rather than annual predictions,
are used to maximize the accuracy of the population estimates. As time passes, migration
changes can cause population counts to shift dramatically, and the most precise data comes
from the first year of a new decade (Frederick 2007; U.S. Census Bureau 2014a).
Incorporating the most recent census data affords this project enhanced precision while also
retaining a contemporary cross-sectional approach. Population data were collected for all 50
states and for all cities in the United States with a population of at least 100,0005 in 2010.
This resulted in two original datasets: one containing state data with 50 cases and another with
city data and 274 cases.
Data on the racial makeup of populations has been collected ever since the first census
in 1790 (Hixson, Hepler, and Kim 2011). The White Population: 2010 Census Brief was used
to capture the number of Caucasian/White citizens residing in each state. This number was
subtracted from the total population figure to obtain the number of non-White residents in
each state. Finally, the percentage of the state’s non-White population in 2010 was calculated.
5

When studying cities in the United States, there is precedent for selecting a population threshold to limit the
number of cases. This research focuses on urban centers and populous municipalities so the 100,000 population
benchmark makes intuitive sense. In addition, others have used this specific population size to define the cases in
their dataset (e.g., Smith, Reingold, and Owens 2012).
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A similar process was used to identify the non-White population at the city level. The
non-White percentage of each city, with a population of at least 100,000 in 2010, was
obtained by using the United States Census Bureau’s, “State and County QuickFacts” (n.d.).
The data was collected and categorized for each of the 274 cases. This source reported
percentages directly, so the percentage of the population that was Caucasian/White was
collected and that figure was subtracted from 100 to obtain the percentage of the city’s
population that was non-White.
With race data gathered for both units of analysis, states and cities, attention turns to
the legislative body in each geographic area included here. The size of each state legislature
was collected using secondary data from the National Conference of State Legislatures
(2013). City council size was collected by visiting the websites of every municipality included
in the dataset. Mayors were not included as part of city councils even when they had a seat on
the council (e.g., Glendale, California; Huntington Beach, California; Modesto, California;
Ontario, California; Durham, North Carolina; Greensboro, North Carolina; Raleigh North
Carolina; Dayton, Ohio; Corpus Christi, Texas; Irving, Texas; Plano, Texas). For the purposes
of this project, mayors were considered approximately the equivalent of a governor at the
state level. As such, mayors were deemed part of the executive branch instead of the
legislative branch.6

6

It must be noted, the data on city council size and their demographic makeup was collected throughout the
early years of the second decade of the 21st century. No historic compilation of city council size and
demographics exists for all cities in the dataset. The issue of data collected over an extended period of time is not
particularly troublesome due to the infrequency of changes to the number of city council seats.
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Finally, the number of African-American/Black and Hispanic/Latino/a state legislators
and city councilmembers was captured for each case.7 State and city websites were used to
visually assess the racial makeup of the assembly since photos are often included online. With
the number of non-White representatives determined, the percentage of each state legislature
and city council that is non-White could be calculated.
The pieces are in now in place to answer the first research question: How
demographically congruent are state legislatures—and city councils—with their
constituencies? To assess racial congruence, the “gap” was identified between the non-White
population in the relevant constituency and the non-White makeup of the legislative body.
The racial gap was calculated by subtracting the percentage of the total population that is nonWhite from the percentage of the state legislature that is non-White. The same method was
used at the city level of analysis. In either instance, a positive figure indicates that the
legislature has relatively more racial minorities than the population at large. A negative figure
suggests underrepresentation—solely in terms of demographics—of racial minorities in the
legislature. A hypothetical gap value of “0” indicates a perfect demographic match between
the constituency and the legislature. Attention now turns to an exploration of the gap in
American states.

7

This measurement does not account for the small number of Asian-American, Hawaiian, and other Pacific
Islander representatives. The case of Hawaii is the most obvious example. To clarify, the state legislature in
Hawaii has no African-American or Hispanic members, but it is 100% non-White due to all members being
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander.
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The State Gap: State Legislatures and Demographic Congruence
Tremendous variation exists in terms of heterogeneity of populations and legislatures
at the state level of analysis. For example, just 4.7% of Vermont’s population was non-White
in 2010 compared to 75.3% in Hawaii. Hawaii has a large Asian population and,
unsurprisingly, a sizable group of Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders. The average
state was 23.3% non-White in 2010. Arkansas (23.0 %) is the state nearest to the mean. With
regard to legislatures, there were five states with completely White assemblies: Iowa, Maine,
North Dakota, and South Dakota. Hawaii’s state legislature was the only one in America that
is completely non-White; all of their state representatives were Native Hawaiians or other
Pacific Islanders.
Table 4 depicts each American state, sorted by the size of its racial gap. It is plain to
see the influence of Hawaii’s non-White legislature as it takes the top spot with a positive gap
figure of 24.7%. This number means that the state legislature had relatively more racial
minorities than the population at large. Hawaii was one of only three states where this was the
case; New Mexico and Florida also featured a relatively more diverse state assembly than
their population at large. This means there are 47 states in which non-White members of the
population were descriptively underrepresented.
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Table 4
Racial Gap Between State Representatives and Constituents, 2010

State
Hawaii

Percent
Non-White,
Constituency

Percent
Non-White,
Legislature

1,360,301

75.30

100.00

24.70

Population

Racial Gap

2,059,179

31.60

45.54

13.94

Florida

18,801,310

25.00

25.63

0.62

Texas

25,145,561

29.60

29.28

-0.32

Ohio

11,536,504

17.30

14.39

-2.91

1,852,994

6.10

2.24

-3.86

625,741

4.70

0.56

-4.14

12,830,632

28.50

24.29

-4.21

Michigan

9,883,640

21.10

16.89

-4.21

Maine

1,328,361

4.80

0.00

-4.80

New Hampshire

1,316,470

6.10

0.47

-5.63

Wyoming

563,626

9.30

3.33

-5.97

Alabama

4,779,736

31.50

25.00

-6.50

Indiana

6,483,802

15.70

8.67

-7.03

Missouri

5,988,927

17.20

10.15

-7.05

Kentucky

4,339,367

12.20

5.07

-7.13

Tennessee

6,346,105

22.40

14.39

-8.01

New Mexico

West Virginia
Vermont
Illinois

3,046,355

8.70

0.00

-8.70

37,253,956

42.40

33.33

-9.07

2,853,118

16.20

6.67

-9.53

New York

19,378,102

34.30

24.53

-9.77

Nebraska

1,826,341

13.90

4.08

-9.82

Montana

989,415

10.60

0.67

-9.93

1,567,582

10.90

0.95

-9.95

672,591

10.00

0.00

-10.00

Utah

2,763,885

13.90

3.85

-10.05

Connecticut

3,574,097

22.40

12.30

-10.10

Pennsylvania

12,702,379

18.10

7.91

-10.19

Arizona

6,392,017

27.00

16.67

-10.33

North Carolina

9,535,483

31.50

20.00

-11.50

South Carolina

4,625,364

33.80

21.76

-12.04

Mississippi

2,967,297

40.90

28.74

-12.16

New Jersey

8,791,894
31.40
(continued on following page)

19.17

-12.23

Iowa
California
Kansas

Idaho
North Dakota
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Table 4 (continued)

State

Population

Percent
Non-White,
Constituency

Percent
Non-White,
Legislature

Racial Gap

Massachusetts

6,547,629

19.60

7.00

-12.60

Arkansas

2,915,918

23.00

10.37

-12.63

Minnesota

5,303,925

14.70

1.99

-12.71

Wisconsin

5,686,986

13.80

0.76

-13.04

Oregon

3,831,074

16.40

3.33

-13.07

Rhode Island

1,052,567

18.60

5.31

-13.29

Colorado

5,029,196

18.70

5.00

-13.70

814,180

14.10

0.00

-14.10

Nevada

2,700,551

33.80

19.05

-14.75

Georgia

9,687,653

40.30

23.73

-16.57

Maryland

5,773,552

41.80

25.00

-16.80

Washington

6,724,540

22.70

3.40

-19.30

Louisiana

4,533,372

37.40

18.06

-19.34

Virginia

8,001,024

31.40

10.71

-20.69

897,934

31.10

9.68

-21.42

3,751,351

27.80

4.70

-23.10

South Dakota

Delaware
Oklahoma

710,231
33.30
1.67
-31.63
Alaska
Note: Population data reported from the 2010 Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
www.census.gov/2010census/data/. percentage of non-White population derived from
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml#none. percentage of non-White
legislators developed by visiting each state’s website. Racial gap calculated by subtracting the percentage of the
total population that is non-White from the percentage of the state legislature that is non-White. A positive figure
indicates that the legislature has relatively more racial minorities than the population at large. A negative figure
suggests underrepresentation—solely in terms of demographics—of racial minorities in the state legislature. A
hypothetical gap value of “0” indicates a perfect demographic match between the constituency and the
legislature.

Figure 1 visually depicts the racial gap between representatives and constituents. It is
plain to see the overwhelming underrepresentation when the data are portrayed in this way.
Alaska was furthest away from a perfect demographic match (i.e., a hypothetical gap value of
0) between citizens and the assembly. The three overrepresented states (Florida, New Mexico,
and Hawaii) are similarly easy to see. Figure 1 also visually depicts the near-perfect
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congruence of Texas, with a gap of -0.3%. All told, 94.0% of American states were
underrepresented demographically in 2010.

Alaska, -31.68

Hawaii, [VALUE]
-40.00

-30.00

-20.00

-10.00

0.00

10.00

20.00

30.00

Figure 1: Racial gap between state representatives and constituents, 2010.

The City Gap: City Councils and Demographic Congruence
The racial disparity between representative assemblies and populations at large was
even more pronounced at the city level of analysis. Due to the number of cases in the city
dataset (n = 274), only the most racially overrepresented (Table 5) and underrepresented
(Table 6) are included here.
Due to the minimum size criteria, the cities included are naturally more diverse, on
average, than less populous municipalities (see Dahl and Tufte 1973, 13-14). For example,
when considering all 274 cases, the average percentage of non-Whites in the cities included is
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51.2%. Stated differently, in America’s largest cities, more than half of their 2010 populations
are non-White, on average. Austin, Texas, is nearest the mean value with 51.3% of its
population non-White. At the extremes are Fargo, North Dakota, and Miami Gardens, Florida.
Fargo has the smallest percentage of non-White citizens at just 11.0%. On the opposite end of
the spectrum, Miami Gardens, a city of 107,167 people, is 97.4% non-White.
With regard to city council diversity, there are 68 councils that consist solely of White
representatives. Put differently, a quarter (24.8 %) of cities with populations of 100,000 or
more had no African-American or Hispanic councilmembers at the time of this study.
Conversely, there are just ten cities with 100% non-White city councils. This finding
highlights the unevenness of descriptive representation at the local level, much like some of
the previous work on the topic (e.g., Herring and Forbes 1994; Karnig and Welch 1982; Shah,
Marschall, and Ruhil 2013; Taebel 1978), which has uncovered the underrepresentation of
minorities on local assemblies. We will return to this momentarily.
Table 5 shows the demographic race gap between city councils and their
constituencies. Included here are the top 20 most racially “overrepresented” municipalities.
The gap is calculated precisely the same way as discussed earlier at the state level. It is
perhaps unsurprising to see Honolulu, Hawaii, with a council more diverse than its citizenry.
The state of Hawaii has the top spot in the state analysis (see Table 4; Figure 1), so it makes
intuitive sense that Honolulu is near the top of Table 5. When considering all 274 cases, there
are 30 municipalities with a positive racial gap, or the overrepresentation of minorities.
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Table 5
Twenty Most Racially Overrepresented: Racial Gap Between City
Councilmembers and Constituents, 2010

State

Population

percent
Non-White,
Constituency

Honolulu

HI

337,884

77.00

100.00

33.00

Columbus

OH

787,033

40.70

57.14

16.44

Miramar

FL

122,041

88.40

100.00

11.60

Newark

NJ

277,140

88.40

100.00

11.60

Atlanta

GA

420,003

63.70

75.00

11.30

Savannah

GA

136,286

63.80

75.00

11.20

Santa Ana

CA

324,528

90.80

100.00

9.20

New Haven

CT

129,779

68.20

76.67

8.47

Detroit

MI

713,777

92.20

100.00

7.80

Hampton

VA

137,436

59.00

66.67

7.67

Billings

MT

104,170

13.10

20.00

6.90

Murfreesboro

TN

108,755

26.90

33.33

6.43

Peoria

AZ

154,065

27.80

33.33

5.53

El Monte

CA

113,475

95.10

100.00

4.90

Hialeah

FL

224,669

95.80

100.00

4.20

West Valley City

UT

129,480

46.30

50.00

3.70

Cincinnati

OH

296,943

51.90

55.56

3.66

Laredo

TX

236,091

96.60

100.00

3.40

Inglewood

CA

109,673

97.10

100.00

2.90

City

percent
Non-White,
Council

Racial Gap

TN
132,929
38.90
41.67
2.77
Clarksville
Note: Population and demographic data reported from the 2010 Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html. City council data derive from the official city websites of each
municipality. Racial gap calculated by subtracting the percentage of the total population that is non-White from
the percentage of the city council that is non-White. A positive figure indicates that the council has relatively
more racial minorities than the population at large.

Table 6 elucidates the problem of underrepresentation in American city councils.
Municipalities in California and Texas appear to be particularly challenged, with many failing
to achieve even reasonable levels of descriptive representation. Of the top 20
underrepresented cities in Table 6, fifteen are located in California and four are situated in
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Texas. The most extreme example is Garden Grove, California, which has a very diverse
population (77.4% non-White) but has no non-White councilmembers. Palmdale, Fremont,
and Anaheim, California, as well as Grand Prairie, Texas, are in very similar situations with
racial gaps all in excess of -70.

Table 6
Twenty Most Racially Underrepresented: Racial Gap Between
City Councilmembers and Constituents, 2010

City
Garden Grove

State
CA

Population
170,883

Percent
Non-White,
Constituency
77.40

Percent
Non-White,
Council
0.00

Racial
Gap
-77.40

Palmdale

CA

152,750

75.50

0.00

-75.50

Fremont

CA

214,089

73.50

0.00

-73.50

Anaheim

CA

336,265

72.50

0.00

-72.50

Grand Prairie

TX

175,396

70.90

0.00

-70.90

Lancaster

CA

156,633

65.80

0.00

-65.80

Sunnyvale

CA

140,081

65.50

0.00

-65.50

Santa Clara

CA

116,468

63.90

0.00

-63.90

Bakersfield

CA

347,483

62.20

0.00

-62.20

Elk Grove

CA

153,015

61.90

0.00

-61.90

Fullerton

CA

135,161

61.80

0.00

-61.80

San Jose

CA

945,942

71.30

10.00

-61.30

West Covina

CA

106,098

84.70

25.00

-59.70

Fontana

CA

196,069

84.60

25.00

-59.60

Mesquite

TX

139,824

58.40

0.00

-58.40

Rancho Cucamonga

CA

165,269

57.30

0.00

-57.30

Visalia

CA

124,442

55.70

0.00

-55.70

New Orleans

LA

343,829

69.50

14.29

-55.21

McAllen

TX

129,877

88.30

33.33

-54.97

Irvine

TX

212,375

54.90

0.00

-54.90

Note: Population and demographic data reported from the 2010 Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html. City council data derive from the official city websites of each
municipality. Racial gap calculated by subtracting the percentage of the total population that is non-White from
the percentage of the city council that is non-White. A negative figure suggests underrepresentation—solely in
terms of demographics—of racial minorities in the city council.
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The interplay of population and legislature is once again highlighted in the case of
McAllen, Texas. With a 33.3% non-White council, McAllen’s local assembly is actually more
diverse than the average city (mean = 27.8% non-White) when considering all 274 cases. Yet
the average population is 51.2% non-White and McAllen comes in at 88.3%. Despite the
diversity of McAllen’s council, it is the 19th most descriptively underrepresented city in this
study largely due to its population heterogeneity. Yet again, we are reminded that population
and legislatures must not be viewed in isolation when studying representation.
Figure 2 portrays the racial gap from Table 6. A quick comparison with Figure 1
indicates that American cities are even less demographically congruent than American states
in 2010. The upper portion displays those municipalities with negative racial gaps. There are
244 underrepresented cities (89.1% of the dataset; n = 274) compared to 30 overrepresented
cities (11.0% of the dataset; n = 274).

Garden Grove, 77.40

Honolulu, 33.00
-100.00

-80.00

-60.00

-40.00

-20.00

0.00

20.00

Figure 2: Racial gap between state representatives and constituents, 2010.

40.00
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A Closer Look at State Legislatures: African-Americans,
Latino/as, and Women
To this point, the evidence suggests that American legislatures at the sub-national
level are quite unrepresentative of their constituencies when it comes to comparing the nonWhite demographic profile. More evidence can be uncovered by breaking down the macro
“non-White” measure and investigating this phenomenon among specific demographic
groups, namely African-Americans and Latino/as, but also females, or gender-based
comparisons. Data for African-American and Latino/a representatives was obtained by
accessing state legislature and city council websites individually. At the state level, data on
female representatives was gathered from the National Conference of State Legislatures
(2010). For city councilwomen, the information was collected by visiting the websitesof all
274 municipalities.

African-Americans
Table 7 portrays the demographic gap between state legislatures and their
constituencies for explicit population groups.8 Beginning with African-Americans, it is plain
to see that no mirror image exists between legislatures and the populace; however, state
legislatures are more descriptively representative of African-American constituents than either
Latino/as or females. The typical African-American gap is -3.3%, suggesting some
underrepresentation at the state level, on average. Connecticut has this exact gap value. Four
states—Ohio, Nevada, Illinois, and California—are “overrepresentative,” meaning that there

8

States in Table 7 are sorted alphabetically since there are three “gap variables” of interest.
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Table 7
African-American, Latino/a, and Female Gap Between State
Representatives and Constituents, 2010

State
Alabama

Population
4,779,736

AfricanAmerican Gap
-1.80

Latino/a Gap
-3.90

Female Gap
-38.64

710,231

-3.00

-5.50

-26.33

Arizona

6,392,017

-2.77

-15.16

-18.08

Arkansas

2,915,918

-5.70

-6.40

-27.94

California

37,253,956

3.63

-15.10

-23.63

Colorado

5,029,196

-2.97

-17.70

-11.90

Connecticut

3,574,097

-3.33

-9.12

-19.21

897,934

-14.87

-6.59

-25.79

Florida

18,801,310

-0.77

-13.13

-27.35

Georgia

9,687,653

-9.07

-7.53

-31.71

Hawaii

1,360,301

-2.85

-8.90

-17.01

Idaho

1,567,582

-1.02

-10.25

-24.19

Illinois

12,830,632

2.12

-9.02

-22.75

Indiana

6,483,802

-2.09

-5.33

-29.47

Iowa

3,046,355

-3.72

-5.00

-27.17

Kansas

2,853,118

-2.85

-8.08

-20.10

Kentucky

4,339,367

-3.60

-3.10

-34.86

Louisiana

4,533,372

-14.74

-4.20

-35.03

Maine

1,328,361

-1.64

-1.30

-22.07

Maryland

5,773,552

-8.03

-6.07

-20.22

Massachusetts

6,547,629

-3.26

-7.10

-26.10

Michigan

9,883,640

-0.37

-2.37

-25.90

Minnesota

5,303,925

-5.18

-3.70

-15.57

Mississippi

2,967,297

-8.86

-2.70

-37.03

Missouri

5,988,927

-2.84

-2.99

-28.66

Montana

989,415

-0.80

-2.23

-23.80

Nebraska

1,826,341

-1.34

-9.20

-29.99

Nevada

2,700,551

1.69

-18.56

-17.75

New Hampshire

1,316,470

-1.41

-2.56

-13.91

New Jersey

8,791,894

-2.29

-11.03

-22.97

New Mexico

2,059,179

-0.98

-2.55

-20.24

-9.11

-27.54

Alaska

Delaware

New York

-1.17
19,378,102
(continued on following page)
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Table 7 (continued)
State
North Carolina

Population
9,535,483

AfricanAmerican Gap
-3.74

Latino/a Gap
-7.22

Female Gap
-25.42

-1.65

-2.00

-33.19

11,536,504

1.03

-3.10

-29.23

Oklahoma

3,751,351

-4.70

-8.23

-39.09

Oregon

3,831,074

-0.35

-10.59

-21.61

Pennsylvania

12,702,379

-4.36

-5.30

-35.88

Rhode Island

1,052,567

-4.74

-9.75

-29.58

South Carolina

4,625,364

-7.04

-5.10

-41.40

814,180

-1.81

-2.70

-30.00

6,346,105

-3.81

-3.84

-32.36

25,145,561

-3.76

-17.16

-26.64

2,763,885

-1.56

-9.15

-27.68

Vermont

625,741

-0.93

-1.50

-13.48

Virginia

8,001,024

-10.67

-7.19

-31.61

Washington

6,724,540

-3.47

-9.16

-17.55

West Virginia

1,852,994

-1.91

-1.20

-34.28

Wisconsin

5,686,986

-7.10

-5.14

-28.43

North Dakota
Ohio

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

672,591

-0.18
-6.68
-32.33
563,626
Wyoming
Note: Population data reported from the 2010 Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
www.census.gov/2010census/data/. percentage of African-Americans, Latino/as, and females derived from
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml#none. percentage of African-American,
Latino/as, and female legislators created by visiting each state’s website and manually coding demographic
information. Each gap is calculated by subtracting the percentage of the total population that is AfricanAmerican, Latino/a, or female from the corresponding percentage of the state legislature that falls into each
demographic group. A positive figure indicates that the legislature has relatively more racial minorities or
women than the population at large. A negative figure suggests underrepresentation—solely in terms of
demographics—in the state legislature. A hypothetical gap value of “0” indicates a perfect demographic match
between the constituency and the legislature.

is a higher percentage of African-Americans in state legislative seats than the corresponding
percentage in the general population. On the other end, Delaware and Louisiana are the most
demographically “underrepresentative” of African-Americans, with gap values of -14.9 and
-14.7%, respectively.

63
Latino/as
The average Latino/a gap is -7.01, once again suggesting general demographic
underrepresentation. In this case, however, all 50 states have negative gap values, suggesting
across the board demographic underrepresentation for Latino/as. West Virginia comes closest
to a gap value of “0” at -1.2. Nevada has the largest Latino/a gap at -18.6. Stepping back for a
moment, 18.0% of states have gaps in excess of ten percent.

Females
Including gender allows for additional insight beyond race or ethnicity. It is here that
we see the gap balloon substantially. Indeed, women are the least descriptively represented
group in this analysis. Once again all 50 states have negative gap values; South Carolina has
the largest gap at -41.4%. Specifically, the population in South Carolina is 51.4% female9 and
only 10.0% of state representatives are women. In fact, South Carolina has one of the largest
female populations proportionally, but it has the smallest percentage of legislative seats held
by women—just 17 seats in an assembly of 170 members. The smallest gap is found in
Colorado at -11.9%. For perspective, the smallest female gap (in Colorado) is nearly as large
as the biggest African-American gap (Delaware, -14.8%). The average gap value in this area
is -26.5% and Alaska is the state nearest the mean (-23.3%).

9

The percentage of the population that is female fluctuated between 48.0% (Alaska) and 51.7% (Rhode Island)
in 2010.
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A Closer Look at City Councils: African-Americans,
Latino/as, and Women
Attention now turns to deeper exploration of the descriptive gap at the city level.
Using only the non-White measure leaves room for measurement error, so three common
demographic groups provide an additional lens through which to view descriptive
representation in city councils across the United States.

African-Americans
Portraying this information in a single table is unwieldy considering the 274 cases at
this unit of analysis. Instead, the twenty cities that are most underrepresented are provided for
each demographic group. Turning first to African-Americans (see Table 8), there is much
more variation at the city level than at the state level. The most underrepresented city—in
terms of African-American descriptive representation—is New Orleans, Louisiana, with a gap
value of -60.2%. The most overrepresented city, not show in the table, has a value of 48.0%
(West Valley City, Utah). The average value (-1.6%) is relatively close to the perfect
demographic match of “0”; the “mirror image” is nearer at the city level than at the state level
(-3.3%), on average. New York City’s value of -0.01% is the closest in terms of perfect
congruence between African-Americans on the city council and in the population at large.
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Table 8
Twenty Most Underrepresented: African-American Gap Between
City Councilmembers and Constituents, 2010
City

State

Population

African-American
Gap

New Orleans

LA

343,829

-60.20

Raleigh

NC

403,892

-29.30

Shreveport

LA

199,311

-26.13

Chattanooga

TN

167,674

-23.79

Vallejo

CA

115,942

-22.10

Mesquite

TX

139,824

-21.80

Lancaster

CA

156,633

-20.50

Grand Prairie

TX

175,396

-20.20

Killeen

TX

127,921

-19.81

Pembroke Pines

FL

154,750

-19.80

Virginia Beach

VA

437,994

-19.60

Coral Springs

FL

121,096

-17.90

Palm Bay

FL

103,190

-17.90

Antioch

CA

102,372

-17.30

Chesapeake

VA

222,209

-17.30

Richmond

VA

204,214

-17.27

Victorville

CA

115,903

-16.80

Hollywood

FL

140,768

-16.70

Port St. Lucie

FL

164,603

-16.30

Providence

RI
178,042
-16.00
Note: Population and demographic data reported from the 2010 Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html. City council data derive from the official city websites of each
municipality and manually coding demographic information. African-American gap calculated by subtracting
the percentage of the total population that is African-American from the corresponding percentage of the city
council. A negative figure suggests underrepresentation—solely in terms of demographics—of AfricanAmericans in the city council.
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Latino/as
The average Latino/a gap at the city level (-12.4 %) is more noticeable than at the state
level (-7.01). Palmdale, California, has the largest gap (-54.4 %), suggesting rather severe
descriptive underrepresentation (see Table 9). Interestingly, only three of the twenty most
underrepresented cities for this population group fall outside of California or Texas. Both
states continue to experience a Latino/a population boom and electing descriptively
representative councilmembers has typically not kept pace. With that said, there are
exceptions. The six most overrepresented cities—Daly City, El Monte, Santa Ana, Antioch,
Laredo, and Chula Vista—have gap values ranging from 51.3 to 16.8 and are all situated in
California or Texas. In total, 243 of 274 (88.7 %) city councils underrepresent their Latino/a
constituents, while only 31 (11.3 %) overrepresent this sub-population.

Table 9
Twenty Most Underrepresented: Latino/a Gap Between City Councilmembers and Constituents, 2010
City

State

Population

Latino/a Gap

Palmdale

CA

152,750

-54.40

West Covina

CA

106,098

-53.20

Anaheim

CA

336,265

-52.80

McAllen

TX

129,877

-51.27

Pasadena

TX

137,122

-49.70

Visalia

CA

124,442

-46.00

San Bernardino

CA

209,924

-45.71

Bakersfield

CA

347,483

-45.50

Elgin

IL

108,188

-43.60

Grand Prairie

TX

175,396

-42.70

Fontana

CA

196,069

-41.80

(continued on following page)
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Table 9 (continued)
City

State

Population

Latino/a Gap

Irving

TX

216,290

-41.10

Lancaster

CA

156,633

-38.00

Garland

TX

226,876

-37.80

Santa Clara

CA

116,468

-37.70

Garden Grove

CA

170,883

-36.90

Oceanside

CA

167,086

-35.90

Costa Mesa

CA

109,960

-35.80

Pueblo

CO

106,595

-35.51

Paterson

NJ

146,199

-35.38

Note: Population and demographic data reported from the 2010 Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html. City council data derive from the official city websites of each
municipality and manually coding demographic information. Latino/a gap calculated by subtracting the
percentage of the total population that is Latino/a from the corresponding percentage of the city council. A
negative figure suggests underrepresentation—solely in terms of demographics—of Latino/as in the city council.

Females
Finally, females are also underrepresented at the city level, on average (see Table 10).
The typical municipality is underrepresented to the tune of a -21.5% gap value, which is much
higher than either the African-American (-1.6 %) or the Latino/a (-12.3 %) gap at the city
level. The average state gap (-26.5 %) for females is larger than at the city level (-21.5 %), but
not by much. At the extremities, Montgomery, Alabama, has the largest gap (-53.0 %)
compared to the state of South Carolina at -41.4%. Conversely, cities have more instances of
female overrepresentation than states. The closest match for female demographic
representation at the state level is Colorado (-11.9 %) and at the city level is New Orleans,
Louisiana (34.1 %). Interestingly, the Big Easy city legislature has an overrepresentation of
females while also embodying a gross underrepresentation of African-American citizens.
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Table 10
Twenty Most Underrepresented: Female Gap Between
City Councilmembers and Constituents, 2010
City

State

Population

Female Gap

Montgomery

AL

205,764

-53.00

West Covina

CA

106,098

-51.80

Surprise

AZ

117,517

-51.70

Hartford

CT

124,775

-51.70

Fort Wayne

IN

253,691

-51.60

Augusta-Richmond

GA

200,549

-51.60

Downey

CA

111,772

-51.50

Huntsville

AL

180,105

-51.40

Lafayette

LA

120,623

-51.40

Visalia

CA

124,442

-51.20

Frisco

TX

116,989

-51.10

Fullerton

CA

135,161

-50.90

Fresno

CA

494,665

-50.90

Stamford

CT

122,643

-50.70

Norwalk

CA

105,549

-50.40

Fort Lauderdale

FL

165,521

-47.20

Milwaukee

WI

594,833

-45.13

Boston

MA

617,594

-44.41

Charleston

SC

120,083

-44.37

Los Angeles

CA

3,792,621

-43.53

Note: Population and demographic data reported from the 2010 Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html. City council data derive from the official city websites of each
municipality and manually coding demographic information. Female gap calculated by subtracting the
percentage of the total population that is female from the corresponding percentage of the city council. A
negative figure suggests underrepresentation—solely in terms of demographics—of females in the city council.

Table 11 summarizes this analysis of descriptive representation across all previously
mentioned groups: non-White, African-American, Latino/a, and female. Unanimously, the
minimum and maximum values at the city level are more extreme than at the state level of
analysis. This is reiterated by viewing the standard deviations, which are noticeably larger in
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the city dataset. A primary reason for this difference is the size of each dataset (n = 50, states;
n = 274, cities), which allows for more variation in values at the city level. When displayed
side-by-side, however, it is plain to see that each demographic group is underrepresented at
both units of analysis, on average. It appears the non-White findings are bolstered by the
secondary analysis of racial/ethnic subgroups and a gender analysis.

Table 11
Summary of Descriptive Representation in States and Cities

Min
Max
Mean
St Dev

NonWhite
Gap
-31.63
24.70
-9.73
8.50

STATES
AfricanAmerican
Latino/a
Gap
Gap
-14.87
-18.56
3.63
-1.20
-3.33
-7.01
3.66
4.40

Female
Gap
-41.40
-11.90
-26.45
7.01

NonWhite
Gap
-77.40
33.00
-23.33
18.98

CITIES
AfricanAmerican
Latino/a
Gap
Gap
-60.20
-54.40
48.00
51.30
-1.59
-12.42
10.96
14.28

Female
Gap
-53.00
34.11
-21.47
16.66

Conclusion
Descriptive representation has been a topic of debate in the United States since the
earliest days of the republic. Political theorists argue that values such as justice, equality,
equity, fairness, and accountability are possible through descriptively representative political
institutions. At a bare minimum, descriptive representation, particularly in legislatures,
suggests a notion of inclusivity.
This chapter painted a portrait of demographic congruence between representatives
and constituents at the state and city levels. First, the racial “gap” was identified between the
size of the non-White population in constituencies and the non-White makeup of legislatures.
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The racial gap was calculated by subtracting the percentage of the total population that is nonWhite from the percentage of the state legislature or city council that is non-White. Next, a
deeper look at this phenomenon was offered by breaking down the macro “non-White”
measure. Descriptive gaps were identified for African-Americans, Latino/as, and females.
Finally, summary statistics revealed the differences between these three sub-groups and also
between states and cities.
At the state level, females were the most underrepresented group—from a purely
demographic standpoint. At the city level, the most underrepresented group was the aggregate
measure, non-Whites; however, females were very close behind. All groups were
descriptively underrepresented, on average, no matter the unit of analysis or the subpopulation analyzed. Finally, there was considerably more variation in gap values at the city
level, with standard deviations at least twice as large as the corresponding figure for states.
The consensus in existing literature is that, while difficult to measure, descriptive
representation has intrinsic value (Canon 2005). The difficulty comes in the measurement of
“value.” On the topic of African-American majority districts, Abigail Thernstrom argues:
Whether on a city council, on a county commission, or in the state legislature, blacks
inhibit the expression of prejudice, act as spokesmen for black interests, dispense
patronage, and often facilitate the discussion of topics (such as black crime) that
whites are reluctant to raise. That is, governing bodies function differently when they
are racially mixed, particularly where blacks are new to politics and where racially
insensitive language and discrimination in the provision of services are longestablished political habits. (Thernstrom 1989, 239)
Stated differently, introducing diversity has the capacity to encourage others to be more
inclusive, shift the terms or focus of debate, introduce issues that would not otherwise be
discussed, and encourage tolerance (see also Canon 2005). Politicians, scholars, and citizens
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alike who favor democratic values and discourse can appreciate these less tangible benefits of
descriptive representation. Yet, this chapter showed a relatively grim outlook for descriptive
representation in the United States.
The chapter began with a question: How demographically congruent are state
legislatures—and city councils—with their constituencies? The answer: not very. A
substantial demographic void exists between representatives and those they represent. At the
outset of this chapter, “exact portraits,” “mirror images” and other creative descriptions of
how assemblies ought to look in relation to their constituencies were discussed. In
contemporary America, there are almost no exact portraits and precious few portraits
representing close approximations. Furthermore, the portrait becomes even more akin to
abstract expressionism when considering descriptive representation at the local level.

CHAPTER FOUR
UNDERSTANDING THE GAP: LEGISLATURE SIZE AND DESCRIPTIVE
REPRESENTATION

“…the legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society…the faithful echo
of the voices of the people” (James Wilson 1787).

So far a few points have become clear. First, political philosophers, Founding Fathers,
contemporary political scientists, and politicians alike have struggled with the challenge of
how large or small a representative legislature ought to be. When making these
determinations, there are important tradeoffs to consider. Namely, larger legislatures are more
representative, in theory, but decision-making costs typically increase with the number of
legislative seats and the assembly becomes less functional overall (Buchanan and Tullock
1962; Dahl and Tufte 1973). Next, population size and legislature size must not be viewed in
isolation. Analyses reported in Chapter Two repeatedly make this point, with the lesson being
that a shift in the size of either the political community or the legislature can alter the
dynamics of the representational experience. Finally, the findings from Chapter Three suggest
that state legislatures and city councils are often not demographically congruent with the
constituencies they represent. With this foundation in place, the time has come to connect
these dots by empirically exploring the relationship between legislature size and descriptive
representation.
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This chapter seeks to address the following question: Is the size of legislatures
associated with the demographic gap between state legislatures—and city councils—and their
constituencies? To this point, the existence of a demographic gap has been identified in the
majority of American states and cities; however, the next step introduces legislature size into
the equation. If size does indeed matter, then steps need to be taken to provide evidence to
better understand the ways in which size matters. This chapter takes a necessary first step by
suggesting that the relative size of sub-national legislatures has an interesting, albeit uneven,
relationship with descriptive representation.

Legislature Size and Descriptive Representation
Scholars have noticed “one of the peculiar features of the American legislative
systems [is] that only those with relatively high occupational status have a good chance of
achieving legislative membership” (Squire and Hamm 2005, 131). Others find the typical
state representative is a White male, well educated, and well off financially (Moncrief, Squire,
and Jewell 2000). These earlier works suggest there is an important demographic gap, one
that might expose some constituent groups to less quality substantive representation.
Robert Preuhs convincingly shows that the descriptive representation of AfricanAmericans (2006) and Latino/as (2007) in state legislatures can influence the level of
government service these groups can hope to obtain. Preuhs’ argument suggests that the size
of a legislature1 may matter, if smaller legislatures are found to be less descriptively

1

For a review of literature on legislature size, see Chapter Two.
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representative. A closer look at the relationship between legislature size and the descriptive
representation of specific demographic groups is in order.
The representation of Latino/as, specifically, has received substantial attention in the
past 10 to 15 years (Casellas 2009, 2011; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Preuhs 2007; Sanchez and
Morin 2011; Wilson 2010), but the findings tend to be mixed. Some scholars find a
significant relationship (Trounstine and Valdini 2008) between assembly size and Latino/a
representation and others do not (Casellas 2009). Despite null findings, Jason Casellas (2009)
offers the first study to compare Latino/a descriptive representation between the U.S.
Congress and state legislatures. His cross-sectional, time-series model fails to identify a
significant relationship between legislature size and Latino/a representation in 1992, 1996,
2000, and 2004, yet his work invites more studies of descriptive representation, particularly at
the sub-national level.
At the local level, scholars have identified assembly size as an important factor in
bolstering representation of African-Americans. Melissa Marschall, Anirudh Ruhil and Paru
Shah (2010) study representation in city councils and on local school boards. They find that
the number of legislative seats2 is an overlooked phenomenon in studies of representation and
empirically link the number of seats available to enhanced descriptive representation of
African-Americans. The authors hypothesize that city council size
matters in these situations because people are less fearful of sharing when there is
more to distribute…voters may feel more comfortable with diversity in an AL [atlarge] election with a large number of open seats, especially when contrasted with the
zero-sum proposition of an SMD [single-member district]. (Marschall, Ruhil, and Shar
2010, 123)
2

Others find that the most powerful predictor of African-American representation is the size of the Black
population due to racial bloc voting (Bullock and Campbell 1984; Murray and Vedlitz 1978).

75
Delbert Taebel uses similar language when theorizing why larger city councils promote
African-American and Hispanic representation: “If there are only a few slices in the pie
[council seats] the white majority may not be very enthusiastic about sharing” (Taebel 1978,
151).
With regard to females, there is quite a bit of theorizing related to legislature size and
descriptive representation. For instance, some piggyback on the pie analogy by noting that “if
there are only a few slices in the pie the white male political majority may not be very
enthusiastic about sharing” (Alozie and Manganaro 1993, 386). Others promote a
prestige/desirability hypothesis, which suggests that councils with more seats are less
prestigious and, as such, holding a seat is less desirable (Karnig and Welch 1979).
Accordingly, this theory posits that women will attain more council seats in larger legislative
bodies. To be clear, this claim has not received much empirical support (Bullock and
MacManus 1991; Herrick and Welch 1992; Karnig and Welch 1979). In the end, much like
other demographic groups, the empirical findings related to legislature size and female
representation are mixed. Some scholars uncover significant evidence suggesting council size
enhances female representation (Trounstine and Valdini 2008), but others note that “council
size does not explain the degree of women’s representation” and only find a relationship in
district election municipalities (Alozie and Manganaro 1993, 393).
The lack of a clear association between legislature size and descriptive representation
suggests we are traversing into unsettled territory. Decades of research has been unable to
definitively answer the question: Is the size of legislatures associated with the demographic
gap between state legislatures—and city councils—and their constituencies? While the
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following does not conclusively close the book on this matter, the findings presented later
offer some additional insight on the descriptive representation of legislatures of varying size
in contemporary American society.

Understanding the Gap: Data and Methodology
As mentioned in Chapter Three, this project has resulted in the creation of two new
datasets containing information for all American states and every city in the United States
with a population of 100,000 or more according to the 2010 decennial census. The following
variables are used to understand the relationship between legislature size and descriptive
representation.
State Legislature Size—This is the number of seats in the state assembly. The lower
and upper chambers are combined to yield the total figure for all 50 states with the exception
of Nebraska. Nebraska has a unicameral legislature; as a result, the single amount is included
for Nebraska’s total legislature size.
City Council Size—This is the number of seats in 274 city councils representing
municipalities in the United States with a population of 100,000 or more. Mayors are not
included in the city council figures. For the purposes of this project, mayors are considered
comparable to governors and are classified as executive rather than legislative positions.
Constituents per Representative—This is the number of constituents represented by
each legislator/councilmember in a given state or municipality. The variable is calculated for
both the state and city datasets. The value at the state level is determined as follows: state
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legislature size/state population, and at the city level: city council size/city population.3 This
provides an alternative measure of legislature size. By including population, the indicators
become a measure of the relative size of assemblies, which allows for more meaningful
comparisons.
Demographic Gaps (Non-White, Latino/a, African-American, Female)—The
percentage of a state/city population and the percentage of the corresponding legislature (i.e.,
state legislature or city council) are differenced (percent in population – percent in
legislature), yielding four “gap” variables.4 The absolute value of this difference is used to
facilitate reporting. Basically, a larger gap means that there is less demographic congruence
compared to a smaller gap that suggests a tighter descriptive fit between representatives and
constituents.5
To test the relationship gap, demographic variables are correlated to the relative size
of state legislatures and city councils as well as the constituents per representative variables
for each unit of analysis. In theory, a larger legislature, on average, will be more
heterogeneous than a relatively smaller legislature. Accordingly, more legislative seats ought

3

Population and demographic data are obtained from the 2010 Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau,
www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html. Legislature size data are collected from the National Conference of
State Legislatures, www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/number-of-legislators-and-length-ofterms.aspx. City council data come from the official city website of each municipality.
4
Percentage of non-White population derived from
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml#none. Percentage of non-White
legislators was obtained by visiting each state and city website. Percentage of African-Americans, Latino/as, and
females is derived from http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml#none. The
percentage of African-American, Latino/as, and female legislators is obtained by visiting each state and city
website.
5
By using the absolute value, whether a state or city is over-represented or under-represented is disregarded in
favor of a parsimonious value for congruence. It is worth noting there are no state legislatures that over-represent
females or Latino/as, and just three that barely over-represent African-Americans. At the city level, less than
32% of cases over-represented African-Americans, less than 11% of municipalities over-represented Latino/as,
and less than nine percent over-represented females.
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to correlate with a smaller representation gap (i.e., negative relationship). On the other hand,
more constituents per representative (i.e., smaller legislature relative to the population) should
correlate with a larger descriptive gap (i.e., positive relationship).
To illustrate, in 2010, 17.5% of the Illinois state legislature was African-American
while this group made up 15.4% of the state population. Contrast this close demographic
match with South Carolina. In 2010, females held just 10.0% of all state legislature seats, yet
they made up 51.4% of the population, resulting in a strikingly large gap. At the city level, St.
Louis, Missouri, had a very tight Latino/a match (3.6% of city council seats; 3.5% of
population) in 2010. On the other hand, Garden Grove, California, had a very large non-White
representation gap at the city level in 2010. The four-seat council consisted of all White
members and the population was 77.4% non-White. Once again, the question becomes: Is the
size of legislatures associated with the demographic gap between state legislatures—and city
councils—and their constituencies?

Results
Table 12 exhibits bivariate correlations between state legislature size and various
population groups. As noted above, legislature size is operationalized in two ways: 1) the
number of seats in the assembly and 2) the number of legislative seats divided by the state
population. It can be noted when using the first measure of size that non-Whites and Latino/as
are more likely to be proportionally represented in larger state legislatures (p < .05). Put
differently, the tests for non-Whites and Latino/as produce the hypothesized negative
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Table 12
Descriptive Representation of State Legislatures: Correlation with Select Populations, 2010

Gap between the % of the Population
and the % of the State Legislature
Non-White
African-American
Latino/a
Female

State Legislature Size
-.323*
.023
-.304*
-.063

Constituents per State
Representative
-.237*
-.048
.517**
-.041

** p < .01; * p < .05 (one-tailed tests)
N = 50
Note: A negative relationship is expected between state legislature size and the demographic gaps. Put
differently, a legislature with more seats is expected to have a smaller demographic gap than a corresponding
legislature with fewer seats. A positive relationship is expected between constituents per representative and the
gap variables. A constituency with more members has a smaller relative legislature; as a result, the gap is
expected to be larger in these communities.

relationship, suggesting that larger state legislatures correspond with improved demographic
congruence. The relationship between legislature size and female representation is in the
expected direction; however, the analysis yields a bivariate coefficient that is not statistically
significant. On the other hand, the test of African-American demographic representation
produces a positive coefficient suggesting this group is better represented in smaller
legislatures, but the difference also does not meet standard conventions for statistical
significance.
The second operationalization of legislature size incorporates population data. As
discussed throughout this project, viewing legislature size without concern for population or
constituency size can be misleading due to the variance in the constituents per representative
quotient.6 Similar results are obtained, but now the results for Latino/as are even stronger. In
states with more constituents per legislator (i.e., relatively smaller legislatures), Latino/as
6

See Chapter Two for more detail on the interplay between legislature and population size.
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experience less descriptive representation (p < .01). In populous states such as California,
Texas, Florida, and New York, Latino/as are noticeably underrepresented, which contributes
to this association. The plot thickens, however, when considering the other demographic
groups. Non-Whites, women, and African-Americans all enjoy more congruent descriptive
representation as constituency size increases. This positive relationship contradicts the
expectation that smaller constituencies will associate with smaller demographic gaps between
legislatures and the population at large. Notably, however, only non-Whites are statistically
significant in this un-hypothesized direction (p < .05) and the bivariate correlation is only .24.
Viewing this puzzle at the city level of analysis yields similar results in that
statistically significant relationships are identified for non-Whites and Latino/as, but not
African-Americans or females. Once again, a negative relationship is expected between city
council size and the various demographic gaps, which is the case in each instance except
females. Non-White (p < .05) and Latino/a (p < .01) gaps have statistically significant
associations with the size of city councils. Stated differently, larger city councils are related to
enhanced descriptive representation for non-White and Latino/a constituents.
Table 13 shows this is the case using the alternative operationalization of size as well.
In this analysis, a positive relationship is hypothesized; smaller constituencies associated with
tighter demographic congruence. This holds true for non-White and Latino/a groups
(p < .05 ). Conversely, African-Americans and females have negative relationships with
constituency size at the city level, but neither association is statistically significant.
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Table 13
Descriptive Representation of City Councils: Correlation with Select Populations, 2010

Gap between the % of the Population
and the % of the City Council
Non-White
African-American
Latino/a
Female

City Council Size
-.129*
-.070
-.170**
.046

Constituents per City
Councilmember
.118*
-.047
.136*
-.045

** p < .01; * p < .05 (one-tailed tests)
N = 50
Note: A negative relationship is expected between city council size and the demographic gaps. A positive
relationship is expected between constituents per councilmember and the gap variable

Investigating the Typical and the Atypical
Much like previous research on this topic, the findings reported here are somewhat
murky. In an attempt to gain clarity, what follows is a closer look at the typical cases and
outliers for each operationalization of size at each unit of analysis.

American States
To begin, this section offers a more thorough look at state legislatures. Michigan, for
instance, features the state legislature that is nearest to the mean size (147.6) at 148 seats. In
every instance, the demographic gap is smaller in Michigan than the average gap and it
features the third smallest African-American gap (0.4), with nearly perfect demographic
congruence. The typical female gap is 26.45% and Michigan is basically right on target at
25.9%. Contrast Michigan with Nebraska—the state with the smallest legislature. The
Cornhusker State has gap values below the mean for non-Whites (9.8 %) and African-
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Americans (1.3 %). On the other end of the spectrum is New Hampshire with an
extraordinarily large state legislature containing 424 seats. New Hampshire has gap values
below the mean for every demographic group. To reiterate, a smaller legislature is
hypothesized to have larger demographic gap values than a larger legislature. Accordingly,
the cases of Nebraska, and especially New Hampshire, confirm this hypothesis. However,
moving to the next largest legislature, Pennsylvania, is all it takes to reveal some cracks in the
proverbial foundation. Pennsylvania has a 203-seat state legislature, but it has less
demographic congruence for females and African-Americans than the average state.
Furthermore, the case of Nebraska only partially complies with expectations. As the state with
the smallest legislature, it ought to have gap values on the larger end of the spectrum, yet
Nebraska features multiple gaps below the mean. When Pennsylvania and Nebraska are
removed from the analysis, the coefficient becomes negative for African-Americans (-.008),
which then aligns with the hypothesized relationship. This adjustment bolsters the strength of
relationship between the non-White gap and legislature size (p < .01) but does not result in
statistically significant relationships between legislature size and demographic gaps for
African-Americans or females.
Moving on, the average constituency size across all states is 42,367. The state nearest
the mean is Oregon at 42,567 constituents per representative. The Oregon legislature is quite
descriptively representative, with female, African-American, and Latino/a gap values near the
mean. New Hampshire, with its huge legislature, has the fewest constituents per
representative (3,105). As noted earlier, New Hampshire confirms the expectation related to
size and demographic congruence. Vermont has the second smallest constituency per
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representative and its gap values are similar to New Hampshire, and findings related to the
Granite State also comport with expectations. Matters change noticeably, however, when
looking at the cases with the third and fourth smallest constituencies. North Dakota (33.2) and
Wyoming (32.3) have female gap values that are noticeably larger than the average (26.5).
Once again, it is clear to see some of the cases that lead to a lack of significant relationships
between size and descriptive representation, particularly for females. However, after running
multiple alternative models, it takes the removal of ten outliers to turn the coefficients for
non-Whites, females, and African-Americans to the hypothesized direction (i.e., positive
relationship).
Finally, California state representatives have the most constituents in America, on
average (310,450). The expectation is that the demographic gaps for California would be
larger due to the smaller relative size of its legislature. This is not true. In fact, California has
smaller demographic gaps for females, African-Americans, and non-Whites than the average
across all states. The fact that the state with the largest constituencies has fairly good
descriptive representation suggests it is surely playing a role in the emergence of negative
relationships between constituency size and these demographic groups, which contradicts the
hypothesized negative relationship.7 On the other hand, California has a large gap in Latino/a
representation (15.1), suggesting this subpopulation is underrepresented in the state, which
contributes to the strong relationship that was identified previously (p < .01).

7

Running the analysis without California is, indeed, enough to turn the direction of the relationship between
constituency size and female descriptive representation, although the relationship remains statistically
insignificant. Removing California alone does not turn around non-White or African-American.
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American Cities
At the city level, the average city council—in municipalities with populations of
100,000 or more—has 8.4 seats. There are 35 cities that have councils with eight seats. The
variation among this subset of “average” municipalities is extraordinary. For instance, cities
with eight-seat councils range in constituents per representative from 12,547 to 180,704.
Some have incredibly tight demographic congruence, whereas others are lacking in terms of
descriptive representation. Table 14 summarizes the disparities that exist among cities with
eight-seat (i.e., “average”) councils.

Table 14
Descriptive Statistics of Municipalities with Average Sized City Councils, 2010

Min
Max
Mean
St Dev

Constituents per
Representative
12,547.13
180,704.00
38,261.00
39,014.88

Non-White
Gap
1.00
70.90
26.13
17.14

AfricanAmerican Gap
.50
29.30
8.00
6.58

Latino/a Gap
3.30
49.70
16.74
12.58

Female Gap
.10
39.40
23.63
12.89

n = 35

Like the state analysis, no significant relationships were found between city assembly
size and African-American and female descriptive representation. A closer look at some of
the fringe cases offers insight as to why these relationships may not have emerged. There are
50 instances of cities with councils consisting of four seats, the smallest size in the dataset.
The average female gap among just these 50 municipalities (21.0) is actually lower than when
all 274 cases are considered (23.3). This helps explain why no relationship was identified and
why the expected negative relationship between council size and female descriptive
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representation was not obtained. On the other end, the cities with larger assemblies (i.e., 43
cases with councils of 11 seats or higher) are generally in line with expectations. For instance,
when the analysis is reconsidered to include only those cities with at least 11 council seats, the
coefficient for females turns negative, which was originally hypothesized.
When considering constituents per representative at the city level, Stamford,
Connecticut, is the smallest (i.e., largest relative legislature, smallest constituency). A positive
relationship is hypothesized, once again; smaller constituencies suggest a relatively larger
legislature and tighter demographic congruence is expected (i.e., smaller gaps). Yet, that is
not the case. Stamford has an exceedingly large gap related to female descriptive
representation that is more than 27 points larger than the average. The explanation is clear:
Stamford has no women on its city council and the general population consists of 50.7%
women. This yields a large gap value and contributes to the findings in Table 13. Stamford is
not alone; there are 16 instances in the dataset of a city council with no female members. It
should be noted, Stamford also exceeds the African-American gap value mean by a noticeable
amount. Los Angeles, California, has the most constituents per councilmember (252,841).
This is a confirming case in that it has gap values well over the mean for every demographic
group. The systematic removal of 17 outlier cases8 strengthens the relationship between
constituency size and the Latino/a demographic gap (p < .01), maintains the relationship
between the non-White gap and constituency size (p < .05) and turns the remaining
coefficients (African-Americans and females) to the hypothesized direction.
8

Cases removed include: Stamford, Connecticut; Waterbury, Connecticut; Green Bay, Wisconsin; Charleston,
South Carolina; Clarksville, Tennessee; Providence, Rhode Island; Lafayette, Louisiana; Berkeley, California;
Erie, Pennsylvania; Paterson, New Jersey; Allentown, Pennsylvania; Hartford, Connecticut; El Paso, Texas;
Tucson, Arizona; Austin, Texas; New York, New York; San Diego, California (ordered from smallest number of
constituents per councilmember to largest).
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All told, the results presented here indicate that legislature size at the sub-national
level is related to descriptive representation of non-Whites and Latino/as. In fact, the
descriptive representation of Latino/as has a statistically significant relationship—in the
hypothesized direction—with state legislature and city council size in all four models. While
scholars have identified contradictory findings related to the relationship between assembly
size and Latino/a representation (e.g., Trounstine and Valdini 2008), the results from this
chapter fall firmly in the camp supporting a link between size and descriptive representation
of Latino/as. The aggregate measure, non-Whites, is found to be significant in the
hypothesized correct direction in three of the four tests. The relationship is in the wrong
direction when considering constituents per state representative. In the other three models,
representing both units of analysis, legislature size is significantly related to the descriptive
representation of racial minorities (non-Whites) in the United States. When considering
African-Americans and women, the under-representation story is more mixed. However, after
removing anomalous states and cities from the respective analyses, the findings are consistent
with the expectations of this research.

Conclusion
This chapter explored a seemingly direct question: Is the size of legislatures
associated with the demographic gap between state legislatures—and city councils—and their
constituencies? This was investigated using archival data for the 50 American states and 274
municipalities with populations of 100,000 or greater in 2010. Correlational analyses
unearthed results indicating that non-White and Latino/a groups tend to experience improved
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descriptive representation when larger legislatures are present.9 On the other hand, evidence
suggesting enhanced descriptive representation for females and African-Americans failed to
materialize.
By looking at average and outlier cases, additional detail was offered related to this
puzzle. For instance, cases like Pennsylvania, North Dakota, and Wyoming—with large
legislatures but relatively poor descriptive representation for women—helped explain the null
findings for this group. Moreover, California has the largest state representative constituencies
in America but actually has fairly good descriptive representation. As a result, California
more than likely contributed to the negative relationships between constituency size and nonWhites, African-Americans, and females (i.e., the direction of the relationship contradicted
expectations). At the city level, the story was similar except there was even more disparity
with the larger number of cases (n = 274).
Collectively, the story here was that legislature size matters with regard to descriptive
representation for certain groups. As discussed in Chapter Three, descriptive representation
does not tend to be simple or straightforward. The nuances emerged plainly here: Latino/as
and non-Whites tend to make representational in-roads when there are more legislative seats
available. For females and African-Americans specifically, it seems challenges persist. As
noted earlier, “if there are only a few slices in the pie the white male political majority may
not be very enthusiastic about sharing” (Alozie and Manganaro 1993, 386). perhaps this
phenomenon is crowding out females and African-Americans disproportionately compared to
Latino/as and non-Whites, broadly stated? perhaps electoral arrangements are more
9

The aforementioned exception is the negative relationship between the non-White gap and constituency size,
which is in the wrong direction.
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prohibitive for candidates of a certain population group compared to others?10 These are
questions for another day, in research that seeks to understand the determinants of descriptive
representation. For now, the focus remains on the size of American representational
institutions.
If legislature size matters for the descriptive representation of many Americans, how
else might it impact contemporary society? Evidence from past research shows that
descriptive representation tends to enhance the policy interests of women and minorities in the
electorate (Reingold and Smith 2012, 2014). Since there is some trace of a connection
between size and descriptive representation, might legislature size have some effect on other
subgroups such as the under-educated or the poor? The next two chapters will investigate
these, looking at the relationship between the size of legislatures and two dominate public
policy arenas in contemporary America: education and poverty.

10

Electoral arrangements receive a lot of attention in the descriptive representation literature (e.g., Bullock and
MacManus 1991; Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Moncrief and Thompson 1992; Reingold and Harrell 2010;
Smith, Reingold, and Owens 2012; Trounstine and Valdini 2008).

CHAPTER FIVE
EXPANDING CONSTITUENCIES AND MINDS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CONSTITUENCY SIZE AND EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES

“Laws for the liberal education of youth, especially of the lower class of people, are so
extremely wise and useful, that, to a humane and generous mind, no expense for this purpose
would be thought extravagant” (John Adams 1841, 284).

The principal argument of this dissertation is that legislature size matters. Moreover, it
is held that legislature/constituency size matters in three different ways: 1) descriptive
representation, 2) educational outcomes, and 3) socioeconomic realities. This first point is
addressed in Chapter Four, which empirically tackled the relationship between legislature size
and descriptive representation. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Wilson
passionately argued that “the legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole
society…the faithful echo of the voices of the people” (n.p.). Chapter Four suggests that—for
non-Whites and Latino/as—increased legislature size is one way to enhance that faithful echo.
The time has come to shift focus from representation to responsiveness. Much like with
representation, the normative claim is that increased legislature size can enrich the capacity of
that assembly to respond to societal needs. Most specifically, this chapter will focus on the
relationship between the size of legislatures and a particular education outcome—graduation
rates. Consistent with John Adams’ contention cited at the outset, the assumption is made that
higher graduation rates represent an important collective goal.

90
The chapter will discuss education responsiveness with particular attention paid to
Dahl and Tufte’s work on “system capacity” (1973, 20). Then, a brief overview of education
in the United States is provided to make clear the important place it holds in society and in
politics. Finally, empirical tests are presented to assess the link between the size of state
representatives' constituencies (and city councilmembers' constituencies) and educational
attainment. This multivariate investigation will shed light on the following research question:
Does the size of state legislatures—and city councils—correspond with educational
outcomes? The findings reveal a significant relationship exists at both levels of government.

Revisiting Responsiveness
Chapter One touches on the notion of legislative responsiveness, which is linked to
representation. Hannah Pitkin (1967) explicitly ties these two concepts together in her classic
treatment on representation: Political representation means “acting in the interest of the
represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin 1967, 209). Given the topic of this
dissertation, it is no coincidence that the first chapter leads with this epigraph.
For Pitkin, responsiveness is rooted in accountability.1 Basically, by voting an elected
official out of office, constituents have the ability to punish their representatives for failing to
act according to their desires. At the risk of belaboring the point, acting according to their
desires is another way of saying responsiveness. Thinkers such as John Dewey and James
Tufts recognized this decades before Pitkin: “One is held responsible in order that he may
become responsible, that is, responsive to the needs and claims of others, to the obligations
1

Pitkin (1967) identifies four types of representation: formal, symbolic, descriptive, and substantive. Under
formal representation falls two subcategories: authorization and accountability.
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implicit in his position” (Dewey and Tufts 1908, 338–339). Despite this, Pitkin’s typology
meaningfully advances our collective understanding of representation and responsiveness by
expanding on these concepts in a comprehensive manner that was unparalleled at the time her
classic entry was published. There are others who investigate the notion of responsiveness and
raise important questions, such as whether or not politicians should be responsive to the
public (see Converse 1964). These works, however, address philosophical ideals more than
the sort of parochial present-day realities this work is most interested in addressing. With that
said, a cursory review of specific bodies of literature on responsiveness is in order.

Public Opinion
To be certain, debate exists over the validity and meaningfulness of public opinion and
by turn the importance of elected representatives responding to popular opinions. On the one
hand are those who believe people are “awash in ignorance” on issues of political significance
(Kinder 1998, 785–789). Philip Converse’s (1964) work supports this side of the debate in
that he suggests the majority of individuals do not possess a complete set of beliefs, have no
clear ideology, and have little motivation to improve their understanding of issues that are not
directly applicable to their lives. Other notable work focuses on the fragility of American
public opinion (Lippmann 1922) and the lack of a guiding ideology in the mass public
(Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).2 Influential scholarship by William Riker
(1982) holds little hope for the validity of public opinion. He cites strategic voting as a

2

Others have focused on citizen competence and identifying when citizens who lack information can and cannot
make the same decisions they would have arrived at if they had been better informed (Lupia and McCubbins
1998).
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method of manipulating the “true expression of public opinion” (236), which yields a voting
outcome that is not a “fair or true amalgamation of the voters’ values” (236). This leads Riker
to argue that voting and public opinion are empty and that the masses speak in “meaningless
tongues” (1982, 239).3
On the other hand are scholars who offer evidence to the contrary.4 Although V.O.
Key Jr. believes the public may not have well-formed opinions on specific issues and
whatever views are held likely resulted from elite influence, he is sympathetic to the citizenry
by noting, “The masses do not corrupt themselves; if they are corrupt, they have been
corrupted” (1961, 558). This suggests the negative influence elites and opinion leaders may
have on average Americans. Similarly, Key’s The Responsible Electorate (1966) was
essentially a retort to The American Voter and he argues that “voters are not fools” (7). Others
argue for the stability of aggregate opinions; that is, individuals may be poorly informed, lack
political knowledge, and falsely portray their attitudes, but when combined with others on a
large scale, collective stability emerges (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2001; Page and
Shapiro 1992).
An additional consideration in determining the validity of public opinion is the role
played by media outlets. The media can use specific techniques to influence opinions, such as
priming (Althaus and Kim 2006; Claibourn 2008; Dragojlovic 2011; Druckman and Holmes
2004; Hetherington and Rudolph 2008; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Malhotra and Krosnick

3

See Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter (1996) for a helpful look at political knowledge among the
citizenry.
4
E.E. Schattschneider (1960) argues, “One implication of public opinion studies ought to be resisted by all
friends of freedom and democracy; the implication that democracy is a failure because the people are too
ignorant to answer intelligently all the questions asked by the pollsters. This is a professorial invention for
imposing professorial standards on the political system and deserves to be treated with extreme suspicion” (132).

93
2007) and framing (Chong and Druckman 2007, 2013; Druckman 2001; Druckman, Fein, and
Leeper 2012; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Iyengar 1994; Jacoby 2000). Priming “occurs
when media attention to an issue causes people to place special weight on it when
constructing evaluations” (Miller and Krosnick 2000, 301). Stated differently, it arises “when
an individual changes the criteria on which he or she bases an overall evaluation” (Druckman
and Holmes 2004, 757). Framing is a process of offering different understandings of a single
issue (Schattschneider 1960). Issues can be framed such that certain aspects are emphasized
over others, which can result in a framing effect, that is, “when individuals arrive at different
positions on the issue, depending on the priority given to various considerations” (Druckman
and Nelson 2003, 730). This technique matters because its ability to influence public opinion
raises “questions about the capacity of citizens to provide autonomous input into the
democratic process. If public preferences can be arbitrarily manipulated by how issues are
framed, there can be no legitimate representation of public interest or meaningful discussion
of government responsiveness” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 637).
On balance, the debate over public opinion is only cursorily related to the test of
association between constituency size and education outcomes. The assumption being made
here is that better educational outcomes are consistent with mass public opinion; hence, a
legislature that responds by producing these better outcomes is one that is being more
“responsive.” Regardless of the soundness of public opinion, it is widely held that positive
education outcomes are a public good, one that advances the interests of democratic societies
(Adams 1841; Almond and Verba 1963). Arguments about the soundness of public opinion
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and the desirability of a responsive legislature are being provided here in the spirit of
thoroughness and with a commitment to telling the entire story.

Re-Election
Another primary focus in the literature on responsiveness is related to electoral
accountability with a specific focus on the desire of politicians to get re-elected. One of the
most influential studies on the U.S. Congress is put forth by David Mayhew (1974). Countless
articles written since Mayhew’s contribution rely on his bold declaration of “congressmen as
single-minded seekers of re-election” (1974, 5) and his identification of an incumbency
advantage5 among members of Congress. But, are members of Congress able to actually do
anything about securing re-election? This question is repeated frequently by Mayhew (see
pages 17 and 32), and the author argues in the affirmative. Specifically, in trying to retain
office, incumbents engage in three types of electoral behavior: advertising, credit claiming,
and position taking (Mayhew 1974, 49-64). Much of the subsequent literature on the
incumbency advantage has attempted to identify possible explanations for the advantage, such
as the growth of bureaucracy (Fiorina 1977a), change in relations between incumbents and
constituents (Fenno 1978; Romero 2006), and/or the media’s influence (Ansolabehere,
Snowberg, and Snyder 2006; Prior 2006).
Still others note that in the course of seeking re-election incumbents have a variety of
tools at their disposal. In different ways, these tools allow them to appear responsive to their
constituencies. For instance, legislators may represent constituent policy concerns (Miller and
5

Gary Jacobson (1987) finds evidence suggesting that incumbent members of Congress enjoy no electoral
advantage; while they may win by larger margins, incumbents are no safer than they were in the 1950s.
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Stokes 1963), chase pork-barrel spending for the district (Chen 2010; Ferejohn 1974; Fiorina
1977b; Lazarus 2010), offer casework services (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Hibbing
1991; Johannes 1983; Johannes and McAdams 1981), or generally carry themselves in a way
that fosters the district’s trust in their abilities (Fenno 1978). perhaps the most relevant of
these in terms of responsiveness is in the area of policy equivalence.

Elite-Mass Policy Congruence
The notion that citizens want their policy views to be represented by government is
not new (e.g., Downs 1957). Warren Miller and Donald Stokes (1963) introduce the term
congruence into the representation discourse via their study of constituent influence in
Congress. They shift the focus away from party influence and toward constituency control as
the primary determinant of congressional roll-call voting. The authors find that representation
styles differ depending on the issue area, but nonetheless there is considerable elite
responsiveness to public concerns.6 Miller and Stokes’ classic work led to many similar
studies (Erikson 1978; Weissberg 1978), and policy congruence became a substantial
component of what scholars consider representation to be (i.e., high congruence interpreted as
good representation; low congruence interpreted as bad—or nonexistent—representation).7
Others take issue with the congruence approach. Heinz Eulau and Paul Karps (1977),
for instance, are quite firm in their opposition to Miller and Stokes’ study of representation

6

Similarly, Richard Fenno (1977, 1978) argues there are multiple constituencies (i.e., geographic, re-election,
primary, and personal) and legislators present themselves differently accordingly. Specifically, Fenno identifies a
“home style” approach where representatives act differently when they are back “home” with constituents in the
district compared to their actions in Washington, D.C.
7
Sidney Verba and Norman Nie (1972) identify public policy issues as the target of responsiveness. Instead of
congruence they opt for the term concurrence (302).
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and responsiveness. Eulau and Karps take issue from top to bottom; they criticize the lack of
theory, methods, causal link, and, most importantly, the use of congruence as a measure for
representativeness. For Eulau and Karps, the issue with congruence is that it is neither
necessary nor sufficient for responsiveness:
The representative may react to constituency opinion, and hence evince congruent
attitudes or behavior, yet not act in what is in the best interest of the constituency as he
might wish to define that interest, thereby being in fact unresponsive. Further, the
representative may make policy in response to groups and interests other than his
constituents, including executive and bureaucratic agencies. Whether such conduct is
also in the interest of his district as he sees it is an empirical question. (Eulau and
Karps 1977, 242)
Instead, they identify four components of responsiveness that collectively make up
representation (i.e., policy, service, allocation, and symbolic). Accordingly, policy
responsiveness is only one concern and its role should be reserved to the “great public issues
that agitate the political process” and not to more narrow matters (Eulau and Karps 1977,
241). Moreover, they argue that policy responsiveness should not be viewed in isolation of the
other types of representation.
More generally, policy compatibility has been found to significantly influence public
evaluations of elected officials (Binder, Maltzman, and Sigelman 1998; Ragsdale 1991).
Additionally, David Mayhew (1974) notes the most important part of position taking is that
the representative assumes a policy position in alignment with that of his or her constituents.
“The position itself is the commodity” (Mayhew 1974, 62); whether the representative’s
position wins is of secondary importance.
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The Capacity to Respond
Despite some debate on whether or not elected officials should be responsive and the
nuances of what it means to be responsive, what shines through here is that responsiveness
can come in a variety of forms and it is related to factors such as public opinion, re-election,
and policy congruence. At a basic level, however, the political unit must have the capacity to
respond if responsiveness is to occur. This fundamental notion is one of the core tenets of
Dahl and Tufte’s (1973) classic work on size. We return, once again, to Size and Democracy.
Essential to the book is their definition of the ideal political unit, which satisfies at
least two conditions: citizen effectiveness and system capacity. To Dahl and Tufte, citizen
effectiveness refers to “citizens acting responsibly and competently [to] fully control the
decisions of the polity [political unit]” (20). In other words, an ideal government features
citizens who civilly and capably participate in the democratic process. System capacity refers
to responsiveness. Dahl and Tufte argue that system capacity means “the polity has the
capacity to respond fully to the collective preferences of its citizens” (20). Citizen
effectiveness and system capacity are interrelated. Theoretically, smaller political systems
allow the opportunity for enhanced citizen effectiveness due to reduced direct communication
barriers between citizens and representatives, but capacity suffers. Larger systems have the
greater potential to respond to societal needs. Yet citizen effectiveness tends to deteriorate
because of increased communication challenges and system complexity (Dahl and Tufte
1973).
Dahl elaborates on the relationship between citizen effectiveness and system capacity
by noting the potential for a contradiction:
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That larger political systems often possess relatively greater capacity to accomplish
tasks beyond the capacity of smaller systems leads sometimes to a paradox. In very
small political systems a citizen may be able to participate extensively in decisions
that do not matter much but cannot participate much in decisions that really matter a
great deal; whereas very large systems may be able to cope with problems that matter
more to a citizen, the opportunities for the citizen to participate in and greatly
influence decisions are vastly reduced. (Dahl 1994, 28)
This challenging puzzle remains unsolved. A tradeoff exists that has implications for
democratic values, elite responsiveness, and competent representation. And, Dahl argues,
“judgements about tradeoffs are no easy matter” (1994, 29).

Addressing the Tradeoff and Hypotheses
Fortunately, to address the research question at hand, this dissertation does not need to
resolve this tradeoff. The analysis which follows focuses on one specific area of societal
importance: education.8 The normative argument is that education is a desirable trait in any
society. This is not a controversial statement. On the whole, there is ample face validity in the
assumption that public opinion supports better educational outcomes. The non-controversial
nature of the topic area helps mitigate the tradeoff outlined by Dahl. Citizens support
educational attainment and want politicians to do what is possible to enhance educational
outcomes. By choosing a straightforward policy area like education, the focus can be placed
firmly on system capacity without the need to dwell on citizen effectiveness.
Along these lines, Malcolm Jewell (1982)—in his work on state legislatures—cites
articulated and unarticulated interests as problems when studying representation and
responsiveness:

8

The following chapter shifts focus from education to poverty.
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We are interested in how representatives respond to both the articulated demands and
the unarticulated interests of their constituents. The reality faced by the legislator is
that the needs and interests of constituents are often not articulated clearly as demands.
One of the major tasks is to determine what these interests are and what his
constituents think. And one of his most important responsibilities is to weigh the often
loudly articulated demands of a few against the unarticulated wishes of the many, to
determine if these involve a conflict and to decide what choices to make if there is a
conflict. (Jewell 1982, 18)
As suggested earlier, educational attainment is considered a valued collective goal. It may be
articulated or unarticulated as a demand, but, at a minimum, it is a desirable broad ideal. If we
accept this assumption, concerns about tradeoffs and whether or not it is a sufficiently
articulated demand fade to the background.
Based on these assumptions and relying on Dahl and Tufte’s guidance on system
capacity or the ability of a governing unit to respond effectively to societal needs, the
following two hypotheses are explored:
Hypothesis 1: Fewer constituents per state legislator will associate with a smaller percentage
of residents over the age of 25 without a high school diploma.
Hypothesis 2: Fewer constituents per city councilmember will associate with a smaller
percentage of residents over the age of 25 without a high school diploma.
Stated differently, larger legislatures—relative to the populations they serve—will yield
improved educational outcomes. Testing these hypotheses will shed valuable light on the
overriding research question for this chapter: Does the size of state legislatures—and city
councils—correspond with educational outcomes?
Before turning to data and methods for the tests at hand, it seems worthwhile to
reiterate the value placed on education in the United States and its importance in democratic
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governing systems. This is especially pertinent considering educational attainment serves as
the dependent variable in this chapter.

Education in the United States
The Boston Latin School was founded in 1635 and was the first public school in the
United States (Boston Latin School n.d.), indicating that formal educational institutions
preceded the ratification of the Constitution by more than 150 years. In short order, all of the
colonies required towns to establish schools (Cubberley 1934). By 1870, all of the American
states had free, public elementary schools (Monroe 1911). With the passage of more time, the
Progressive Era of the early twentieth century brought an even greater focus on the number of
public schools and student attendance, which, scholars argue, propelled the country into the
modern era of rapid technological advancement (Herbst 2004).
Still more, educational attainment has seen dramatic growth over the most recent half
century. In 1960 only 41.0% of adults in the United States earned a high school diploma
(Helliwell and Putnam 2007). The most recent data from the U.S. Department of Education
(2015) indicate that 81.0% of adults graduated from high school in 2012-13. The U.S.
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan said:
We can take pride as a nation in knowing that we’re seeing promising gains, including
for students of color. This is a vital step toward readiness for success in college and
careers for every student in this country, and these improvements are thanks to the
hard work of teachers, principals, students, and families. (U.S. Department of
Education 2015, n.p.)
This elucidates the point made earlier; at a normative level, educational attainment is a noncontroversial public good. The public wants a more educated citizenry, whether they
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articulate that demand or not. What Mr. Duncan fails to mention when giving credit for these
educational improvements is the role of government, in particular the role of states and
localities, which are the primary funding sources for public schools (U.S. Department of
Education 2014). Some may argue the improvements Mr. Duncan discusses have come in
spite of government; however, the importance of funding and policies emanating from
government that support and structure education in the United States cannot be overstated. In
fact, total expenditures for public elementary and secondary schools in America exceeded
$620 billion during the 2011-12 academic year, which represents an expenditure of about
$10,500 per pupil enrolled. Importantly for this work, there is considerable variability in
“system capacity” or the willingness of state and local governments to support education. The
question this research seeks to answer is whether constituency size matters in all of this,
especially once a control for per-pupil expenditures is put in place.
But education has an even deeper connection with democratic governance than the
flow of funding through public-sector channels might indicate. Educational theorists, such as
John Dewey (1916), elevated the stature of education and emphasized its importance in
American society while connecting it with Democracy. Dewey suggested that education
should help students reach their complete potential and develop skills that could be used for
the greater good of society. To Dewey, education was not about rote lessons; rather it should
be viewed as a democratic tool for the betterment of all.
Others have provided empirical evidence in support of education’s role in democracy.
For example, scholars have linked education with more inclusive democratic politics (Barro
1999; Glaeser et al. 2004; Lipset 1959). Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) offer a
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classic assessment of the political and social attitudes that are vital for successful
democracies. They argue education is a critical determinant of civic culture and democratic
participation, “The uneducated man or the man with limited education is a different political
actor from the man who has achieved a higher level of education” (1963, 315). Almond and
Verba’s contribution influenced other studies on the positive link between education and civic
engagement (e.g., Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer 2007;
Hillygus 2005).
In sum, an educational outcome as a dependent variable makes sense for a variety of
reasons. First, it is a widely recognized public policy arena. Second, positive educational
outcomes are desirable at a normative level, and third, education is linked to quality
democracy and important ideals such as civic engagement. Still more, states and localities
play dominant roles in the education policy arena, which is necessary given the tests which
follow focus on sub-national legislatures. With these justifications in place, attention now
turns to the data and methods used to study the link between constituency size and educational
outcomes.

Data and Methodology
The same two datasets that were used in Chapters Three and Four are relied upon here.
The datasets include publicly available data for all American states and every city in the
United States with a population of 100,000 or more according to the 2010 decennial census.
The following variables are used in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to better
understand the relationship between constituency size and educational outcomes.
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Educational Attainment—The dependent variable in this analysis is a specific measure
of educational attainment. The consideration is operationalized as the percentage of the
population over the age of 25 without a high school diploma in each geographic area
represented by the relevant legislature (i.e., American states and cities with populations of
100,000 or more). The data are derived, specifically, from the U.S. Census Bureau’s
American Community Survey.9
Constituency Size—The key explanatory variable is constituency size. This is obtained
by dividing the state population by the total number of legislative seats in the state or local
assembly. The resulting quotient is the number of constituents per representative. The same
calculation is carried out to obtain the number of constituents for each councilmember at the
city level of analysis. This operationalization captures population and legislature size in a
single variable.
Per-Pupil Expenditure—It is vitally important in any test of the effect of an
institutional arrangement on an educational outcome to control for the amount of money that
is spent per student. Minus this highly intuitive control variable it is not likely one can
ascertain much about the role of other concerns. At the state level, per-pupil expenditures are
highly and negatively correlated with those over 25 without a high school diploma (r = -.33; p
< .01). per-pupil expenditure data are not readily available at the city level. As a result, per
capita city income is substituted in the local model. This comes at the expense of consistency,
but given that public schools are funded to a large extent by local property taxes this
consideration of local wealth should serve as a suitable surrogate. It can be noted that in the
9

Table S. 1501, Educational Attainment for States, Percent with High School Diploma and with Bachelor’s
Degree: 2010, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/xls/cb12-33table1states.xls.
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city model, those over 25 without a high school diploma is very highly correlated with this
alternative measure (r = -64; p < .01).10
Female Legislators—Scholars routinely argue that congresswomen are more liberal
than their male counterparts (Burrell 1994), even within their own party, and suggest that
education is an area of historical importance to female legislators (Thomas 1991). Others,
such as Michele Swers, suggest that women are more likely to cross party lines to support
bills focused on women’s issues, including education, and persuasively argue that gender
influences policy making (Swers 1998, 2002, 2005). To capture this important control
variable, the percentage of the state legislature and city council that is female is included in
each respective model. State-level data were gathered from the National Conference of State
Legislatures.11 For female city councilmembers, information was collected by visiting each
municipality’s website and entering the appropriate number.
South—Last, the models include a dummy variable for the southern region of the
United States. Specifically, the variable is scored “1” for the 16 states that are classified in the
South geographic region by the U.S. Census Bureau. States in all other regions are coded “0.”
In contemporary research, Jerome Morris and Carla Monroe (2009) argue convincingly that a
major explanation for the desperate graduation rates of African-Americans and others in the
United States has to do with the cultural legacy born of slavery in the South. The authors
demonstrate how and why the geographic South is critical to understanding the educational

10

Data for the American states were accessed from the Public Education Finances: 2010 report created by the
U.S. Census Bureau (Dixon 2012). City data derived from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Local Area Personal Income, 2010, is obtained from
http://www.bea.gov/regional/histdata/releases/0412lapi/index.cfm.
11
Women in State Legislatures: 2010 Legislative Session, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatorsstaff/legislators/womens-legislative-network/women-in-state-legislatures-2010.aspx.
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achievement gap (see also Fitzpatrick and Yoels 1992). When using local legislatures as the
unit of analysis, cities situated in southern states—as determined by U.S. Census Bureau—are
coded “1” and all others “0.” In all tests the expectation is for a positive coefficient,
suggesting the South will associate with more adults without a high school diploma.
A positive relationship is anticipated between the dependent variable and the key
explanatory variable. Stated differently, as the number of constituents per representative
increases, there should be a corresponding increase in the percentage of the population over
the age of 25 without a high school diploma. Alternatively, smaller constituency sizes (i.e.,
relatively larger legislatures) are anticipated to associate with fewer people without a high
school diploma. This prediction has theoretical roots in the work of Dahl and Tufte (1973),
who suggest a larger political unit has enhanced capacity to respond to collective interests
such as educational achievement. Negative relationships are hypothesized between the
percentage of the population over the age of 25 without a high school diploma and per-pupil
expenditures and the percentage of legislative seats held by females. In other words, as the
amount of spending and the number of females goes up there should be a drop in adults
without a high school diploma, on average, all else being equal. Financial investment and
more female legislatures ought to yield a more educated population. It is important to note
that some research suggests that per-pupil expenditures have no bearing on individual student
test performance (Sutton and Soderstrom 1999); however, plenty of others have identified
linkages between expenditure and longer term outcomes (Balfanz and Legters 2004; Rizzuto
and Wachtel 1980). Finally, if the work of Swers (1998, 2002, 2005) and others (e.g., Thomas
1991) holds true, fewer female legislators will associate with fewer high school graduates and
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the South ought to associate positively with high school “dropouts.” These expectations are
anticipated using either unit of analysis.

Results
Before discussing multivariate findings, it is arguably worthwhile to mention some
descriptive characteristics of each dataset. This step provides useful context related to the
question at the center of this chapter: Does the size of state legislatures—and city councils—
correspond with educational outcomes?

Education Attainment: Descriptive Statistics in American States
When considering all 50 American states, 13.4% of citizens over the age of 25, in
2010, had not completed high school; Missouri is the state nearest to the mean at 13.5%.
Unsurprisingly, there is quite a bit of difference between the minimum and maximum.
Wyoming (8.3 %), Minnesota (8.4 %) Alaska (8.4 %), New Hampshire (9.1 %), and Montana
(9.1 %) have the best educational outcomes according to this measure. On the other end of the
spectrum are Texas (20.4 %), Mississippi (20.1 %), California (19.8 %), Louisiana (18.8 %),
and Kentucky (18.7 %). Stated differently, more than one-fifth of people over the age of 25
living in Texas and Mississippi had not earn a high school diploma. Of the five states on the
lower end of educational attainment, four are situated in the southern region of the United
States. California falls outside of the South, but it has an extraordinarily small legislature
relative to its large population, which aligns with the theoretical underpinnings of this
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analysis.12 Constituency size has been detailed in previous chapters, but to revisit: California
legislators have the largest constituencies with 310,450 citizens per representative. Contrast
this with New Hampshire’s average constituency size of 3,105. The average constituency size
is 42,366 when considering all cases; Oregon is the best example of a typical state with
42,568 constituents per representative.
As predicted, there is considerable variation in per-pupil expenditures at the state
level. Utah is on the low end of education investment with just $6,064 spent per pupil.
Alternatively, New York spends $18,618 per student. At $10,734, Nebraska is the state
closest to the per-pupil expenditure mean ($10,795). The other control variable—percentage
of legislative seats held by females—ranges from a low of 10.0% in South Carolina to 38.0%
in Colorado. New York is nearest to the average with just under a quarter of legislative seats
occupied by females (24.1 %). The final control is a dummy variable to code whether or not a
state is located in the South; 16 states are considered to be in the southern geographic region
per the U.S. Census Bureau. Table 15 provides descriptive statistics for each variable in the
state model with the exception of the South dummy variable.

12

Arguably, the relatively large foreign born population in California, which intuitively experiences lower levels
of educational attainment, might not receive effective substantive representation as it relates to education policies
in the small state legislature.
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Table 15
Descriptive Statistics of Educational Attainment Model, States 2010

Min
Max
Mean
St Dev

Percent Without a High
School Diploma
8.30
20.40
13.40
3.55

Constituents per
Representative
3,105
310,450
42,366
48,366

Per Pupil
Expenditure
6,064
18,618
10,795
2,652

Percent of
Legislature Seats
Held by Females
10.00
38.00
24.21
6.87

n = 50

Education Attainment: Descriptive
Statistics in American Cities
Variation in the value of key variables at the city level is even more striking than at the
American state level of analysis. On average, the 274 American cities included in the dataset
have 15.8% of citizens over the age of 25 with no high school diploma. This is slightly higher
than at the state level (13.4 %), suggesting urban areas are more likely to see an overrepresentation of citizens without a high school diploma. Plenty of policy-related
nongovernmental organizations (e.g., America’s Promise Alliance 2015), quasi-governmental
organizations (e.g., City Year 2015), popular media outlets (e.g., Dillon 2009; Guryan and
Ludwig 2014), and scholars (e.g., Amos 2008; Balfanz and Legters 2004; Dentler and
Warshauer 1968; Rumberger and Thomas 2000) have elaborated on the ills of urban schools
in America and specifically note the higher dropout levels in urban postsecondary schools.
Boston, Massachusetts (15.8 %), is the locality that falls nearest to the mean, a typical city in
terms of high school education attainment. The city of Centennial, Colorado, has the best
educational attainment with just 3.2% of its population over 25 years without a high school
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diploma. Notably, Centennial barely made the cutoff for inclusion in this study with a
population of 100,377. This provides more anecdotal evidence that less populous areas (i.e.,
smaller constituency size in the city model) may generally enjoy more desirable educational
outcomes. Conversely, nearly half (48.1 %) of Santa Ana, California, over the age of 25 has
failed to earn a high school diploma. In fact, six of the ten lowest performing cities are located
in California. This makes some sense if we recall from the state level of analysis that
California is the only state in the bottom five that falls outside of the southern region.
Considering the key explanatory variable—constituency size—the typical
councilmember in Stamford, Connecticut, has just 3,066 constituents while their counterparts
in Los Angeles, California, have 252,841. Cities in Connecticut and New Hampshire
dominate the top five in terms of smallest constituencies, whereas large population areas in
California, Arizona, New York, and Texas have extraordinarily large constituency sizes.
Somewhat surprisingly, Portland, Oregon, has the fifth largest constituency size per
councilmember at 145,944. This is due in large part to its four-seat city council.
Moving on, in the city model, per capita income takes the place of per-pupil
expenditure. This is due to a data availability constraint; regardless, the proxy measure still
captures the economic standing of the geographic area. Brownsville, Texas, has the lowest per
capita income at just $12,900. Compare this with the $54,892 per capita mark in Alexandria,
Virginia, and it is plain to see another instance of considerable variation present in the date.
The average per capita income amount is $26,474 and Albuquerque, New Mexico, is nearest
this amount at only $38 per capita less than the average. Like the state model, the percentage
of legislative seats held by females is also included as a control variable. This ranges from no

110
seats—which is the case in 16 municipalities—to an 85.7% female local council in New
Orleans, Louisiana. Finally, the South dummy variable is also included in the city model.
Considering all 274 cases, 33.9% (i.e., 93 cases) are located in the southern geographic region
based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s designation. Table 16 summarizes the data associated with
the city model variables.

Table 16
Descriptive Statistics of Educational Attainment Model, Cities 2010

Min
Max
Mean
St Dev

Percent Without a High
School Diploma
3.20
48.10
15.82
7.58

Constituents Per
Representative
3,066
252,841
34,876
29,332

Per Capita
Income
12,900
54,892
26,474
7,129

Percent of
Legislature Seats
Held by Females
0.00
85.71
29.65
16.57

n = 274

Multivariate Results: Educational Attainment, State Model
Table 17 includes results for the state-level analysis of educational attainment. There
is a clear positive association between constituency size and the percentage of the population
over the age of 25 without a high school diploma (p < .001). This aligns with expectations;
larger constituencies associate with less desirable educational outcomes. The tests of other
variables also match expectations lending construct validity to the overall analysis. Negative
coefficients result for per-pupil expenditures and the gender makeup of state legislatures,
although neither of those variables shares a statistically significant relationship with high
school graduation attainment. The South (p < .001) performs markedly worse than states that
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fall outside the region. A high level of collinearity between the South dummy variable and the
other two considerations may be robbing the former from any chance of returning statistically
significant coefficients.

Table 17
Constituents per State Legislator and Percent of the Population Over 25 Years
Without a High School Diploma, 2010

Key Explanatory Variable
Constituents per State Representative

Expected
Sign
+

Coefficient
(Standard Error)
.00003 ***
(.000007)

Control Variables
Per Pupil Expenditure
Percent of Legislature Seats Held by
Females
South
Constant
F-statistic
R2 (overall)
n
*** p < .001 (one-tailed tests)

+

-.0001
(.00014)
-.6485
(.057)
3.9920 ***
(.866)
13.96 ***
(2.17)
16.06 ***
.59
50

An interpretation of the coefficient for the key explanatory variable suggests an
increase in 100,000 constituents per representative is associated with approximately a 3.0%
increase in citizens over the age of 25 without a high school diploma. Alternatively, a single
standard deviation increase in constituency size is linked with a .40 standard deviation
increase in citizens who did not graduate high school. The other significant variable—
southern region—deserves interpretation as well. All else being equal, states situated in the
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South are predicted to have about 4.0% more citizens without a high school diploma than
their non-South counterparts.

Multivariate Results: Education Attainment, City Model
Table 18 exhibits the results of the education model at the city level. Consistent with
the previous analysis, constituency size is positively associated with the percentage of the
population over 25 years old without a high school diploma (p < .001). per capita income also
follows expectations with a clear negative relationship. In this model, a significant
relationship exists between the financial proxy and “dropouts” (p < .001), whereas this did not
materialize in the state analysis. A negative relationship was hypothesized between the
percentage of council seats held by females and the percentage of the population who did not
graduate high school, and a positive relationship was expected between cities located in the
South and the education variable. Both of these instances did not align with expectations, each
turning up marginally significant coefficients (p < .10). The South dummy variable was quite
influential in the state model, so this is a bit surprising. Reading between the lines, results
suggest that education outcomes in urban southern metros are about on par with their nonSouth counterparts, perhaps suggesting it is the rural southern localities where high school
graduation rates are comparatively lower.13

13

The model was run again without the South dummy variable or the percentage of female councilmembers.
Their removal has no real influence on the model, with constituents per representative and per capita income still
returning statistically significant coefficients in the hypothesized direction (p < .001). Additionally, the R2 value
only moves incrementally from .46 (with all variables included) to .45 (with South and female councilmembers
removed). As such, from a model specification standpoint, the goodness of fit does not suffer noticeably in the
alternative model run.
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Table 18
Constituents per City Councilmember and Percent of the Population Over 25 Years
Without a High School Diploma, 2010
Expected
Sign

Key Explanatory Variable
Constituents Per City Councilmember

+

Coefficient
(Standard Error)
.00005 ***
(.00001)

Control Variables
Per Capita Income

-

Percent of Council Seats Held by Females

-

South

+

Constant
F-statistic
R2 (overall)
n
t
*** p < .001; p < .10 (one-tailed tests)

-.0007 ***
(.00005)
.0315 t
(.021)
-1.0277 t
(.718)
31.92 ***
(2.17)
57.10 ***
.46
274

A closer look at the constituency size coefficient reveals that an increase of 10,000
constituents per councilmember is associated with 0.51% improvement in high school
graduation rates. Taken to the next level, an increase of 100,000 constituents per
councilmember is linked with a 5.1% rise in education attainment. per capita income also
shares a significant relationship with the dependent variable. A decrease of $1,000 in per
capita income is associated with a 0.70% jump in the percentage of citizens over the age of 25
without a high school diploma.

Discussion
The key explanatory variable—constituency size—returns significant relationships
with the education variable in each model. This brings to mind the discussion of community
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size in Chapter Two, with these findings lending support to much of what was covered in that
chapter. Political scientists (Dahl 1998), sociologists (Duncan 1951), and others (Dentler and
Warshauer 1968) argue against huge metropolitan governing units. Population size has been
linked to a variety of societal considerations like community satisfaction and crime rates (Auh
and Cook 2009; Jackson 1986; Photiadis 1967; Sacco 1985; Stephan and McMullin 1982). In
this analysis, constituency size is clearly associated with education attainment. Attention now
turns to a closer look at the coefficients in each model and identifying some cases from the
datasets that bring those figures to life.
At the state level, an increase of 100,000 constituents per representative is associated
with a 3.0% increase in citizens over the age of 25 without a high school diploma. Kansas and
Florida elucidate this finding. Kansas has a 165-seat legislature and each representative has
17,292 constituents on average. Florida has a slightly smaller legislature (160 seats) but a
noticeably larger population, resulting in 117,508 constituents per representative, on average.
This is a difference in constituency size of 100,216, very near the hypothetical increase of
100,000 reported earlier. Turning to the dependent variable, Kansas comes in at 10.5% of the
population over 25 years without a high school diploma and Florida is at 14.8%. This
difference of 4.3% in education attainment actually exceeds the coefficient value but is very
close to expectations. Moving closer to the extreme values in the dataset, there is a 192,942
difference in constituency size between California (310,450) and Florida (117,508). The
percentage of the population over 25 that did not graduate from high school is 14.8% in
Florida and 19.8% in California, five percentage points apart, which is just under what the
coefficient suggests it ought to be given the difference in constituency size.
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Among cities, the percentage of citizens with no high school diploma is predicted to
increase by 5.1% for every 100,000 increase in constituents per representative. Clarksville,
Tennessee, and Houston, Texas, serve as good examples of this relationship. Clarksville
councilmembers have 31,111 constituents each on average. Houston’s local representatives
typically have 131,216 constituents each, which is a difference of 100,105. Education
outcomes are, once again, close to what the model predicts. In Clarksville, 19.3% of residents
over the age of 25 lack a high school diploma, but that percentage jumps to 25.6% in
Houston, resulting in a difference of 6.3%.
A clear statistically significant association exists between constituency size (i.e.,
relative size of representative institutions) and education outcomes at the sub-national level.
Of course, the “fundamental problem of causal inference” suggests we can never know for
sure the cause and effect nature of these considerations (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 79–
80). This is where theory and scholarship can help bolster these findings. Returning to Dahl
and Tufte (1973), a political unit must have the capacity to respond to collective societal
needs. By extension, legislature size may be considered antecedent to responsiveness. If
system capacity is inadequate, then responsiveness is hindered even before deliberations and
negotiations begin. Indeed, Douglas Muzzio and Tim Tompkins (1989) agree that relatively
larger legislatures have more capacity to respond to constituent needs than do smaller
assemblies. Others note that legislatures control the purse strings related to school funding
(Wood and Theobald 2003), which may play a role in satisfying this collective need for a
more educated society (Leachman and Mai 2014).
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As discussed throughout Chapter Two, population size must be considered when
investigating the size of legislatures because of the representational duty that accompanies the
legislative branch and the tremendous variation that exists at the sub-national level. Recall
that New Hampshire’s incredibly large state legislature with 424 seats helps drive down the
number of constituents per representative. For Wyoming, it is the low population figure—
563,626 in 2010—that reduces the value. The same dynamics are true in the cities. Once
again, Ann Arbor’s population is 113,934 compared to St. Louis, which is 319,294; however,
councilmembers in St. Louis generally have just 10 more constituents than their counterparts
in Ann Arbor. In this example, city council size mitigates the large population difference. St.
Louis has 28 city council seats while Ann Arbor is much smaller at 10. Due to this
interrelatedness, one could argue that a societal need like positive educational outcomes is a
function of population growth, or perhaps urban decay. To be sure, classic literature from
renowned scholars like George Simmel (1903) and Max Weber (1921) point to the negative
societal implications of large, urban populations. Funding for education—a function of
legislative institutions—is, undoubtedly, one piece of the puzzle, but overwhelming
population size is likely another vital piece. An ever-increasing population with static
legislature size will drive up the constituent per representative quotient to an unsustainable
level from the perspective of adequate representation and legislative responsiveness. This has
implications for the competence of democratic political units and most importantly
legislatures.
There is little hope for population figures to decline consistently over the coming
years. The other side of the equation is where the answer lies: legislative institutions must
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adapt and adjust to constituency growth. This is not a particularly popular stance, yet it is
likely more palatable than proposing population control of some kind. What this analysis has
shown is that there are practical implications associated with constituency size. perhaps with
time and more empirical research, the need for adjustments to constituency sizes of subnational legislatures in the United States will become clearer.

Conclusion
Chapter Five has shined a light on the relationship between the size of the
constituencies state representatives and city councilmembers are asked to represent and
educational attainment in the relevant geographic locations. The theoretical claim underlying
this investigation is that larger legislatures have enhanced “system capacity” (Dahl and Tufte
1973, 20) to respond to collective societal needs. These larger legislatures, relative to the
population, have smaller constituency sizes per representative on average, which contributes
to their ability to respond.
The central question of this chapter asks: Does the size of state legislatures—and city
councils—correspond with educational outcomes? The empirical results yielded a positive
relationship between the key explanatory and the dependent variables using two distinct levels
of analysis. More specifically, the percentage of a population over the age of 25 without a
high school diploma increased along with constituency size in American states and cities. A
closer look at the coefficients obtained from multivariate tests revealed a bit more detail. At
the state level, an increase of 100,000 constituents per representative was associated with a
3.0% increase in citizens over the age of 25 without a high school diploma. The increase was
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noticeably higher in cities; the percentage of citizens with no high school diploma was
predicted to increase by 5.1% for every 100,000 increase in constituents per representative, all
else being equal.
So far, this dissertation has provided evidence to suggest legislature size matters in
two ways. Chapter Four showed an association between legislature size and descriptive
representation. Chapter Five has just linked relative legislature size (i.e., constituency size)
with a specific measure of collective education attainment. One more test remains. To gain
additional leverage on the theoretical claims related to system capacity, the next chapter will
investigate the link between constituency size and a measure of socioeconomic well-being.
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CHAPTER SIX
FROM CHAMBER FLOOR TO DIRT FLOOR: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CONSTITUENCY SIZE AND POVERTY

“In a country well governed, poverty is something to be ashamed of”
(Confucius 551-479 B.C.).

A final round of empirical tests is offered here in Chapter Six to provide a bit of
additional evidence that legislature size—and by extension, constituency size—does indeed
matter. So far the findings from Chapters Four and Five indicate there are measurable costs
associated with larger constituencies. These costs come in the form of lower levels of
descriptive representation and hindered responsiveness as operationalized via education
outcomes. Here, the focus shifts to poverty rates which serves as a proxy for socioeconomic
well-being.
This chapter begins by revisiting important elements of legislative responsiveness with
particular attention paid to justifying the inclusion of poverty in these analyses. Following that
is a discussion of poverty in the United States to define, outline, and chart the history of this
phenomenon. With a sturdy foundation in place, data and methods are detailed and descriptive
statistics are shared before testing the association between constituency size and the
percentage of the population living in poverty. Yet again, the results suggest a relationship
exists between the proxy for relative system capacity (i.e., constituency size) and societal
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outcomes (i.e., poverty rates). In the end, the multivariate tests that follow help answer the
final research question which was mentioned at the outset: Does the size of state
legislatures—and city councils—associate with socioeconomic outcomes?

Poverty and Unarticulated Demands
Once more, the theoretical claim is that smaller constituencies allow for enhanced
responsiveness by representative assemblies. This is rooted in Dahl and Tufte’s work
suggesting that larger political units have increased “system capacity” (1973, 20). Following
this line of thinking, larger legislatures relative to their constituencies ought to have more
capacity to respond to collective societal needs than their smaller counterparts. This was
covered extensively in Chapter Five; however, it seems necessary to revisit the tradeoff
between ideal small-sized and large-sized political units as outlined by Dahl and Tufte. Doing
so helps justify the inclusion of poverty in the analyses that follow.
In Size and Democracy, Dahl and Tufte (1973) argue that larger political units have
enhanced ability to respond and smaller units allow for more citizen participation. This
paradox results in tradeoffs because there is no perfect size to satisfy these competing goals.
Like education, poverty works particularly well as the dependent variable in this analysis
because this tradeoff is sidestepped. To clarify, poverty is undesirable at a normative level just
like poor educational attainment. There is arguably less need for citizen involvement to
articulate the demand for less poverty. Society, broadly stated, realizes the value in having
fewer individuals and families living in poverty. Like education, this assumption about
poverty is fairly uncontroversial and could be articulated or unarticulated (Jewell 1982). The
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beauty of including these variables is that some pressure to justify their inclusion is mitigated
by their normative appeal: Higher education attainment is a good thing; fewer people in
poverty is a good thing. In sum, including poverty in the analyses means that citizen
participation as outlined by Dahl and Tufte (1973) recedes in importance and the focus can
rest with system capacity (i.e., responsiveness). While some citizens may articulate a demand
for programs to alleviate poverty, the assumption is that individuals want less poverty, all else
being equal, even if that demand is not articulated.
Based on these expectations and relying on Dahl and Tufte’s philosophical
framework, the final remaining hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 3: Fewer constituents per state legislator will be associated with smaller
percentages of residents living below the poverty line.
Hypothesis 4: Fewer constituents per city councilmember will be associated with smaller
percentages of residents living below the poverty line.
Put another way, larger legislatures—relative to the populations they represent—will link
with improved socioeconomic outcomes. Testing these hypotheses provides insight about the
research question for this chapter: Does the size of state legislatures—and city councils—
associate with socioeconomic outcomes? With these theoretical assumptions laid bare yet
again and the hypotheses in place, attention now shifts to a broad discussion of poverty in the
United States.
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Poverty: Definitions and Context in the United States
Targeting the beginning point of poverty is tricky business, mainly because it has
always been with us. Poems, plays, and satires were written in ancient Greece (Jones 1996)
and Rome (Bradley 1994) on topics of wealth as well as an utter lack of material possession.
perhaps more familiarly, the Bible contains many verses and parables on the topic of poverty,
especially in the Book of John. Despite its long history, there are multiple definitions of
poverty.

Defining Poverty
In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776, n.p.) identifies the lack of “necessities”
as the experience of being unable to consume “not only the commodities which are
indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders
it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without.” By this definition,
social perception contributes to determining what constitutes poverty. Smith suggests that
inequality is independent of economic progress and that wealth and poverty would exist no
matter the state of the economy. Despite inequality, Smith (1776) argues that the positive
effects of economic growth trickle down to those at the lower end of the societal spectrum.
According to Smith, economic growth raises the collective standard of living for all, which
ultimately ameliorates severe poverty.
While Smith advocates for economic progress through free-market capitalistic
principles, Henry George (1879) argues that immense wealth and extraordinary economic
productivity are accompanied by poverty. George challenges laissez-faire economics and the
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singular pursuit of individual self-interest and suggests these contribute to inequality through
highly concentrated wealth among a select few. George defines poverty as “the openmouthed, relentless hell which yawns beneath civilized society” (1879, 411). He continues,
“For poverty is not merely deprivation; it means shame, degradation; the searing of the most
sensitive parts of our moral and mental nature as with hot irons” (George 1879, 411). This
suggests poverty is an intensely personal, embarrassing experience that influences an
individual’s sense of self.
The historian James Patterson brings these realities to life by discussing a social
worker’s report from the Great Depression:
Chicago, 1936: One woman wrote to a relief station as follows: ‘I am without food for
myself and child. I only got $6.26 to last me from the tenth to the twenty-fifth. That
order is out and I haven’t anything to eat. We go to bed hungry. Please give us
something to eat. I cannot stand to see my child hungry.’ (Patterson 2000, 38)
Another woman pled, “I must have rent for my flat. I am not strong enough to fight for
anything so if I don’t get attention in my desperate situation I just can’t survive any more. It
isn’t worth it” (Patterson 2000, 38). To be sure, the hardships that accompany poverty are
often overwhelming for people to endure.
Peter Townsend takes a slightly different view than Smith or George. He perceives
people as social beings who take on a variety of roles in a community, such as employee,
parent, citizen, and friend. He defines poverty as the absence of adequate income for people to
“play the roles, participate in the relationships, and follow the customary behavior which is
expected of them by virtue of their membership in society” (Townsend 1993, 10). This view
expands poverty beyond the economic realm and suggests broader implications for
communities, social bonds, and social norms. Looking back at one of the examples gathered
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by Patterson, it is plain to see that a single mother with no food and $6.26 left to spend for the
month would have difficulty playing the roles expected of her as a community member.

Categorizing Poverty Definitions
Others argue that poverty definitions can basically fit into three categories: “A.
Poverty is having less than an objectively defined, absolute minimum. B. Poverty is having
less than others in society. C. Poverty is feeling you do not have enough to get along”
(Hagenaars and de Vos 1988, 212). This is helpful as a way to organize competing
definitions, yet it is clear that the first two categories define poverty as an objective situation
and the third category is subjective. This is somewhat problematic for comparison purposes,
but it is arguably necessary given the wide range of poverty definitions. Category A typically
includes basicneeds like food, clothing, and housing as part of the absolute minimum
definition (Orshansky 1965; Rowntree 1901). This basic-needs approach requires an analysis
of what the minimum amount ought to be related to each need, and the amounts are combined
to generate the poverty threshold for income. This poverty line varies based on household
composition (Hagenaars and de Vos 1988). Similarly, ratios are often deployed to help
determine who lives in poverty. These include the food/income, fixed cost/income, and total
expenditure/income ratios (Van Praag, Spit, and Van de Stadt 1982; Watts 1967). Definitions
based on absolute minimums are often criticized for being rather arbitrary and the ratios fail to
acknowledge the economies of scale associated with different expenditures (Hagenaars and de
Vos 1988).
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Category B argues that poverty is having less than others. This suggests poverty is
about deprivation and the definitions categorized here focus on deprivation with respect to
income (Abel-Smith and Townsend 1965; Townsend 1974). Under these definitions, an
average consumption level is determined to represent what is typical for society. When
referring to the term consumption in this way, it is typically the use or possession of durable
consumer goods like vehicles, electronics, and appliances. Next, actual consumption is
benchmarked against the average level. Finally, the amount of deprivation is assumed based
upon the difference between the typical amount and the actual amount. Once again, these
definitions are typically criticized as arbitrary threshold amounts. In addition, younger
individuals who are just starting their careers may possess fewer durable consumer goods, but
it would be inaccurate to classify them as living in poverty or to consider them poor
(Hagenaars and de Vos 1988).
Category C tends to rely on survey data so that a subjective evaluation of an
individual’s feelings and opinions related to their poverty status can be obtained (Goedhart et
al. 1977). From the survey responses, the income amount considered sufficient to “get by” can
be identified. If an individual’s income is less than that amount then they are considered to be
poor. This definition lacks objectivity and assumes that the level of income associated with
the word sufficient is the same across all survey respondents, which is highly unlikely
(Hagenaars and de Vos 1988).
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Poverty in the United States
Having outlined some of definitions of poverty, it is arguably worthwhile to build on
this foundation by briefly charting its history in the United States. Given the long history of
poverty, it is no surprise that poverty has plagued the United States from the earliest days of
the republic. During colonial times, poverty was thought to derive from individual
disobedience, misbehavior, and undesirable actions as opposed to any structural economic
causes (Katz 1993). Often, the poor were categorized as either deserving or undeserving of
support and unsurprisingly those perceived as apathetic, lazy, idle, and indolent were not
treated kindly; whippings, indentured servitude, and even jail time were not uncommon
(Iceland 2013). The justice system supported this treatment of the undeserving poor. For
example, in 1633 the General Court of Massachusetts declared severe punishment for
individuals who spent time “idly or unprofitably” (Trattner 1998, 22). On the other hand,
hardships among the elderly and children (i.e., the deserving poor) were typically viewed
more favorably among colonists, with some communities offering assistance to those who
were in need and “deserved” the help (Trattner 1998).
Attitudes and distinction between a deserving and undeserving poor class continued
through the 1800s. This difference was elaborated on by the Reverend Charles Burroughs:
In speaking of poverty, let us never forget that there is a distinction between this and
pauperism. The former is an unavoidable evil, to which many are brought from
necessity, and in the wise and gracious providence of God. It is the result, not of our
faults, but of our misfortunes…Pauperism is the consequence of willful error, of
shameful indolence, of vicious habits. It is a misery of human creation, the pernicious
work of man, the lamentable consequence of bad principles and morals. (Burroughs
1835, 9)
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Stated another way, an individual living in poverty is not at fault for it can be unavoidable, but
paupers are vile because they have willfully created their circumstances. The term pauper was
also typically used to portray those who received public government assistance, usually from
the local or county level (Iceland 2013). Public sentiment toward those who seek out and
receive public assistance has always trended low, but in earlier eras it was particularly evident
with this clear divide between those who lived humbly in poverty and those classified as
revolting paupers.
As capitalism took hold in the United States, poverty signified personal failure. The
sentiment was that opportunity and wealth—or at a minimum, comfortable existence—were
possible for those with talent, energy, and a drive to be successful. Yet the availability of
livable wage employment and economic prosperity was verstated. A number of factors
contributed to the entrenchment of poverty during the early mid-nineteenth century.
The transformation in economic relations, the growth of cities, immigration, the
seasonality of labor, fluctuations in consumer demand, periodic depressions, low
wages, restricted opportunities for women, industrial accidents, high mortality, and the
absence of any social insurance: together these chiseled chronic poverty and
dependence into American social life. (Katz 2013, 7)
Attitudes toward poverty were firmly imbedded during this period and public policy and
private charity reflected this sentiment. The assistance that was available could be described
as mean-spirited and inadequate and it was still considered shameful to accept this ungenerous
assistance (Katz 2013).
Late in the nineteenth century and into the early 1900s, scholars and theorists began to
focus on poverty. Surveys and records from administrative agencies depicted poverty as a
“complex product of social and economic circumstances usually beyond individual control”
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(Katz 2013, 8);1 however, this did little to shift attitudes or public opinion. Even Progressive
reformers who had come to reject individual explanations of poverty continued to reflexively
use the moral definition of poverty (Katz 2013). Despite tracing poverty to its structural roots,
Robert Hunter (1904) employed the common distinction between poverty and pauperism
suggesting little progress toward a more nuanced understanding.
The United States continued growing rapidly, becoming more industrialized and
urbanized through the 1920s. Immigrants arrived in tremendous numbers and AfricanAmericans moved north in search of more economic opportunities. Corporations tapped both
the immigrant and Black communities in building cheap and capable workforces (Iceland
2013). Due to their tenuous economic footing, African-Americans were often more likely than
others to receive public assistance in some urban areas (Trotter Jr. 1993). Those who did not
make it to a city were typically concentrated in rural southern areas, serving as sharecroppers
(Iceland 2013). Those who found work in cities generally had no opportunity for
advancement and were compensated quite poorly, to the tune of less than $5 per week
(DuBois 1899).
The Great Depression hit the United States hard, particularly rural areas, with a quarter
of the labor force unemployed in 1933 (Patterson 2000). This widespread impact ensured that
“poverty could no longer be blamed on individual morality and misbehavior, for the role of
larger economic forces was plain to see” (Iceland 2013, 17). Moreover, domestic programs
made possible by President Roosevelt’s New Deal meant that millions of people were now
directly or indirectly benefitted by publicly-funded initiatives ranging widely from stabilizing

1

See Poverty and Policy in American History by Michael Katz (1983) for additional information.
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the agricultural economy to housing programs (Rauchway 2008). To be sure, it became more
difficult to criticize those who received assistance when they were friends, neighbors, and
family members.
Following World War II, the next major milestone in the United States was President
Johnson’s War on Poverty in response to an escalating poverty rate. Johnson saw education
and health care as vital poverty mitigation strategies; his tenure as president saw the creation
of Medicare, Medicaid, and food stamps as well as initiatives to address systemic poverty like
Head Start, Job Corps, and Volunteers in Service to America (Orleck and Hazirjian 2011).
The poverty rate has trended downward since the War on Poverty began and some predict that
rates would be worse without the initiatives created during Johnson’s presidency (Gillette
2010). Unsurprisingly, there are many critics, including politicians, in the contemporary era.
In March 2014, Paul Ryan, Chairman of the Budget Committee of the House of
Representatives, released a report arguing that the War on Poverty has done little to alleviate
poverty and that cuts should be made to federal assistance programs (U.S. House of
Representatives Budget Committee Majority Staff 2014).
In sum, poverty has multiple definitions and means something different depending on
who is asked. Definitions of poverty are often classified in three ways: having less than an
objectively established minimum, having less than others, or feeling as though basic needs
cannot be met. History shows that perceptions about poverty—and pauperism—have evolved
over time. Today, more recognize that poverty is not solely the result of an individual’s
actions and circumstances; rather, structural elements likely play a role. With this foundation
in place, attention turns to a brief discussion of how poverty is measured.
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Measuring Poverty
Perhaps the earliest measurements began in the mid-1800s. European statisticians of
that era began investigating income and expenditures of working-class families to understand
how much was needed to afford a certain standard of living (Iceland 2013). Relatively soon
after, the concept of a poverty line was introduced by Charles Booth (1892). This set the stage
for more in-depth investigations of absolute economic minimums (e.g., DuBois 1899; Hunter
1904 ).
The standard used by the U.S. Census Bureau and others today is firmly rooted amid
those definitions of poverty that rely on an absolute minimum threshold. The measure was
created by Mollie Orshansky (1965) in response to President Johnson’s War on Poverty. The
first poverty estimates were published by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1967 and two years later
the Office of Management and Budget circulated a memorandum establishing the official
poverty measure of the United States and identifying the Census Bureau as the agency
responsible for providing the annual estimates (U.S. Census Bureau 2014b). Over time,
various efforts have been made to improve the poverty measure including an Interagency
Poverty Studies Task Force in the 1970s and a National Academy of Sciences panel in the
1990s (U.S. Census Bureau 2014b). The following provides additional detail about the
measurement of poverty in the United States:
In alignment with the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Statistical Policy
Directive 14, the Census Bureau has a detailed criteria for who is considered to be
living in poverty: The Census Bureau uses a set of money income thresholds that vary
by family size and composition to determine who is in poverty. If a family's total
income is less than the family's threshold, then that family and every individual in it is
considered in poverty. The official poverty thresholds do not vary geographically, but
they are updated for inflation using Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). The official
poverty definition uses money income before taxes and does not include capital gains
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or noncash benefits (such as public housing, Medicaid, and food stamps)….The
original poverty definition provided a range of income cutoffs or thresholds adjusted
by such factors as family size, sex of the family head, number of children under 18
years old, and farm-non-farm residence. At the core of this definition of poverty was
the economy food plan, the least costly of four nutritionally adequate food plans
designed by the Department of Agriculture. It was determined from the Department of
Agriculture’s 1955 Household Food Consumption Survey that families of three or
more people spent approximately one-third of their after-tax money income on food;
accordingly, poverty thresholds for families of three or more people were set at three
times the cost of the economy food plan. Different procedures were used to calculate
poverty thresholds for two-person families and people living alone in order to
compensate for the relatively larger fixed expenses of these smaller units. For twoperson families, the cost of the economy food plan was multiplied by a factor of 3.7
(also derived from the 1955 survey). For unrelated individuals (one-person units), no
multiplier was used; poverty thresholds were instead calculated as a fixed proportion
of the corresponding thresholds for two-person units. Annual updates of these SSA
poverty thresholds were based on price changes of the items in the economy food plan.
As a result of deliberations of a Federal interagency committee in 1969, the following
two modifications to the original SSA definition of poverty were adopted: The SSA
thresholds for nonfarm families were retained for the base year 1963, but annual
adjustments in the levels were based on changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
rather than on changes in the cost of foods in the economy food plan. The farm
thresholds were raised from 70 to 85% of the corresponding non-farm levels. The
combined impact of these two modifications resulted in an increase in the tabulated
totals for 1967 of 360,000 poor families and 1.6 million poor people. In 1981, three
additional modifications in the poverty definition recommended by another
interagency committee were adopted for implementation in the March 1982 CPS as
well as the 1980 census: Elimination of separate thresholds for farm families.
Elimination (by averaging) of separate thresholds for female-householder families and
"all other" families (earlier termed "male-headed" families). Extension of the detailed
poverty threshold matrix to make the largest family size category "nine people or
more." (U.S. Census Bureau 2015, n.p.)
To summarize, multiple factors are considered when determining poverty status. These
considerations include monetary inflows (e.g., earnings, unemployment compensation,
alimony, child support, etc.), family size, and ages of family members. While some
government aid programs use different poverty measures, the Census Bureau’s approach is
widely accepted and is often the basis upon which other measures are developed. When the
Census Bureau’s measure is used, individuals and families must not exceed the monetary
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threshold amounts if they seek to qualify for aid programs. Table 19 provides the financial
threshold levels for 2014. Relying heavily on the standard measure of poverty offered by the
U.S. Census Bureau lends credibility to the analysis that follows. Attention now turns to a
brief outline of the data and methods used to assess the relationship between constituency size
and poverty in American states and cities.

Table 19
Poverty Thresholds for 2014 by Size of Family and Number of Related Children Under 18 Years
Related children under 18 years
None

Size of Family Unit
One person
(unrelated individual)
Under 65 years

12,316

65 years and over

11,354

One

Two

Three

Four

Five

Six

Seven

Eight or more

Two people
Householder under 65 years

15,853

16,317

Householder 65 years and over

14,309

16,256

Three people

18,518

19,055

19,073

Four people

24,418

24,817

24,008

24,091

Five people

29,447

29,875

28,960

28,252

27,820

Six people

33,869

34,004

33,303

32,631

31,633

31,041

Seven people

38,971

39,214

38,375

37,791

36,701

35,431

34,036

Eight people

43,586

43,970

43,179

42,485

41,501

40,252

38,953

38,622

Nine people or more

52,430

52,685

51,984

51,396

50,430

49,101

47,899

47,601

45,768

Note: Data gathered from U.S. Census Bureau poverty thresholds,
https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/about/overview/measure.html.

Data and Methodology
The same datasets for American states and cities are used once again for the final
empirical tests of this dissertation. Testing at the state and city levels allows for comparisons
to be made and provides the opportunity to gain additional leverage on the arguments made
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here. The following variables are used in an ordinary least squares regression model to assess
the link between constituency size and poverty. In an effort to achieve symmetry with the
previous models exploring educational attainment, the analyses presented here include the
same control variables; however, some additional variables are also included in subsequent
model runs.
Poverty Rate—The dependent variable in each of the following models is the
percentage of the population living in poverty for each geographic area (i.e., all 50 American
states and 274 cities with populations of 100,000 or more). Poverty data were accessed from
the U.S. Census Bureau.2
Constituency Size—Once again, the key explanatory variable is constituency size. This
is obtained by dividing the state population by the total number of legislative seats in the state
assembly. The resulting amount is the number of constituents per representative. The same
calculation is carried out to obtain the number of constituents for each councilmember at the
city level of analysis. This operationalization captures population and legislature size in a
single variable.
Per Capita Income—Chapter Five included per capita income as the economic control
variable in the city model. Here it is introduced in the state and city models as an imperative
consideration for explaining poverty levels in the United States. At the state level, per capita
income and the percentage of the population living below the poverty line are clearly
associated (r = -.71; p < .01) and the city data yield similar results (r = -.66; p < .01). per

2

Poverty rates are available by state, county, and city for 2010, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html.
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capita income figures derived from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis.3
Female Legislators—Controlling for the percentage of the state legislature and city
council that is female helps to ensure that the policy preferences of female legislators are held
constant. To clarify, evidence suggests that congresswomen are more liberal than their male
counterparts (Burrell 1994), meaning it is likely they might support programs and public
policies designed to improve the conditions of those on the lower end of the socioeconomic
scale. State-level data were gathered from the National Conference of State Legislatures. 4 For
female city councilmembers, information was collected by visiting each municipality’s
website and entering the appropriate number.
South—Finally, included is a dummy variable to indicate a state or city situated in the
southern region of the United States. As mentioned previously, scholars argue that graduation
rates among African-Americans and others are associated with the enduring legacy of slavery
in the South (Fitzpatrick and Yoels 1992; Morris and Monroe 2009). Educational achievement
contributes to financial sustainability later in life; the lack of education could therefore yield
more individuals in poverty. The variable is scored “1” for the 16 states that are classified in
the South geographic region by the U.S. Census Bureau. States in all other regions are coded
“0.” At the local unit of analysis, cities situated in southern states—as determined by U.S.
Census Bureau—are coded “1” and all others “0.”

3

Table SA1-3, State Annual Personal Income, http://www.bea.gov/regional/histdata/releases/0911spi/index.cfm,
and Local Area Personal Income, 2010, http://www.bea.gov/regional/histdata/releases/0412lapi/index.cfm.
4
Women in State Legislatures: 2010 Legislative Session, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatorsstaff/legislators/womens-legislative-network/women-in-state-legislatures-2010.aspx.
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The aforementioned variables essentially replicate the models from Chapter Five with
the sole difference being that education attainment is replaced with poverty status. This
consistent approach works well because the control variables are arguably valid for both
models. With that said, the empirical section that follows includes some alternative models to
provide additional insight. These supplementary models hinge on the removal of the South
dummy variable and the addition of a variable that captures the percentage of the population
that is African-American. The data were gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau.5
A positive relationship is expected between constituency size and the percentage of
the population living below the poverty line. Put another way, larger legislatures relative to
the population (i.e., smaller constituency size) ought to be associated with fewer citizens
living in poverty. This expectation is based on Dahl and Tufte’s (1973) theoretical view that
larger political units have enhanced capacity to respond to mutual societal interests such as
socioeconomic well-being. This could be because of the diversity and heterogeneity that
accompanies larger groups resulting in a more descriptively representative assembly and, by
extension, a desire to craft policies to assist those at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.
Indeed, for the analyses at hand, it is most likely policy responsiveness—as discussed in
Chapter Five—that will theoretically be enhanced via larger relative legislature size. Negative
relationships are expected between both per capita income and the percentage of legislative
seats held by females and the dependent variable. The poverty threshold is partially reliant
upon income, and higher income levels mean fewer people living in poverty. Moving on,
female legislators are more likely to support policies related to education, health care,

5

QuickFacts Beta, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html.
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economic development, and employment (Barrett 1995)—all of which can at least partially
contribute to the socioeconomic standing of constituents. Areas with a larger percentage of
legislative seats held by women are expected to associate with fewer constituents living in
poverty. Finally, southern states and cities are expected to have a higher percentage of their
population living below the poverty line than their northern counterparts. Again, this is
partially due to the disparity in educational attainment (Morris and Monroe 2009). The
hypothesized direction of these relationships is anticipated regardless of the unit of analysis.

Results
With context, theory, and methods established, the time has come to investigate the
relationship between constituency size and poverty rates in the United States. Before
discussing the empirical findings, attention turns to some descriptive statistics associated with
data gathered for states and cities.

Poverty Rates: Descriptive Statistics in American States
Table 20 includes descriptive statistics for the state dataset. Beginning with the
dependent variable—the percentage of the state’s population living below the poverty line—
there is solid variation among the 50 American states. Considering all states, 12.7% of
Americans live below the federally established poverty line. Idaho is nearest to the mean at
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Table 20
Descriptive Statistics of Poverty Model, States 2010

Min
Max
Mean
St Dev

Percent Living Below
Poverty Line
7.61
21.19
12.74
2.94

Constituents Per
Representative
3,105
310,450
42,366
48,366

Per Capita
Income
31,071
54,239
39,031
5,540

Percent of
Legislature
Seats Held by
Females
10.00
38.00
24.21
6.87

n = 50

12.6%. At almost half the average is New Hampshire (7.6 %), which has the smallest
percentage of residents living in poverty. Considering their low poverty rates and New
Hampshire’s small constituency size—the fewest constituents per representative in the nation
(average of 3,105)—this case aligns nicely with the theoretical expectations of this analysis.
On the other hand, at nearly three times New Hampshire’s figure is Mississippi, with 21.2%
of citizens living in poverty. Similar to the education rates revealed in Chapter Five, the states
with the highest percentages of poverty are situated in the southern region of the United
States. Mississippi (21.2 %), Louisiana (17.4 %), Kentucky (17.3 %), Arkansas (17.3 %), and
New Mexico (17.1 %) are the bottom five states in terms of poverty and all but New Mexico
are located in the South.
The key explanatory variable—constituency size—has received ample attention to this
point. Briefly, New Hampshire has the smallest constituencies, on average (3,105), which
contrast dramatically with California’s average constituency size of 310,450 citizens per
representative. Moving on to the first control variable, Connecticut has the highest per capita
income in the nation. Those states on the high end of per capita income are situated in the
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northeastern region of the United States. The wealthiest states per capita are Connecticut
($54,239), Massachusetts ($51,304), New Jersey ($51,139), Maryland ($49,023), and New
York ($48,596). Four of the five states with the lowest per capita income are located in the
South: Mississippi ($31,071), Idaho ($31,897), West Virginia ($32,042), Kentucky ($32,316),
and South Carolina ($32,462). We see a bit of overlap among states that are relatively worse
off in terms of poverty and per capita income. For instance, Mississippi and Kentucky are in
the bottom five states for each of those measures. It is not, however, a perfect match, which is
why it is important to hold per capita income constant when attempting to isolate a
relationship between constituency size and poverty rates.
Next, the model controls for the percentage of legislative seats held by females. This
ranges noticeably from 10.0% in South Carolina to 38.0% in Colorado. The final control is a
dummy variable to code whether or not a state is located in the South; 16 states are considered
to be in the southern geographic region per the U.S. Census Bureau. The previous paragraphs
allude to why the South has particular relevance when studying poverty. Moreover, it is quite
common in empirical research on American government to carefully consider the southern
region (Carmines and Stimson 1982; Engstrom and McDonald 1982; Fiorina 1994; Hayes and
McKee 2008; Key 1949; Murray and Vedlitz 1978; Preuhs 2006; Valentino and Sears 2005).

Poverty Rates: Descriptive Statistics in American Cities
Much like the data used in Chapter Five, variation is much more dramatic among
cities than states. When considering all 274 American cities included in the dataset, the
average amount of the population living in poverty is 17.3%. Right away it is plain to see that
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cities have higher poverty rates than states as a whole, on average. Orlando, Florida, and
Killeen, Texas, both have poverty rates matching the average of 17.3%. Both of these
“average” cities would be far from typical in the state dataset. To be sure, Kentucky and
Arkansas both have 17.3% of their populations living in poverty and they are tied for the third
highest rates in the nation. This may be somewhat unsurprising considering the urban poor
has historically outnumbered other geographic areas, although that trend is shifting with
increases in suburban poor throughout the 2000s (Kneebone 2014; Kneebone, Nadeau, and
Berube 2011). The differences between states and cities are even more elaborate when
looking at the minimum and maximum values. Naperville, Illinois—a well-regarded,
generally affluent community—has a poverty rate of 3.5%. This is noticeably lower than New
Hampshire’s rate of 7.6%. On the high end, Flint, Michigan’s, poverty rate is 38.2% and
Detroit, Michigan, is close behind at 36.2%. These two cities were hit particularly hard during
the global financial crisis of 2008 due in part to a reliance on manufacturing as a vital
component of their regional economy (Akers 2013; Shaiken 2009).
Moving on to constituency size, the typical councilmember in Stamford, Connecticut,
has just 3,066 constituents while those in Los Angeles, California, have 252,841. To reiterate
discussion of this variable from Chapter Five, cities in Connecticut and New Hampshire rule
the top five in terms of smallest constituencies. On the other hand, populous areas in
California, Arizona, New York, and Texas, have the most extraordinarily large constituencies.
The control variables used here were also incorporated in Chapter Five. Briefly,
Brownsville, Texas has the lowest per capita income at just $12,900. Alternatively,
Alexandria, Virginia, has a per capita income level of $54,892. The average per capita income
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amount is $26,474. Gender composition of the city councils is also included as a control
variable. This ranges from no seats held by women—which is the case in 16 municipalities—
to 85.71% of the city council consisting of females (New Orleans, Louisiana). Finally, the
South dummy variable is included. Considering all 274 cases, 33.9% are considered southern
based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s designation. Table 21 includes descriptive statistics for the
city model variables.

Table 21
Descriptive Statistics of Poverty Model, Cities 2010

Min
Max
Mean
St Dev

Percent Living Below
Poverty Line
3.50
38.20
17.28
6.88

Constituents Per
Representative
3,066
252,841
34,876
29,332

Per Capita
Income
12,900
54,892
26,474
7,129

Percent of
Legislature
Seats Held by
Females
0.00
85.71
29.65
16.57

n = 274

Multivariate Results: Poverty, State Model
Table 22 shows results depicting a link between the key explanatory variable and
poverty rates at the state level. Specifically, there is a relationship (p < .05) between the
number of constituents per state representative and the percentage of residents living below
the federally established poverty line. The positive direction of the relationship is exactly
what was predicted based on the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation. In essence,
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larger legislatures—relative to their constituencies—ought to correspond with more desirable
socioeconomic outcomes. Table 22 offers evidence that this is the case.

Table 22
Constituents per State Legislator and Percent of the Population Living
Below the Poverty Line, 2010

Key Explanatory Variable
Constituents Per State Representative

Expected
Sign
+

Coefficient
(Standard Error)
.00001 *
(.000006)

Control Variables
Per Capita Income
Percent of Legislature Seats Held by
Females
South
Constant
F-statistic
R2 (overall)
n
*** p < .001; * p < .05; t p < .10 (one-tailed tests)

+

-.0003 ***
(.00005)
-.0742 t
(.046)
1.4763 *
25.68 ***
(2.16)
20.42 ***
.65
50

The control variables also align with the hypothesized expectations. Negative
coefficients result for per capita income (p < .001) and the percentage of legislature seats held
by females (p < .10). In addition, the results indicate that southern states tend to have higher
percentages of residents living in poverty (p < .05) than non-South states.
Turning to the coefficient values, an increase of 100,000 constituents per state
representative corresponds with a 1.1% increase in citizens living in poverty. Viewed a
different way, an increase of one standard deviation in constituents per representative is
associated with a .08 standard deviation increase in poverty rates. Moving on, an increase of
$10,000 per capita is linked with a 3.1% decline in poverty rates, on average. This makes
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intuitive sense given how important income is to determining poverty status. On average, an
increase of ten females per legislature is associated with a reduction of poverty rates by nearly
three-quarters of a percent. Finally, 1.5% more of the populace in southern states live in
poverty than non-South states, all else being equal.

Multivariate Results: Poverty, City Model
Table 23 includes results for the poverty model at the city level. The direction of each
variable’s relationship with poverty rates matches expectations with the exception of female
legislative seats, much like the previous chapter.6 Most importantly for the analysis at hand is
that the relationship between constituency size and poverty rates materializes, albeit weakly (p
< .10). Put differently, a larger city council constituency is associated with a higher
percentage of the constituency living below the poverty line. In addition, per capita income (p
< .001) and geographic location (i.e., South dummy variable; p < .10) also return significant
relationships with poverty rates.
Moving on to the coefficients, an increase of 100,000 constituents per councilmember
is marginally linked with a 1.0% increase in the percentage of the population living in
poverty. Moreover, a $10,000 increase in per capita income is associated with a 6.4%
decrease in the percentage of a city’s population living in poverty. Once again, this is to be
expected since the poverty threshold is primarily determined by income. Finally, cities located
in southern states tend to have higher poverty rates than cities situated elsewhere. Southern
6

Dropping the percentage of council seats held by women from the model has very little effect. The key
explanatory variable remains marginally significant (p < .10), per capita income stays highly related (p < .001)
and the South is unchanged (p < .05). Moreover, the goodness of fit persists at .45 regardless of whether the
percentage of females on the council is included or not.
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cities have approximately 1.2% more of their population living in poverty than non-South
cities, on average.

Table 23
Constituents per City Councilmember and Percent of the Population Living Below the Poverty Line, 2010

Key Explanatory Variable
Constituents Per State Representative

Expected
Sign
+

Coefficient
(Standard Error)
.00001 t
(.00001)

Control Variables
Per Capita Income

-

Percent of Legislature Seats Held by
Females

-

South

+

Constant
F-statistic
R2 (overall)
n
*** p < .001; * p < .05; t p < .10 (one-tailed tests)

-.0006 ***
(.00004)
.0172
(.019)
1.2434 *
(.655)
32.79 ***
(1.38)
55.92 ***
.45
274

Alternative Poverty Models
Four models have now been completed exploring the relationship between
constituency size, educational outcomes (state model, p < .001; city model, p < .001), and
poverty rates (state model, p < .05; city model, p < .10). Each model meets typical levels of
statistical significance, with the exception of the city poverty model. Interestingly, with only
minor adjustments, the key explanatory variable’s relationship with poverty rates emerges
more powerfully than before.
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When re-evaluating the poverty model specifications, the South dummy variable
raised some questions, namely: What is it about the South? As discussed earlier, the South
variable is essentially a proxy for the low graduation rates—and their corresponding influence
on employment prospects—of African-Americans, the underlying notions being that AfricanAmericans make up a greater percentage of state populations in the South than elsewhere (r =
.72; p < .01) and that larger African-American populations in a given state are linked with
higher percentages of those without a high school diploma (r = .57; p < .01) and higher
unemployment rates (r = .34; p < .01). These linkages are true at the city level as well. The
percentage of the population that is African-American is positively associated with high
school “dropouts” (r = .10; p < .05) and unemployment rates (r = .47; p < .01). While these
factors are indirectly captured in the South dummy variable, in the spirit of identifying a more
direct substitute, the alternative models control for the percentage of the population that is
African-American instead of southern geographic region.
Table 24 portrays a revised state model with the South dummy variable removed. This
minor adjustment retains the relationship between constituency size and poverty rates (p <
.05). Furthermore, the relationship between female legislative seats and poverty was marginal
in the previous model, yet in Table 24 a clear association is present (p < .05). Last, the
alternative variable (i.e., percentage of the population that is African-American) has a stronger
link with poverty rates (p < .01) than the South dummy variable (p < .05). All of these
relationships are in the hypothesized direction.
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Table 24
Alternative State Model: Constituents per State Legislator and Percent of the Population Living
Below the Poverty Line, 2010

Key Explanatory Variable
Constituents Per State Representative

Expected
Sign
+

Coefficient
(Standard Error)
.000005 *
(.000006)

Control Variables
Per Capita Income
Percent of Legislature Seats Held by
Females
Percent of Population that is AfricanAmerican
Constant

+

-.0003 ***
(.00005)
-.1178 *
(.043)
.0726 **
(.029)
26.55 ***
(1.96)
21.04 ***
.65
50

F-statistic
R2 (overall)
n
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 (one-tailed tests)
Note: This model replicates Table 22, substituting the percentage of the population that is African-American for
the South dummy variable. Doing so maintained the relationship between the key explanatory variable and
poverty rates. Additionally, removing the control for southern states allows a stronger association between
females in the legislature and poverty rates to emerge. Moreover, the percentage of the population that is
African-American has a stronger relationship with poverty rates than the South dummy variable found in Table
22.

Table 25 re-imagines the city analysis by replacing the South dummy variable with the
control variable for the percentage of the population that is African-American. Recall that the
model in Table 23 is the only multivariate test in either Chapter Five or this chapter that
returned a marginally significant relationship between the key explanatory variable and the
dependent variable. By substituting the African-American population variable for the South
control variable, the relationship between constituency size and poverty rates meets standard
levels of statistical significance (p < .05). In addition, the relationship between the new
control variable and poverty rates is stronger (p < .001) than what was identified between the
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South variable and poverty earlier (p < .05). This adjustment also noticeably improved the R2
value from .45 to .56, suggesting better goodness of fit in the model overall.

Table 25
Alternative City Model: Constituents per City Councilmember and Percent of the
Population Living Below the Poverty Line, 2010
Expected
Sign

Key Explanatory Variable
Constituents Per State Representative

+

Coefficient
(robust s.e.)
.00002 *
(.000009)

Control Variables
Per Capita Income

-

Percent of Legislature Seats Held by
Females

-

Percent of Population that is AfricanAmerican

+

-.0006 ***
(.00005)
.0204
(.017)
.1270 ***
(.019)
29.62 ***
(1.71)
67.25 ***
.56
274

Constant

F-statistic
R2 (overall)
n
*** p < .001; * p < .05 (one-tailed tests)
Note: This model replicates Table 23, with the South dummy variable removed and a control added for AfricanAmerican populations. This adjustment resulted in a stronger association between constituency size and poverty
rates while also improving the goodness of fit. In addition, the relationship between the African-American
population variable and poverty rates is stronger than the South dummy variable contained in Table 23.

Discussion
While others have identified plenty of ills that accompany population growth (e.g.,
Hirsch 1968; Sale 1980), the evidence uncovered here suggests that constituency size is
linked directly with poverty rates. To understand these results more clearly, the following

147
investigates the coefficients found in the alternative models and identifies some cases from
each dataset that correspond with the empirical output.
At the state level, an increase of 100,000 constituents per representative is related to
about one half of a percent increase in poverty. The cases that best exemplify this are Florida
and Idaho. State legislators in Florida represent about 117,508 constituents on average
compared to 14,929, constituents per representative in Idaho. The difference in constituency
sizes is 102,579; slightly more than the hypothetical increase of 100,000. The poverty rate in
Florda is 13.2%, which is 0.6% larger than Idaho’s poverty rate of 12.6%. Alternatively, there
are 4,241 more constituents per representative in Arizona than in Michigan. An increase of
this amount is predicted to yield a 0.2% bump in poverty rates. In reality, these cases perform
very closely to expectations with Arizona’s poverty rate coming in 0.3% higher than
Michigan’s.
At the city level, the percentage of citizens living in poverty is predicted to increase by
approximately 2.0% for every 100,000 increase in constituents per representative. This
expected increase is brought to life by looking more closely at Evansville, Indiana, and
Columbus, Ohio. Evansville councilmembers had constituencies of 13,047 compared to
113,433 in Columbus. With this difference of 100,386 there is a corresponding difference in
poverty rates as predicted by the coefficient: 19.3% in Evansville compared to 21.8% in
Columbus. The 2.5% difference is a bit larger than the 2.0% jump anticipated by the model,
but it is still roughly equivalent. Looking elsewhere, Los Angeles, California, has the largest
constituency sizes per councilmember at about 252,841. At 60,650, councilmembers in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, typically represent 192,191 fewer constituents than their
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counterparts in Los Angeles. This increase is expected to correspond with a 3.8% leap in
poverty rates. Los Angeles and Albuquerque are quite close to this predicted increase. Over
one-fifth of the population in Los Angeles lives below the poverty line (20.2 %), whereas
Albuquerque has a poverty rate of 16.6%, for a difference of 3.6%.

Conclusion
This chapter investigated constituency sizes of state legislatures and city councils in
relationship to the percentage of constituents living below the federally established poverty
line. In theory, increased legislature size—with smaller relative constituencies—ought to have
increased capacity to respond to societal needs, such as poverty. This “system capacity” (Dahl
and Tufte 1973, 20) enhances the ability of a legislature to respond.
The empirical findings uncovered here clearly identified a link between constituency
size and poverty rates. At the state level, the association met typical expectations of statistical
significance (p < .05), while a marginal relationship was uncovered at the city level of
analysis (p < .10). To further assess this link, an alternative model was constructed. The South
control variable was dropped in favor of a control for the percentage of the population that is
African-American. In the state model, this adjustment retained the relationship between
constituency size and poverty rates while strengthening the connection between female
legislative seats and the dependent variable. At the city level, the alternative model bolstered
the relationship between constituency size and poverty rates and improved the goodness of fit.
Chapter Six contributes yet another piece to this puzzle of size. It seems there is
mounting evidence that legislature size matters in a variety of ways. The next chapter
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concludes by reiterating the ways in which this research suggests size matters. Moreover, a
theoretical framework is developed to summarize the findings presented here, and
opportunities for further study of legislature size are outlined.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE THEORY OF LEGISLATURE SIZE

“Wherever something is wrong, something is too big” (Leopold Kohr 1957, 1).

This dissertation builds upon previous work on legislature size, representation, and
responsiveness by examining sub-national legislatures in contemporary America. In The
Breakdown of Nations, Leopold Kohr warns of the problems associated with large size. He
puts all of his cards on the table at the very beginning:
As the physicists of our time have tried to elaborate an integrated single theory,
capable of explaining not only some but all phenomena of the physical universe, so I
have tried on a different plan to develop a single theory through which not some but
all phenomena of the social universe can be reduced to a common denominator. The
result is a new and unified political philosophy centering in the theory of size. It
suggests that here seems only one cause behind all forms of social misery: bigness.
Oversimplified as this may seem, we shall find the idea more easily acceptable if we
consider that bigness, or oversize, is really much more than just a social problem. It
appears to be the one and only problem permeating all creation. Wherever something
is wrong, something is too big. (Kohr 1957, 1)
I am unwilling to pin all forms of social misery on a single cause; however, all told, this
dissertation suggests that legislature and constituency size have implications for effective
democracy and society in the United States.
The previous chapters offer empirical evidence to suggest legislature and constituency
size matters in three distinct ways: 1) descriptive representation, 2) education outcomes, and
3) socioeconomic realities. One might imagine there are a multitude of additional socio-
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political implications. Moreover, this work has contributed an element of empirical
understanding into a body of literature that is often theoretical. This concluding chapter has
three primary goals. First, the philosophical underpinnings and empirical findings presented
earlier are summarized to reinforce the notion that “size matters” (Dahl 1998, 105). Second, a
theory of legislature size is outlined to help explain the findings from this dissertation.
Finally, areas for future research are identified and briefly discussed in an effort to encourage
more scholarship on the topic.

Summary of Findings
Debates about the appropriate size of a political unit are nothing new and interest
remains high. Chapters One and Two summarize some of the pertinent philosophical and
empirical contributions related to legislature and constituency size. Plato, Aristotle, and
Rousseau favored the small political community and they are not alone; relatively smaller
communities are often favored by theorists and scholars in anthropology, sociology, and
economics. For example, anthropologists have convincingly argued that communications,
durable relationships, and culture sharing are enhanced in smaller communities (Murdoch
1949; Pfeiffer 1969). Sociologists have outlined some of the challenges that persist in urban
areas, such as isolation, normlessness, and deviance (Durkheim 1897; Simmel 1903; Weber
1921). Economists argue that large populations are more heterogeneous, which results in
challenges to maximizing the delivery of public services (Hirsch 1968).
In political science, Size and Democracy by Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte (1973)
offers arguably the most comprehensive theoretical treatment about the size of a political unit.
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Building on their work, Chapter Two argues that population size and legislature size must not
be viewed in isolation. A shift in the size of either the political community or the legislature
can alter the dynamics of the representational experience.
Dahl and Tufte (1973) also provide much of the theoretic foundation for this
dissertation. Importantly, the authors identify representation and the ability to respond to the
public as fundamental considerations in the discussion of size. Representation and
responsiveness are used throughout this dissertation to guide the empirical tests. Specifically,
Chapters Three and Four focus on representation while Chapters Five and Six hone in on
responsiveness.

Descriptive Representation
Chapter Three noted that representation is fundamental to American democracy. Yet,
there is a long-standing academic debate about how representation should be accomplished.
For example, in the late 1700s, some considered the national Congress too small and believed
something needed to be done at the state level to ensure representativeness, while others
suggested large electoral districts were the appropriate solution (Muzzio and Tompkins 1989).
Moreover, influential colonists such as Melancton Smith and John Adams argued that
legislators should resemble those they represent. Indeed, the second president of the United
States said the legislature “should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large”
(Adams 1865, 195). More recently, research has shown that the type of descriptive
representation argued for by Adams and others is linked with improved substantive
representation (Hero and Preuhs 2007; Mansbridge 1999; Swers 2005). Put differently,
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passive representation (i.e., descriptive) can lead to active representation (i.e., substantive),
such as improved policy outcomes for traditionally underrepresented constituents.
The first research question is also answered in Chapter Three: How demographically
congruent are state legislatures—and city councils— with their constituencies? Two unique
datasets were developed to address this inquiry and subsequent research questions. Using
archival information, databases were created for every American state (n = 50) and every
municipality in the United States with a population of 100,000 or more in 2010, the most
current census inventory (n = 274). Relying heavily on U.S. Census Bureau data, these
datasets contain a variety of variables such as population counts, legislature size, constituency
size, demographic variables for legislatures and constituencies, and a range of socioeconomic
and other control variables.
The findings from Chapter Three indicate that American state legislatures and city
councils do not descriptively represent their constituents in a robust manner. The descriptive
analysis included a macro measure (i.e., non-Whites), specific race/ethnicity variables (i.e.,
African-Americans and Latino/as), and gender (i.e., females). A demographic “gap” was
calculated by subtracting the percentage of the total population with a given demographic
characterization from the corresponding percentage of the state legislature or city council with
that characterization. For instance, the percentage of the population in Alabama that is
Latino/a was subtracted from the percentage of the Alabama state legislature that is Latino/a.
At the state level, females are the most underrepresented group—from a purely demographic,
or passive representation, perspective. At the city level, the most underrepresented group was
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the aggregate race measure, non-Whites; however, females were very close behind. All
groups were descriptively underrepresented, on average, no matter the unit of analysis or the
sub-population analyzed.

Legislature Size and Descriptive Representation
The results from Chapter Three dovetail right into Chapter Four. This chapter
introduced legislature size into the discussion of descriptive representation and sought to
answer the following research question: Is the size of legislatures associated with the
demographic gap between state legislatures—and city councils—and their constituencies?
Previous work has identified a link between legislature size, or smaller constituencies,
and enhanced representation for some population groups (e.g., Alozie and Manganaro 1993;
Preuhs 2007; Taebel 1978), but the verdict is mixed, with others uncovering no association
(e.g., Casellas 2009). To test this, the demographic gap variables from Chapter Three were
correlated to the size of state legislatures and city councils (i.e., the number of legislative
seats) as well as an alternative measure of size: constituents per representative. In theory, a
larger legislature, on average, will be more heterogeneous than a relatively smaller legislature.
More legislative seats ought to correlate with a smaller representation gap. Alternatively,
more constituents per representative (i.e., smaller legislature relative to the population) should
correlate with a larger descriptive gap, and this is precisely what is uncovered.
Overall, the analyses suggest legislature size at the sub-national level is related to
descriptive representation of non-Whites and Latino/as. The descriptive representation of
Latino/as has a statistically significant relationship—in the hypothesized direction—with state
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legislature and city council size in all four models (i.e., state and city units of analysis,
number of legislative seats, constituents per representative). In addition, the collective
measure, non-Whites, is found to be significant in the hypothesized correct direction in three
of the four tests. When considering African-Americans and women, the under-representation
story is decidedly mixed. However, after removing atypical states and cities from the
respective analyses, the findings are consistent with the expectations of this research. In sum,
Chapter Four suggested that legislature size matters with regard to descriptive representation
for certain groups.

Constituency Size and Education
As noted earlier, Chapter Five shifted focus from representation to responsiveness.
Similarly though, the normative claim is that increased legislature size, relative to the size of
the constituent population, can enhance the capacity of an assembly to respond to societal
needs. Once more, this is rooted in the work of Dahl and Tufte. The authors argue that system
capacity means “the polity [governing unit] has the capacity to respond fully to the collective
preferences of its citizens” (Dahl and Tufte 1973, 20). With that in mind, the findings from
this dissertation suggest that adequate legislature size may be an antecedent to responsiveness.
If system capacity is lacking, then responsiveness is hindered even before legislative
deliberation, negotiations, or agenda setting can take place. Others agree that relatively larger
legislatures have enhanced capacity to respond to constituent needs than do smaller
assemblies, on average (Muzzio and Tompkins 1989).
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Education outcomes were the dependent variable in Chapter Five. Specifically, the
percentage of the population over the age of 25 years without a high school diploma was
modeled. It was important to select an issue area that legislatures—both statewide assemblies
and city councils—have some involvement with and influence on. To be sure, state and local
legislatures control the flow of funding to schools (Wood and Theobald 2003). Additionally,
improved educational outcomes are generally considered to be a desirable collective outcome
(Leachman and Mai 2014), so it serves as a straightforward societal measure for this test of
responsiveness. The key explanatory variable was constituents per representative for state
legislators and city councilmembers. This single variable captured legislature and
constituency size in one measure, reiterating again that they ought not to be viewed in
isolation.
The central question of Chapter Five asked: Does the size of state legislatures—and
city councils—correspond with educational outcomes? When controlling for a host of other
considerations, the models indicate constituency size is related to education attainment at both
the state and local levels of analysis. At the state level, an increase of 100,000 constituents per
representative was associated with a 3.0% increase in citizens over the age of 25 without a
high school diploma. The increase was noticeably higher in cities; the percentage of citizens
with no high school diploma was predicted to increase by 5.1% for every 100,000 person
increase in constituents per representative, all else being equal.
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Constituency Size and Poverty
Another empirical test was offered in Chapter Six to gain additional leverage on the
theoretical claim that larger legislature size, relative to constituency size, enhances
responsiveness. This time, the relationship between constituency size and the percentage of
the population living below the federally established poverty line was assessed. Much like
education, legislatures at both the state and local levels play a direct role in the creation, and
funding, of programs and policies to address poverty and socio-economic standards more
broadly (Gillette 2010; Orleck and Hazirjian 2011).
The research question presented in Chapter Six asked: Does the size of state
legislatures—and city councils—associate with macrosocioeconomic outcomes? The
dependent variable in this case was poverty rates measured as the percentage of state and city
residents living below the national government-established poverty line. Once again, the key
clarifying variable was constituency size at both units of analysis. A positive relationship was
expected between constituency size and the percentage of the population living below the
poverty line. Again, this expectation is based on Dahl and Tufte’s (1973) theoretical view that
larger political units have enhanced capacity to respond to mutual societal interests such as
socioeconomic well-being.
Initial models uncovered a statistically significant association between constituency
size and poverty rates at the state level (p < .05) but a weaker relationship at the city level (p <
.10). Alternative model runs tightened the analysis and yielded even stronger relationships. To
more directly control for the disproportionate amount of African-Americans in poverty, the
control variable for southern geographic region was replaced with a measure for the
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percentage of the population that is African-American. At the state level, this adjustment did
not change the relationship between constituency size and poverty rates; however, it did result
in a significant association between the percentage of legislature seats held by females and
poverty rates (p < .05). At the city level, dropping the South dummy variable and adding a
control for African-American populations resulted in a coefficient that satisfied conventional
standards for statistical significance between constituency size and poverty (p < .05).
For the alternative models, at the state level, an increase of 100,000 constituents per
representative was related to a 0.5% increase in poverty rates. In the 274 cities studied here,
the percentage of citizens living in poverty was predicted to increase by 2.0% for every
100,000 increase in constituents per representative.
Overall, the findings presented in Chapter Three through Chapter Six suggest
measurable challenges to representation and responsiveness emerge when political
constituencies grow too large. These finding were supported by strong theoretical
expectations. The next section looks to combine the individual theories offered in the
preceding analyses into a more comprehensive theoretic picture. Put differently, this
concluding chapter will now turn to combining the varied and sundry theoretical claims and
empirical findings in a manner that will produce an all-inclusive portrayal of the effect
legislature size has on societal outcomes.
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Toward an Inclusive Theory of Legislature Size
The claim being made throughout this dissertation is that fewer constituents per
legislator yields a better representational experience. Representational congruence (Erikson
1978; Eulau and Karps 1977; Miller and Stokes 1963), demographic similarity between
legislators and citizens (Casellas 2009; Forest 2005; Ladewig 2005; Schraufnagel and
Halperin 2006), and the representative-constituent relationship (Davidson 1969) could all
improve with smaller constituencies. More specifically, a relatively larger legislature should
be more heterogeneous and articulate an enhanced capacity to respond to societal needs than a
smaller assembly, on average. As reported earlier, this dissertation has uncovered
considerable evidence to support these claims.
To further elucidate these findings, Figure 3 outlines a comprehensive theory tying the
size of legislatures to social outcomes. Much of this has been implied throughout the
dissertation, but the current effort is an attempt to put all the pieces in place. Moving left to
right, a larger legislature—relative to the population it is charged with representing—will be
more demographically congruent than a relatively smaller assembly, on average. The link
between legislature size and descriptive representation is supported by others (e.g., Alozie and
Manganaro 1993; Preuhs 2007) and this dissertation has unearthed considerable additional
support, particularly for non-Whites and Latino/as. Improved descriptive representation
results in a transition from passive to active representation (i.e., standing for versus acting

Figure 3: Inclusive theory of legislature size.
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for).1 Philosophical (e.g., Mansbridge 1999) and empirical (e.g., Swers 2005) arguments have
been articulated to support the bond between descriptive and substantive representation. Then
it is through substantive representation that legislators become responsive to constituent
demands and broader societal needs. Legislative responsiveness contributes to improved
societal outcomes, the end result of this theoretical model. This dissertation finds robust
support for this claim in the education arena2 and the socio-economic well-being of state and
city residents.3 What this dissertation does not scrutinize is the actual activities that occur as a
result of active representation. These links in the theoretical chain are identified in Figure 3 as
Agenda Setting, Policy Creation, and Targeted Spending.4 Attention now turns to a discussion
of these theoretical links; case study analyses that examine actual polices created will need to
be reserved for future research.

Agenda Setting
Agenda setting is a vital component of any political process (Bachrach and Baratz
1962). The relevance of agenda setting comes from the ability to influence policy preferences
and outcomes by modifying the range of potential solutions (Bratton and Haynie 1999).
Agenda setting requires strong support for, awareness of, and expertise in the policy area of
interest (Tamerius 1995). John Kingdon’s (1984) influential work on the U.S. Congress states

1

See Pitkin (1967) for more on passive versus active representation.
Constituents per state representative is positively correlated with the percentage of the population over 25 years
old without a high school diploma (p < .001) and constituents per city councilmember is also associated with this
measure of educational attainment (p < .001).
3
Alternative models testing the association between constituency size and the percentage of the population
living below the poverty line can be found in Tables 24 and 25. A significant statistical relationship was
uncovered at both the state and city levels of analysis (p < .05).
4
Agenda Setting and Policy Creation and Targeted Spending are purposefully included in uncolored circles to
indicate they are not included in the empirical tests found in this dissertation.
2
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that public policy agenda items derive from a variety of sources such as the president,
Congress, bureaucrats, media, political parties, interest groups, and the citizenry, and
importantly, he outlines the ways in which the policy agenda can be altered:
The inexorable march of problems pressing in on the system…a process of gradual
accumulation of knowledge and perspectives among the specialists in a given policy
area, and the generation of policy proposals by such specialists…[and] swings of
national mood, vagaries of public opinion, election results, changes of administration,
and turnover in Congress all may have powerful effects. (Kingdon 1984, 16–17)
Stated differently, agendas can be affected by “problem recognition, generation of policy
proposals, and political events” (Kingdon 1984, 18).
Each of these factors could help explain why a legislator from a traditionally
underrepresented group might be able to affect the legislative agenda. Certain events or
problems may not be noticed by a White, male councilmember but may be easily recognized
and extremely important to a Latina assemblywoman. Recognition of what is and is not a
problem is subjective, and introducing diversity into a legislature has the potential to increase
the likelihood of more inclusive problem recognition. Likewise, a diverse legislature
conceivably possesses a broader range of expertise, knowledge, and skill than does a more
homogeneous assembly. The diverse legislature has enhanced capacity for addressing a wider
range of public policy areas, partially due to a built-in variety of perspectives and knowledge
bases. For example, African-Americans are frequently regarded by other legislators as experts
on civil rights and women are typically viewed as experts on matters of gender equality
(Bratton and Haynie 1999). Finally, Kingdon says that political events can alter the policy
agenda. To be sure, this is where “female issues” and “Black issues” come in to play. If an
election shifts a hypothetical council of ten seats held entirely by Caucasian males to a council
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where eight of those seats are held by African-Americans, it is likely that the public policy
agenda will include some different items than before that election took place. We will return
to a discussion of policy preferences momentarily.
Importantly, some argue that racial minorities and women are marginalized as
members of legislative institutions (Reingold and Smith 2014; Sullivan 2000). Placement on
less prestigious committees, blocked from assuming leadership positions, and discrimination
can all contribute to the marginalization of certain elected representatives (Bratton 2002;
Kerevel and Atkeson 2013). This means that cooperation and coalition building are vitally
important for representatives from these groups to get policy items on the legislative agenda.
Sometimes these actions are not enough, especially in light of considerations such as the
power of the majority party, which “acts as a structuring coalition, stacking the deck in its
own favor—both on the floor and in committee—so as to create a kind of ‘legislative cartel’
that dominates the legislative agenda” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 251). Yet, there is plenty
of evidence to suggest that coalitions are quite important to shaping key features of legislative
organization and action (Schickler and Rich 1997).
Also worth mentioning is that agenda setting at the subnational level may be
considered differently than in the national Congress. For instance, governors are often highly
influential in setting the state legislative agenda. Indeed, “the governor is better able than any
of the other actors to place items on the agenda for governmental action” (Ferguson 2006,
n.p.). This results from a governor’s formal powers and the responsibilities of governorship
laid out in state constitutions. The governor’s agenda typically includes the major issues
facing the state and legislators often rely on the priorities set forth in the governor’s agenda to
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establish their broad legislative outline for the year. In contemporary America, “the governor
is the key agenda setter in the state” (Ferguson 2006, n.p.). At the city level, agendas are set in
a variety of ways. Often there is an agenda setting meeting that is attended by all
councilmembers and members of the public (e.g., City of Las Cruces 2015). Other
municipalities have an agenda setting committee that drives what items will receive the
council’s attention and vote (City of Berkeley 2015). Still other cities rely on a strategic plan
and/or previously established goals to guide their council agendas (City of North Liberty
2015; Gabris 1989, 1992).
Despite these differences between units of legislative analysis, the fundamental point
is that agenda setting dictates legislative action. Stated another way, this is a vital stage in the
legislative process that establishes the direction of public policy. The theoretical model put
forth in Figure 3 suggests that the transition from passive to active representation results in
responsiveness in the form of increased capacity for minority and female legislators to
influence the agenda. At the risk of belaboring the point, this has been shown empirically:
Our research tells us that black and female representatives do indeed pursue distinctive
legislative policies, and that these two groups lend each other support. It is possible
that, in the absence of black and women representatives, white male legislators would
step into the gap and articulate the interests of blacks and women. However, our
research demonstrates that if blacks and women are present in the legislature, it is they
who pursue these interests. At the agenda-setting stage of the legislative process, they
represent blacks and women in ways that white males do not. (Bratton and Haynie
1999, 672)
In representative assemblies—with more diversity that reflects the population—there is
enhanced potential for substantive representation to occur via the inclusion of agenda items
that are priorities to traditionally marginalized populations. Importantly, this research has
shown this is more likely to occur in larger legislatures.
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Policy Creation and Targeted Spending
Setting the agenda determines the direction of public policy by defining and redefining
what items are voted on (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). But, why would a larger, more
heterogeneous legislature introduce different policies than a smaller, more homogeneous
assembly? The following briefly identifies some of the unique policy interest areas of
historically underrepresented groups.
Research efforts generally conclude that legislators from underrepresented populations
such as African-Americans and women do make a difference in policymaking (Miller 1990;
Thomas 1991; Thomas and Welch 1991). These representatives may be more likely to
introduce and/or support public policy in certain issue areas. For example, African-Americans
may focus more on social welfare and civil rights issues (Miller 1990; Nelson 1991). Women
also focus on social welfare, as well as policy to support education (Dolan and Ford 1997;
Thomas and Welch 1991). Moreover, researchers find, compared with men, women
legislators’ priorities include health care and children and family issues while focusing less on
business and economic legislation (Thomas and Welch 1991).5 Latino/a legislators can be
considered similar to African-Americans and females, with policy interests focused on health,
education and social welfare (Wilson 2010); however, Latino/a representatives also tend to
support policies on bilingual education and immigration (Bratton 2006). The focus on
educational opportunity is of particular importance as it relates to this research.

5

It should be noted that female legislators are emphasizing legislation on business and commerce more than in
the past, which is likely due to the in-roads women have made in legislative committee placement (Dolan and
Ford 1997).

166
More generally, in mass publics, women, African-Americans and Latino/as have
unique health concerns (Flores 1995; King et al. 2000) and are more likely to encounter
poverty and employment discrimination (Hacker 1992; Massey and Denton 1993). In terms of
public opinion, women are more liberal, more likely to support social programs, more likely
to vote Democratic, and more likely to oppose military action than men (Shapiro and Mahajan
1986). African-Americans are less favorable of the death penalty, more supportive of
affirmative action, and overwhelmingly identify as Democratic (Welch and Foster 1987).
Latino/a publics tend to favor affirmative action, almost entirely support bilingual services,
and approve of amnesty for undocumented immigrants as well as activist political activity;
they are less supportive of the police and tend to oppose the death penalty (Leal 2004).
These opinions may be shared by representatives and there may be pressure to
represent these constituent interests (Minta 2011). Regardless, what matters here is that,
unsurprisingly, certain issues are more important to some groups than others. This lends
further support to the theoretical model presented in Figure 3 because improved demographic
congruence between the public and representatives can theoretically result in a tighter
alignment of policy interests. Once the agenda has been set, the goal is to enact policies that
yield positive societal outcomes. The allocation of funding to these issue areas is another
component of the process.
Briefly, there is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that larger legislatures are
associated with more spending (Baqir 2002; Bradbury and Stephenson 2003; Gilligan and
Matsusaka 1995, 2001; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). However, it is noted that
bicameralism dampens the strength of the relationship (Bradbury and Crain 2001; Primo
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2006). Others note, specifically, that a larger upper chamber is the culprit in terms of spending
(Chen and Malhotra 2007). Overall, the consensus is that larger legislatures produce
legislators more inclined to parochial motives and spending for their constituents, the type of
spending that theoretically may advance educational attainment and relieve socioeconomic
hardship.
Based on this, it may be no surprise that Figure 3—which begins with an increase in
legislature size—also includes a link for funding. What is most essential to clarify, however,
is that some of this spending be targeted to the prioritized policy arenas that will advance
issues of importance for marginalized constituents. This dissertation investigated education
and poverty, domains of interest for African-Americans, Latino/as, and women. There is
ample room for more research in other policy spheres and, more broadly, on representation
and responsiveness in America.

Future Research
This dissertation has helped identify some areas that are ripe for further research. Most
specifically, case study research focused on agenda setting, policy advancement, and spending
by legislatures of varying sizes and with different levels of diversity would be useful to better
understand if the theory of legislature size discussed previously needs to be amended. There is
also opportunity to shift the unit of analysis from the institution to the individual. Through
observing and interviewing individual representatives, we may gain a more complete
understanding of how the institutional characteristics of size and overall homogeneity
influence individual action. Studying individual representatives also allows insight into their
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involvement in majority coalitions, their agenda-setting ability, and their policy and spending
preferences.
Much of this dissertation focuses on the importance of descriptive representation, but,
as Suzanne Dovi (2002) advocated almost 15 years ago, the time has come to move beyond
base analyses of descriptive representation. Dovi notes that so much of the literature focuses
on the need for descriptive representation to occur, rather than on what criteria should be used
to identify “preferable descriptive representatives” (2002, 729). She suggests the discussion
should shift from political institutions ought to have descriptive representatives to descriptive
representatives ought to have certain qualities. Moreover, Dovi argues that some descriptive
representations are preferable to others, just like any other candidate. Stated bluntly, we
should have quality and competent descriptive representatives (Dovi 2002, 2007). More
research is needed to understand common traits, skills, abilities, and policy preferences of
descriptive representatives. Dovi argues that preferable descriptive representatives are
selected based on their “mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups” (2002, 730).
Additional criteria should be identified in an effort to move beyond a commitment to a
“politics of presence” (Burrell 1994; Phillips 1995) and toward a politics of presence and
responsiveness.
More generally, representation in the United States is evolving, which has created
exciting research opportunities. Jane Mansbridge (2003, 2011) and Andrew Rehfeld (2009),
argue for new models of representation that move beyond the narrowness of the
trustee/delegate problem and expand the scope to include representative elements outside of
government. According to Mansbridge (2011), “In a broader understanding of the larger
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representative system, each citizen is represented throughout the system by nonelected,
nonlegislative representatives in parties, interest groups, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), the media, and the citizenry, with varying degrees of formal and informal
accountability” (628). The study of representation by NGOs/nonprofit organizations is of
particular interest when considering the representation of marginalized populations.
Traditionally underrepresented populations frequently lack access to political
participation. Nonprofit organizations, through advocacy roles (Boris and Krehely 2002;
Johansen and LeRoux 2013), work to elevate the plight of those in need and connect them
with needed services. Stated another way, “nonprofit associations form a vital feedback link
between people and their government…The civil society paradigm prompts inquiry about
who has access to the political process” (Boris and Mosher-Williams 1998, 490). It seems this
linking role is particularly important for specific population groups. Influential work by
political scientists suggests there is a participation gap in America and disadvantaged groups
are less likely than others to have their voices heard in the public policy process due to a lack
of opportunities, motivations, and resources (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).
Community-based nonprofit organizations and churches, as a result, are considered vitally
important to the participation of disadvantaged people (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).
Although this literature is in its infancy when compared to the work that has taken place on
representation by legislatures, considering all forms of representation—not just
governmental—is vital to developing a clear, comprehensive understanding of contemporary
representation in the United States (see also Saward 2010).
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Final Word
In the final analysis, this dissertation finds that racial minorities and women are
underrepresented by state legislatures and city councils. Furthermore, larger legislatures are
more descriptively representative than their smaller counterparts, especially as it relates to
non-Whites and Latino/as, all else being equal. Plus, we know that as constituency sizes
balloon, better education outcomes suffer and poverty rates increase, on average. The totality
of the findings in this study indicate that real-world negative implications result when
constituencies grow too large. Yet, these implications find little traction among most
politicians, pundits, and economists who readily point to the financial costs of bigger payrolls
in larger legislatures. It is not difficult to imagine that the marginal increase in salaries would
easily be offset by a more educated and economically stable population capable of working in
ways to advance the health of the broader society. Still more, the message has not reached
most members of the public, many of whom give very little thought to the size of political
institutions and notions of representation and responsiveness.
Population growth in the United States shows no signs of slowing and will almost
certainly become increasingly diverse. With no change in legislature size, the representational
experience in America will decline along with the capacity of our political system to respond
to articulated demands from constituents and the unarticulated needs of the mass public. The
antiquated financial arguments levied against increased legislature size need to be contested
by scholars who are willing to use the fifty states and thousands of municipalities across the
United States as laboratories for testing hypotheses and shedding light on the implications for
representation and responsiveness if no action is taken. At a minimum, when questioning if
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we can afford the price tag of larger legislative assemblies, we must remember to also ask if
we can accept the measurable outcomes associated with unrepresentative and unresponsive
legislatures.
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